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Abstract 
This thesis considers the issues involved in the design and 
implementation of a filing system for a large open inhomogeneous 
computer network. The filing system proposed is implemented on a 
number of file servers, that is, computers attached to the network 
specifically for this purpose. The view as seen by other client 
computers on the network is of a single coherent filing system, 
even though for efficiency and reliability the individual file 
servers are largely autonomous. 	The facilities and guarantees 
available do not vary with the location of files, so that sharing 
of remote files is easy. in particular, there is a single scheme 
for textnaming files which is almost completely free of 
restrictions. There is also a network wide security scheme for 
permitting and preventing access to files by other users and 
programs. 
The most important guarantee given by the filing system is that 
of consistency. 	Irrespective of concurrent access by other 
clients, and of crashes of either servers or clients, consistency 
of files is preserved. Old versions of all files, not just those 
which are completely rewritten, are retained for a time so that 
consistent views of the past are available. 	This permits a 
consistent backup snapshot to be taken of part of the filing system 
whilst it is active. 	Consistency is preserved by atomic 
transactions, and a commitment scheme is developed which is faster 
and more suited than most others to an ordinary filing system. 
FA 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Before considering in detail the issues in the design and 
implementation of a network filing system, it is necessary to have 
a working definrr.\tion of the term. 
* A network filing system is a filing system implemented by a 
number (perhaps only one) of computers which are accessed by 
other computers over a communication network. 
Almost any preconceptions about what is meant by a filing system 
and what is meant by a network will suffice until the definitions 
are refined. Perhaps the most ubiquitous examples of each are the 
Unix filing system [RIT74] and the Ethernet [MET761. An important 
word in the definition is the "a"; a network filing system is a 
single coherent filing system and not a group of filing systems all 
accessible over the same network. 
Many of the loose terms used in describing systems have been 
seized by manufacturers who have used them as precise technical 
terms in the description of their own products. 	In case these 
terms produce confusion, some of them are defined below. 
The computers implementing the network filing system will be 
called "file servers". The computers accessing the network filing 
system will be called "clients". These client machines may have 
their own filing systems or just a small disc used as a cache (or, 
perhaps, bubble memory or something similar). Such discs are not 
necessarily part of the network filing system and will be called 
"local" discs,. 	Note that a client is a computer, or a program 
running on a computer. When the distinction is important, people 
using client machines (and programs) will be called "users". The 
term "site" will be used to mean either a server or,a client. 
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A filing system which runs in the same computer as its host 
operating system will be called a "coresident" filing system. It 
is not out of the question that a coresident filing system should 
also be accessible over a network as part of a network filing 
system. 
There are a number of reasons why client computers or server 
computers may stop running. 	Obvious reasons are power failure, 
hardware failure or a software detected fatal error. 	Such 
stoppages will be called "crashes". 
The filing system stores files somewhere. 	This storage is 
called "stable" since it is non-volatile and survives even when the 
file server processor is turned off.. At present, this is almost 
certainly magnetic disc but write-once laser optical discs or 
bubble memory may become attractive in the future. 	Independent, 
and perhaps removable, units of stable storage will be called 
"volumes". A stable storage volume is thus a magnetic disc pack, 
although it could be other things in the future. 
Most filing systems name files in some way. If these names are 
character strings then they will be called "textnames". Normally 
these textnames will be bound to some internal file identification, 
probably a number; this will be called the "internal name" 
(occasionally, "internal filename") for the file. If this internal 
name is meaningful outside of the network filing system, perhaps as 
a sort of capability for the file, then it may also be called a 
"token" for the file. 	The unqualified term filename will be 
avoided as being confusing. However, the words like "naming" and 
"nameable" will be used in a general sense covering both types of 
name. 
Many filing systems allow users to permit and bar other users 
access to their files. This will be called a scheme of "security". 
Note that security has nothing to do with preserving files in the 
face of crashes but rather with protecting the data they contain 
against unauthorized access. 
Guaranteeing that a crash will not wreck the filing system, 
often called file integrity, will be called "consistency". 	File 
integrity, in the sense of no overlapping files and so on, is but a 
part of a wider notion which encompasses the integrity of data in 
files and agreement between the data in files and other data 
outside of the filing system. 
Why have a network filing system? 
The motivations for having a network filing system are closely 
bound up with the motivations for having a network in the first 
place. In fact, if the existence of the network is taken for 
granted then it is difficult to find convincing reasons for not 
having some form of network filing system. 
The motivations for having a network are twofold. 	Firstly, 
adding communications equipment to existing systems gives easier 
transfer,of data from system to system. 	Secondly, constructing 
decentralized systems gives a new, and perhaps better, way of 
performing computation. 	Furthermore, using a network of small 
computers significantly reduces the cost of entry to having a 
computer system, and the cost of upgrading an existing computer 
system. It short, the approach is generally more flexible. 
In the past, computing has been done on large central computers. 
If the sites where computational power was required were remote 
from the central computer then communication lines were used to 
connect terminals to the central computer. If the terminals were 
within the boundary of the institution owning the computer then 
these communication lines were normally dedicated wires run around 
the site. If the terminals were more remote then a combination of 
economics and, especially, the monopoly of most countries' 
telecommunication carriers forced the use of the telephone network. 
This mode of computing had a number of underlying assumptions. 
Firstly, since most terminals (for example, teletypes) were slow 
then it followed that high bandwidth communication was unnecessary. 
Secondly, it assumed that computers were very expensive and had to 
be shared. 	Thirdly, it assumed that appropriate bandwidth 
communication equipment was relatively cheap (compared to 
computers). All three of these assumptions are much less valid 
today. 
Visual display units have replaced most printing terminals. The 
bandwidth provided by the telephone network is insufficient to 
drive such displays at acceptable speeds for the kind of tasks now 
needed and even that provided by dedicated lines is not as great as 
the bandwidth at which users can extract information. 	It is at 
least an order of magnitude faster to skim through a (paper) book 
to find something, than to look at pages of the book on a display 
drawing at 1000 characters per second. when any sort of graphics 
is considered, for preparation of text for a photo-typesetter or 
for design of VLSI circuits, it is apparent that existing bandwidth 
between a central computer and a terminal is woefully inadequate. 
Even developing programs benefits from high bandwidth graphics 
[TE1773. The first solution was to put limited computational power 
into the terminal. For example, editing text could be done without 
much recourse to the central computer; it thus had better response 
and, often, better bandwidth to the display. Graphics was done by 
running a suitable graphics protocol in a small satellite computer 
with the computational work being done on a much larger central 
computer. 
The tenet that computers are very expensive is found wanting. 
Moderately sized computers have become very cheap and are still 
becoming cheaper (state-of-the-art machines are expensive and will 
always be so; what is commonplace and cheap today was 
state-of-the-art and expensive yesterday). Computational power is 
now cheaper bought in the form of a lot of small machines than one 
big one. Unfortunately, connecting hundreds of small computers to 
get the power of a very large one has proved elusive. 	What has 
happened though, is that a single cheap computer can provide most 
of the needs of a single user. This leads to a connection topology 
which is all too easy to understand; the cheap computers are not 
connected at all. 	Since there is no longer a central filing 
system, each cheap computer is provided with a cheap disc. 
Eventually, some point to point communications equipment may be 
added. However, this is not an integral part of the system, but 
rather a route for two computers to transfer data. 
The third tenet, that communications were relatively cheap has 
changed. The first reason is that processors have become cheap 
making communications relatively more expensive even without any 
other considerations. The second reason that communications have 
become more expensive is that higher bandwidth is now expected to 
be delivered to end-users and bandwidth is not obtained cheaply. 
However, over a small area, high-bandwidth (1-50 megabits per 
second) networks are acceptably cheap. 	Such networks use a very 
cheap transmission medium, wire or a fibre-optic light-pipe, rather 
than interposing a lot of expensive equipment between sites 
[MET76,W1L79). The cost of the network is just the cost of the 
interfaces at each site. 
Communications have also been added to existing large systems to 
connect them up. The most well known of these is Arpanet LMCQ771 
but most manufacturers of large systems have a proprietary network 
offering similar facilities LWEC60,CtP781. 	Connecting existing 
multi-user systems in this way perpetutates a mainly centralised 
mode of computing. Most work is done in the traditional way on a 
time-sharing system accessed through fairly unintelligent 
terminals. Files (and usually other resources) are available over 
the network, usually by specifying a host computer name. 	The 
filing systems of all the hosts taken as a whole form a sort of 
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network filing system, but it turns out to lack many desirable 
facilities. Only in the area of file textnaming is there any kind 
of coherence at all. 
The mode of computing in which all these factors have really 
come together is the local area model of computing. Each user has 
a small personal computer. Sometimes these personal computers are 
allocated from a pool as required but they are not otherwise 
shared. This personal computer is of sufficient power to fulfil 
most of the computational needs of the user. 	Due to cost or 
inconvenience, 	other 	services 	are 	provided 	centrally. 
Line-printers are expensive, used only occasionally and most people 
would not want one in their office anyway. 	Such services are 
accessed over a local network. 	One other service which is both 
expensive and inconvenient is a filing system. 	Large capacity 
magnetic disc drives are both costly and noisy, however, this is 
not the main reason for providing such a service centrally. 
Users preserve the state of their work in filing systems. 
Usually, when a user turns on a computer or logs into an ordinary 
time-sharing system, the only preserved state from the last session 
is held in files. If a user is to be able to work on any machine 
then these files must be accessible from anywhere. 	This is 
particularly important for high level language source files which 
may be runnable (after suitable compilation) on a range of machines 
of different characteristics which users may desire. 
Users cooperate and share data. Usually, the only uniform way 
in which this can be done is to share files containing the data. 
This again means' that any file must be accessible from any personal 
computer. 
This can be achieved either by having local discs on each 
personal machine and making them accessible from anywhere, or else 
by having a central filing system accessible from anywhere (or 
possibly a mixture of both). 	The first approach is very 
unattractive. As has already been mentioned, large discs are too 
costly to give each user asufficiently large one, and too noisy to 
go in offices beside the personal computer. however, the biggest 
problem is that a user is free to run any program in a personal 
computer, to crash it, to write experimental operating systems and 
so on. Only in the case that all personal computers run a reliable 
protected unstoppable operating system is it possible to guarantee 
reasonable access to any file from anywhere. This probably only 
happens with large time-sharing systems leading to the centrally 
oriented model of computing already discussed. 
The second approach, where the filing system is provided 
independently, is much better. 	The fact that it is provided 
centrally does not mean that it is provided by a single central 
file server, merely that it does not comprise the personal machines 
of users.. 	As has already been seen, local high bandwidth 
communication is acceptably cheap. Long distance communication at 
the same bandwidth is prohibitively expensive, but if a much lower 
bandwidth is used the cost becomes acceptable. Rooftop satellite 
communication should offer high bandwidth cheap communication, but 
the transit time from sending a message to receiving its reply 
remains long. A large institution thus ends up with a number of 
high bandwidth local networks connected by a much lower bandwidth 
intermediate network, probably rented from the telephone company or 
some other third party. 
Clearly it makes sense to have at least one file server on each 
local network since the communication overhead of accessing a 
remote network is considerable. 	In order to share processor 
cycles, memory bandwidth, channel bandwidth and so on, there are 
even good reasons for having multiple file servers on the same 
network. These servers may cooperate to varying degrees. 	The 
filing system which they present to a user at a personal computer 
is the network filing system. 
Note that the main motivations for having a network filing 
system are not economic but because files are objects which it is 
desirable to share between users and between client machines. The 
economic arguments merely make this sensible. 
Hardware 
Before going on to consider the design of a network filing 
system, it is sensible to examine the hardware to be used to 
implement it in more detail. We have already seen how the change 
in the ratio of the costs of computers and high-bandwidth 
communications has changed the ground rules for doing computing. 
Similarly, details of the performance of the computers comprising 
the system, of the network and of the storage media all impact on 
the design to some extent. 
We assume that the file servers are computers of ordinary power. 
In the future, what constitutes ordinary power will change, but at 
present the fastest single chip (hence suitably cheap) processors 
run at about one million instructions per second, with reasonable 
memory space, say one quarter megabyte. These figures are vague 
since it is only their order of magnitude which is important. it 
would not impact much on the design, merely on the performance, to 
use a 10 mip machine with four megabytes of memory. It is actually 
very difficult to make use of large amounts of memory in a file 
server since, for robustness, it cannot be assumed to be preserved 
over a crash, and hence can only hold transient data en route for 
the stable storage. 
A machine of this speed can cope with the filing system demands 
of many users, but not necessarily of all users on a particular 
network. This fact is likely to remain true as the cost of high 
performance computers continues to drop. Although this means that 
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the performance of the server will improve, the services demanded 
are likely to increase since the performance of the clients will 
likewise have improved. 
We make very few assumptions about client machines. They may be 
single user microcomputers, single user high-performance personal 
computers with virtual memory, ordinary time-sharing systems and so 
on. In particular, we do not assume that they are all the same, 
nor that they all run the same operating system. 	Particularly 
importantly, we do not assume that client machines have local 
discs. In general, we do not assume that the operating system 
which they run is to be trusted although we may relax this for 
systems where the operating system provides as safe and controlled 
an environment as the computers comprising the filing system. In 
this case, which probably only occurs for a large traditional 
time-sharing system, we might implement all or part of a file 
server as a process in the system. 
I 
We assume that the network is inhomogeneous, consisting of a 
number of local networks connected by long haul transport services, 
perhaps using satellite circuits. We will describe a file server 
on the same local network as the client as a local server, and a 
file server on a different local network as a remote server. We 
assume a bandwidth on the local network to be between one and fifty 
megabits per second, with little more than transit delay between 
sending a message and its being received, perhaps 50us. 	On the 
other hand, access to servers on remote networks may vary from 
about lOOus (where the two networks are intimately connected) to 10 
seconds (where the two networks are in different continents) and 
the bandwidth may vary from a hundred kilobits to a few megabits 
per second. 
The network is used by transmitting datagrams, messages of a few 
bytes up to a kilobyte or so which either arrive correctly at their 
destination or are detectably incorrect on arrival. There is no 
restriction on the data part of the datagrams that the client may 
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inject into the network; this non-restriction is very important. 
Sites are distinguished by network addresses, one address for each 
site. We assume that the network is capable of delivering a 
datagram to any accessible network address without the sender 
providing routing information. 	We assume that the network 
addresses in a message are reliable and that it is not possible, 
for example, for a malicious client to masquerade as a file server. 
Thus, although we make no assumptions about the data part of 
datagrams, the control and routing part is assumed to be reliably 
handled by the network hardware. 	We will not be particularly 
concerned with how errors are handled, but merely note that one way 
which is particuarly convenient when the error rate is as low as in 
most local networks is to attempt the operation again if no reply 
is received within a suitable time limit. If the reply was lost 
rather than the initiating command message, then this will result 
in the operation being repeated. We will thus take care to make as 
many operations as possible idempotent; they have the same effect 
applied many times as they do applied once. 
The storage media are magnetic discs or something similar. In 
particular, they could be write-once video discs or large bubble 
memories, or a mixture of all of these. The characteristics that 
are important are that access is not as fast as to main store, say 
10-100ms. We assume that the storage is divided up into fragments 
which we will call pages. Attached to each page are sufficient 
error detection bits that the possibility of reading a bad page 
without the error being detected can be disregarded. 	We assume 
that the pages are small enough that they need not be shared 
between files, say 128 bytes to 4Kbytes. The characteristics so 
far described are just those of modern magnetic disc drives. In 
the foreseeable future things are not likely to change all that 
much. Current very large volume media all have a latency 
associated with the cycling of the storage, either mechanically in 
the case of magnetic and optical discs, or more directly in the 
case of bubble memories. 	Improvements in implementation have 
tended to lead to increased capacity rather than faster access, and 
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this is likely to continue. One change which will probably take 
place is that large page sizes will become more attractive since 
there is an overhead associated with each page. 
A more contentious assumption is that the cost of the storage 
medium is low enough that disc pages are not an incredibly scarce 
resource to be recycled among users at every opportunity. This is 
the exact opposite of the corresponding assumption underlying the 
design of most filing systems today, which seek to reuse pages as 
early as possible. 	If the storage medium is write-once optical 
disc then this assumption is true in two ways. Firstly, a disc may 
hold about 4000 megabytes [LAU80]. Secondly, the pages cannot be 
reused anyway, so it does not matter if they are treated as scarce 
or not. 	In any case, there are currently 600 megabyte discs 
available (and 1200 megabytes on the way). A 600 megabyte disc has 
over one million pages (of 512 bytes) so even a one percent working 
margin is 10000 pages. 
The current cost per bit is minimised for magnetic discs with  
1475 megabyte Winchester drive. This costs just under 14,750 pounds, 
giving a cost of ten pounds per megabyte or a penny per kilobyte. 
riteable optical drives are currently about 80,000 pounds and so 
they are still unacceptably expensive. Even at this price, though, 
the cost per megabyte is only twice that of magnetic discs. Very 
thin film head technology arising out of integrated circuit 
fabrication techniques may push the density of magnetic discs up 
until a 10 platter magnetic disc volume holds the same as a single 
platter laser optical disc. 	Irrespective of which techniques 
become very cheap, it seems likely that the cost per megabyte of 
stable storage is likely to continue to fall. 
The way in which laser optical discs may be used to construct a 
filing system is an open question which will have to await their 
arrival at acceptable cost. One important feature is that although 
disc transports which can write the disc are expensive, read-only 
transports are very cheap due to their development for the domestic 
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entertainment market. At about 400 pounds, a read-only transport 
for thousands of megabytes costs less than the disc pack for a 
100Mb disc drive. An enormous filestore could well be constructed 
with a number of read-only transports and one writing transport. 
Problems 
The main problems associated with the implementation of a 
network filing system stem from two distinct causes. 
Firstly, client machines run operating systems about which 
nothing can be assumed. They may range from well-behaved, through 
unreliable, to deliberately malicious. Further, since the filing 
system has no control of the messages which such a system can send, 
the only reliable identifiers in messages are identifiers issued 
and controlled by the filing system itself, unforgeable identifiers 
such as passwords and capabilities, and identifiers which do not, 
in themselves, convey any privileges, such as file textnames. 
For example, it is not sufficient for a client system to check a 
user's password and then merely tell the filing system that each 
command is on behalf of user "John" 	A malicious user could adapt 
the operating system so that it always says that commands are on 
behalf of "John", or even on behalf of the system manager. Either 
the user must log on to the filing system and receive back a token 
controlled entirely by the filing system, or else the password (or 
a similar token) must be included in each command to the filing 
system. 
However, the designers of client operating systems want to 
present a view of the filing system which best fits the philosophy 
of the rest of the client system. This needs to be done without 
compromising the uniformity of the network filing system. 	Any 
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parts of the implementation which can sensibly be devolved to 
untrusted clients without compromising the safety or the uniformity 
of the network filing system should be so devolved. Furthermore, 
the network filing system should be designed in such a way as to 
maximise the number of such parts. 
The second major problem in the design of a network filing 
system is that we are attempting to create global entities out of 
loosely coupled local implementations. This problem seems to be a 
fundamental one in the design of decentralised systems. Efficiency 
depends on locality but the construction of global abstractions 
conflicts directly with this. 	For example, we will want a 
network-wide file security scheme. let we want to achieve this in 
a way that enables each file server to autonomously decide whether 
or not to allow a file access to proceed. 	This rules out 
centralised user validation, but we would also like to avoid the 
need for every file server to know about every user. 
This thesis refines the statement of theseproblems and proposes 
solutions to them in various •areas. 	The problems are not 
considered directly since they are not soluble directly. 	Rather 
they will crop up repeatedly when considering different areas of 
the design of a network filing system, each different area 
requiring different compromises and so a different solution. 
Solutions require an environment in which their goodness or 
badness can be assessed. This is provided by chapter 2 in which 
criteria are developed to guide and assess the design of a network 
filing system. 
Chapter 3 examines other existing network file servers and 
filing systems in the light of these criteria. The early server 
which we built [DE77] is examined in detail to elucidate the 
lessons learnt from its design and construction. 
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Chapter 4 considers what data transfer primitives are suitable 
for a network filing system. That is, what is meant by the concept 
of a file and how it is transferred between client machine and the 
servers which implement the network filing system. 
Chapter 5 considers the problem of naming of files. 	It 
considers what kind of naming scheme is appropriate for a network 
filing system, and what compromises are necessary to keep the 
implementation tractable. These compromises are mainly concerned 
with increasing the locality of the file servers. 	Location of 
files amongst all the file servers of the filing system is also 
considered in detail. 
Chapter 6 examines the problem of file security. This is mainly 
concerned with the implementation of a security scheme which does 
not depend on central validation, nor on the trustworthiness of 
client systems. 
Chapter 7 develops the notion of consistency and a scheme to 
control it. 	It also considers the problem of how to handle 
multiple versions of files. 	The problem exists in coresident 
filing systems and in single server network filing systems, but to 
an extent problems can be minimised by judicious implementation 
tricks. In a multiple server filing system, consistency has to be 
controlled properly. 	Happily, this turns out to be acceptably 
cheap. 
Chapter 8 looks at how local discs on client machines can be 
used to improve performance. Unfortunately, since client systems 
cannot be trusted, these discs cannot be used to hold the current 
copy of any file (the client may choose not to give it back when it 
is required elsewhere). The nature of the files which can sensibly 
be cached at clients is considered in detail. 
16 
Chapter 9 describes in detail an implementation of the more 
contentious ideas of the preceding chapters. This centres mainly 
on the control of consistency, which is the most difficult area to 
implement. Given this control, the implementation of the other 
areas is relatively straightforward. 
Lastly, chapter 10 reviews all the earlier chapters. 	It 
assesses how well our original design criteria have been satisfied 
by the solutions proposed. 	Finally, it considers where the 
solutions are unsatisfactory and where further research is 
required. 
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Chapter 2: Criteria for a Network Filing System 
In any design it is necessary to have criteria by which to judge 
the goodness or badness of the design, a sort of shopping list of 
desirable features and, perhaps, a list of horrors to be avoided. 
Inevitably, some of these features will conflict and a final design 
will be a compromise. 
The first, and most important, criterion is that the network 
filing system is a filing system. Different programming languages 
and their run-time systems, different operating system and 
different users have various views about what consititutes a filing 
system. Nevertheless, these views have much in common. A filing 
system implements an abstraction called a file which is a 
repository for data. 	Files may be read and written (perhaps by 
mapping them into virtual memory). 	The filing system is 
responsible for the administration of the storage space required to 
preserve files, and for the order in which competing reads and 
writes are scheduled to the storage medium. 	The physical 
characteristics of the medium are hidden from the user, except in 
terms of performance. 	The filing system provides a means of 
textnaming files with character strings. We will use the filing 
system of Unix [R1T71 ,THO78,RIT78] as an example filing system 
since it is widely known and information about it is readily 
accessible. Other filing systems would do equally well. 
The important factor is that the details of the implementation 
of the abstraction of a file are hidden from users of the filing 
system. This is in contrast, for example, to a database system 
where the division of a magnetic disc into cylinders might be 
central to the placement strategy of the database manager; there 
the abstraction is not hidden. 	It is also in contrast to very 
early filing systems in which the user had to specify the physical 
layout of the file, perhaps even to the level of the actual disc 
addresses. Further, the abstraction of a file textname hides the 
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location of a file from users. 
e certainly want to support all notions of files visible in 
high-level programming languages such as Pascal, Fortran or 
A1go168. This gives us our first criterion: 
* The existence of a network filing system has no implications 
for application programs. 	A program written in a high-level 
language will run on an operating system using the network 
filing system in the same way that it runs on a traditional 
operating system with a coresident filing system. 
This does not mean that there are no implications for operating 
systems or for programs on, the borderline such as command line 
interpreters. It merely means that it is possible for operating 
systems and, perhaps, the command line interpreter to provide an 
environment in which application programs can run. 	The 
implementation of such operating systems may require additional 
primitives to those of a coresident operating system communicating 
with its filing system. Some of these additional primitives may be 
desirable but more easily avoidable when the filing system is 
coresident. For example, a coresident filing system is restarted 
when its. host operating system crashes; a server in a network file 
does not (and nor does a client operating system if a server 
should crash). This means that extra commands will be required to 
allow clients to communicate to the network filing system the fact 
that they have recovered from a crash. 
The second criterion for the design is that the filing system 
should be efficient. The efficiency of the filing system dominates 
many activities which users carry out. 	A computationally heavy 
operation such as compiling a program is dominated by the time 
taken to load the code of the compiler, read the source file and 
write the output file. On most systems, a source program has to be 
longer than about 100 lines before the compilation time is not 
dominated by the time taken to load the code of the compiler. Much 
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file activity is of this nature, so it is no good providing elegant 
features at the cost of the efficiency of basic operations such as 
reading a file. 
One particular consideration of this sort is that we do not want 
the efficiency of using a local server to be impaired by the fact 
that we may access files on a remote file server. 	We naturally 
expect a performance degradation when we do access remote files. 
This is analogous to our expectations with telephones. We do not 
expect 	the fact that we can direct-dial international calls to 
affect the speed with which local calls are connected; 
correspondingly, if we do make an international call we do not 
expect it to be connected at the same speed as a local call. 
Summarising these efficiency considerations gives us our second 
design criterion: 
* The network filing system should provide similar performance 
to a coresident filing system, at least when accessing a local 
server. The existence of other servers in the network filing 
system should not degrade local performance. 
So far our criteria have insisted on an efficient filing system 
without any implications for how the different servers should 
cooperate together. We want the different servers to work together 
to implement a single filing system. It is not sufficient for each 
server to implement an independent filing system, with some escape 
from the naming convention to nominate a file on another server. 
Our servers are more tightly coupled than this. 
One key implication of this is that there should only be one 
textnaming scheme for files. The name of a file should not depend 
on the location of either the file or of the client attempting to 
access it. It should not normally be necessary to specify (or even 
know) the location of a file. Occasionally this specification may 
be necessary to create files at specific sites - on a removable 
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storage volume, for example. 
The other major implication is that there should be a uniform 
scheme for permitting and restricting access to files by other 
users and programs. This is bound up, to some extent, with how 
access is controlled in the network to other objects which may be 
protected; network addresses or vector processors, for example. 
Another implication is that the guarantees and facilities 
available should not depend on the location of files (again, the 
performance may). Since it is not normally necessary to know these 
locations, it would be an anomaly for their treatment to vary from 
server to server. 
Furthermore, we do not want to restrict the facilities which we 
provide in order to make it easy to satisfy this criterion. The 
network filing system should offer similar facilities to those 
obtainable from other good filing systems. 	It should be 
state-of-the-art. 
- This requirement for divorcing the abstraction of a file from 
its location leads to our next requirement: 
* The servers of the network filing system cooperate together to 
give the illusion of a single coherent filing system. 	The 
guarantees and facilities provided do not vary with the location 
of files. It is not normally necessary to know the location of 
a file in order to access it. The facilities provided by the 
filing system are not restricted to make this criterion easy to 
satisfy. 
Our next criterion works against the previous one in a direct 
way. Although we want the illusion of a single coherent network 
filing system, we want to achieve it without losing too much 
locality. In particular, we should avoid any sort of centralised 
manager. Apart from obvious reliability issues, a centralized 
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remote server than of the time to access a local server; the bulk 
of the time for a remote access will be network delay. 
So far we have assumed nothing about the client machines. That 
we do not is important if the network filing system is not to be 
unusable by small machines or too restrictive for large ones. We 
cannot assume that client machines all have their own local discs 
but it is unreasonable to assume that they definitely will not; 
they may or may not have local copies of some files. 	We cannot 
assume that clients have any form of virtual memory but it is 
unreasonable to assume that they do not; they may or may not map 
files as virtual memory segments. We cannot assume that they are 
or are not very powerful computers and so on. Clearly we need some 
assumptions, that they have a network connection for example, but 
these have to be a sort of lowest common denominator of the 
computers which may be used as clients. 
Further, we do not want to make assumptions about the messages 
which a client may send. Local area networks tend to be open, in 
the sense that any computer on the network can inject any message 
into the network. whether the receiving site chooses to respond to 
the message or ignore it depends on agreement between sender and 
receiver. Whether the two parties trust each other requires more 
than agreement. 	A client can trust a file server since it is 
assumed to be impossible to run other than the ordinary file server 
program in the file server machine. Sending a password to a file 
server is thus safe, since it is assumed to be impossible to 
substitute a password collecting program for the file server 
program. However, the server cannot trust the client since no such 
dual assumption is reasonable. 	This is very similar to the 
relationship between an ordinary operating system and a programming 
language run-time system. The operating system cannot trust the 
run-time system since, although it is probably reliable, it is 
under the direct control of the user who could choose to amend it. 
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The requirement that we do not assume that the clients have vast 
resources, nor that we assume that they do not have such resources 
leads to our next criterion: 
* The design of the network filing system should make no 
assumptions about client machines. In particular, no assumption 
is made •about whether or not they possess such facilities as 
local discs, virtual memory, large amounts of real memory and so 
on. No assumptions are made about the security or reliability 
of operating systems running in client machines. No assumptions 
are made about the validity of data contained in messages from 
clients. 
Finally, we want to avoid the servers of the network filing 
system doing all the work whilst the client machines wait idly. 
The servers are shared resources and there are few of them, 
compared to the clients which are unshared and comparatively 
numerous. However, we do not want to do this distribution at the 
cost of having to trust untrustworthy client, systems. This means 
that sometimes work has to be done in the server rather than in the 
client. Deleting a file has to be done at the server; providing 
nicely formatted file directory listings does not. when there are 
no compelling reasons to do a task in the server then it should be 
done in client machines (or, perhaps, in a separate server provided 
for the purpose). 	Summarising this criterion for maximising 
functional distribution: 
* As much function as possible should be devolved from file 
server to client machines; the file servers should not provide 
services which could be provided elsewhere without compromising 
security or consistency. 
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The criteria which have been developed can be briefly summarised 
as follows: 
No implications for application programs; 
Access to a local server is efficient; 
A single coherent state-of-the-art filing system; 
High autonomy of each server; 
No assumptions about client machines or systems; 
High functional distribution to untrusted clients. 
All the criteria seem to be necessary, since removal of any one 
of them permits implementations with undesirable features. 	They 
are certainly not sufficient on their own (which would imply that 
only one filing system could satisfy them all). 	Other minor 
criteria will be discussed when choices between alternatives need 
to be made. 
With suitable alteration of the third criterion, the criteria 
form a basis for assessment of the design of a wide range of 
services which might be provided by a network based operating 
system. They are not tuned to present a particular type of network 
filing system favourably, but rather they 'outline how servers 
should be constructed in the environment of a large open network. 
These criteria taken together outline the network filing system. 
Locally efficient servers implement a single filing system with 
global facilities. This is used by client systems which are not 
trusted by the file servers but which are, nevertheless, expected 
to play their part in implementing the view of the network filing 
system seen by application programs and users at terminals. 
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The problem areas 
These design criteria lead to a number of problems in different 
areas of the design. Quite a few of these arise directly from the 
fact that we are dealing with a distributed solution, both because 
the filing system is devolved from the client and because the 
filing system is itself distributed amongst a number of servers. 
These problems will be elucidated briefly before considering each 
area in detail in the following chapters. 
Part of the last criterion, that clients are not trustworthy, 
means that a network filing system is different from a coresident 
filing system. 	Most coresident filing systems trust their 
operating system. For example, a filing system may provide the 
capability to mark a file of code as being executable but not 
otherwise readable; it then trusts the operating system to tell it 
whether the code is to be read by some form of loader or by another 
program (perhaps an unassembler or a copy program). 	A network 
filing system cannot trust client operating systems in this way 
since it would be relatively easywrite a program for a personal 
machine which masqueraded as an operating system loading the code. 
The requirement for efficiency means that the primitives used to 
transfer the data in files are important. After all, reading some 
data from a file is likely to be the most common operation which 
the filing system will be called upon to perform. The requirement 
for devolving functionality conflicts with attempting to provide a 
large number of sophisticated primitives. Clients can themselves 
find the next newline character or unblock logical records. 
However, the desire for a single coherent filing system means that 
we want the data to represent the same information on all systems. 
A file of text is something every system supports, yet its 
representation in terms of bytes within a file may vary. 	This 
problem is considered in detail in chapter 4. 
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The criterion for a single filing system leads to a single 
textname space for naming files. If no restriction is placed on 
naming then it is very difficult to decide when a file is no longer 
named and so no longer required. If too much restriction is placed 
on naming then the demands of some operating systems may be 
unsatisfiable. Further,.we have to be able to locate a file given 
its textname. We do not want to force the textname to contain the 
site at which the file is to be found so this is not trivial. 
Normally it will be found locally, but a strategy is needed to cope 
when this is not the case. This problem is considered in detail in 
chapter 5. 
Security is a problem. 	Identifying users in a distributed 
environment (as opposed to identifying the client machines they may 
happen to be using) is difficult. 	Identifying any sort of 
privileged program is even more difficult since it has to carry its 
identity around within it. This means that a security scheme based 
on permitting file access to certain classes of users or programs 
is tricky. If we use a scheme in which users do not need to be 
identified directly, by using some form of unforgeable file token, 
then we either need multiple tokens for different access to the 
same file, or else client operating systems have to trust each 
other to restrict file access in an agreed uniform way. We want as 
much as possible of the filing system to be devolvable to client 
machines but this conflicts directly with the requirement for 
security. If there is no security then the filing system only has 
to check the legality of requested operations. 	If there is no 
distribution of function then security is implemented entirely 
within the network filing system and so it is a much simpler issue. 
This problem is considered in detail in chapter 6. 
Preservation of consistency when operations are split amongst 
several servers is difficult. 	A coresident filing system takes 
some care to order writes to discs so that a crash normally has 
minimal effect. When only a single server is involved it can do 
the same. 	However, we require that the guarantees are not 
%0 	
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different when files are split amongst several servers, so 
consistency has to be controlled more explicitly. As an example, 
consider creating a file on one server and putting its textname in 
a directory on another. If a crash occurs we either want both to 
happen or neither to happen. This problem is considered in detail 
in chapter 7, and a detailed implementation is described in chapter 
9. 
File accounting is difficult in a filing system with a 
generalised textnaxning scheme and it is even more difficult in a 
network filing system. 	Accounting may be desirable, either for 
charging for filespace or to encourage frugality. However, as the 
cost of stable storage continues to fall it will make less sense to 
rent filespace from a third party, and wastage of filespace will be 
less of a problem. Indeed, for a write-once laser optical disc the 
space charge would need to be the total number of pages ever 
written. It would be difficult to reduce the charge by deleting 
files; since this would probably rewrite a directory it would 
increase the charge! While acknowledging the problem, we will not 
consider accounting further. 
Making sensible use of local discs on client machines without 
trusting their operating systems is difficult. If the local discs 
are used for holding copies of writeable files then there are some 
problems. Firstly, when does the written version drift out to the 
network filing system and how does the network filing system keep 
track of the current version of a file, or keep all copies up to 
date? Secondly, how can the client system and the network filing 
system cooperate to provide the same facilities and guarantees as 
when the files are not cached locally? 	These problems are 
considered in detail in chapter 8. 
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The five main problem areas then are: 
*data transfer primitives; 
*naming and location of files; 
*security of files against unauthorised access; 
*preservation of consistency in the face of crashes; 
*increasing .performance by using local discs at clients. 
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Chaoter : Some Existing Network Filing Systems 
The term file server covers a huge range of facilities. Most 
people -would not consider either a multiply ported disc controller 
a file server, nor an ordinary time-sharing system accessed over a 
terminal network a file server. 	In between these examples are 
servers which provide a virtual disc, through to servers which 
provide a complete filing system together with some commonly used 
file transformation programs such as editors. 	These are all 
considered to be file servers but the distinction near the extremes 
is fuzzy. 
This section examines some existing network filing systems, and 
particularly how they cope with the problems of transfer 
primitives, naming, security and consistency. 
Early file servers 
The earliest file servers were single servers providing one 
fixed filing system [DEW77,C0L72,NPL771. 	The filing systems 
implemented made little attempt to be general. 	Rather they 
provided a set of commands to manipulate files at about the same 
level of complexity and with about the same generality as a filing 
system coresident with its operating system. 	They provided a 
textnaming scheme for files and implemented some form of security 
control. They all have the concept of users; that is of people who 
have confirmed their identity by logging-on to the file server and 
quoting a password. 
Providing a single filing system in this way has a number of 
advantages. Firstly, it is simple to implement and to understand. 
There is a large body of knowledge about implementing filing 
systems of this type. Secondly, it imposes the minimum load on the 
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client systems that support it, both in the amount of processor 
bandwidth used to access the file server, and in the amount of code 
used to implement this. Until recently, most clients had either 
restricted processor bandwith or restrictive memory limits (or 
both) and so moving the hard work across the network to the file 
server machine made sense. 	The present generation of 
microprocessors already offer much larger address spaces than 
previous generations, and are much faster. 	The next generation 
will be more so. Limitations of the client hardware are no longer 
a good reason to centralise everything for it may be the processor 
bandwidth at the server which will be under pressure. 
The main disadvantage of the early servers is that no attempt 
was made to be general. 	If there is only one way to view the 
filing system then it may constrain client operating systems too 
much. This is especially so when an operating system already 
exists with a coresident filing system. 
A filestore system 
One filing system of this early type is the filestore 
constructed in the computer science department at Edinburgh 
University [DE'W77]. Other early file servers were very similar in 
most respects. 	We provided a complete simple filing system 
including textnaming of files and a security scheme. 	it was 
lightly based on the filing system for Titan [BAR67. 
The network consists of a star of point to point connections 
using 2 tnegabaud byte serial links, with the filestore at the 
centre of the star. 	There was no provision for clients to 
communicate with each other through the filestore but neither was 
it assumed that clients did not have other channels of 
communication. 
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There are two completely different data transfer primitives 
corresponding to the two different types of file organisation. 
Both organisations impose no structure on files other than that 
they should be a sequence of bytes, although these bytes are 
divided into 512 byte pages. Both data transfer primitives have 
the concept of an open file. A file is opened by a command which 
provides the file textnalne; the filestore returns a small integer 
channel number used in further commands. The file is locked under 
the usual multiple reader single writer discipline. After it is 
opened, a contiguous file is accessed by two commands, read and 
write, which fetch a specific page from the file or inject a 
specific page into the file. 	Most files are only accessed 
sequentially and in this case the commands give no page number; the 
filestore records the current page. Two files of the same name may 
be read and written simultaneously. when the file being written is 
finally closed it replaces the file being read which is then 
deleted. If the file has other readers at this point, or at any 
other point when it is to be deleted, then the file contents (but 
not the file textname) are preserved until the last reader has 
departed. The two read and write commands for these sequential 
files fetch the next page from the file and add another page onto 
the end of the file. The last page only of a file may be shorter 
than 512 bytes. 
Originally there were no commands to alter the current page 
pointer, but two commands have been added. 	For a file open for 
reading the pointer may be reset to any page in the file. For a 
file open for writing, the last page may be read and removed from 
the file. This last command is the only way that a sequential file 
may be read and written at the same time, without first closing and 
reopening it. It is motivated by the need for simple text editors 
in clients with very limited memory space. 
Textnaming is a two level scheme, the first component normally 
being the initials of the owner of the file. There is a scheme for 
defaulting the owner of files where it is not specified. 	Each 
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owner is limited to 614 files. 
Security is controlled by means of passwords. The filestore has 
the concept of a logged-on user. 	Logging-on is achieved by 
presenting the initials of the owner and a password. 	However, 
anything which an owner can do can be done by another owner if this 
password is quoted. Associated with each owner is another password 
which allows more restricted access to other users if they first 
quote it. 	This is roughly equivalent to a user group in many 
systems (for example, Unix). In common with experience with these 
systems, it is a rarely used facility. 
At any time a user has two passwords quoted. One of these is 
the password used to log on to the filestore and the other is the 
current password. This means that it is not easy to run a program 
which accesses two files belonging to different owners. This would 
be much more of a problem if the filestore was not in an open 
environment where most people leave their files readable by anyone. 
Programs requiring access to private files are in an even worse 
situation since it is difficult for a program to safely quote a 
password in case it is interrupted. In any case, the filestore has 
no mechanism to return the current password (in fact passwords are 
encrypted by a hard-to-invert procedure), so a program quoting a 
password could not reset it and so it would be an inconvenience to 
users running it, who would find their current password altered. 
Any security scheme which relies on a program presenting its 
credentials must ensure that they have a strictly limited life. 
This is most easily achieved by allowing the credentials to be 
specifed with the command for which they are necessary. Otherwise 
it is very difficult for a program to run with the authority of its 
creator rather than of the person running it. 	Being able to do 
this solves many of the authorisation problems which arise in 
practic3. 
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The filestore makes very little effort to preserve consistency. 
Because two files of the same name may simultaneously be read and 
written, there is no problem aboutloss of data since both the old 
and the new versions are in existence until the new version is 
complete. However, the transient file being written can be left 
around if client or server crash, requiring users to examine their 
directories to see what has happened. There is also a security 
breach here if the filestore should crash. 	At any time a file 
will, in general, be overallocated space and this extra space is 
removed when the file is closed. However, if the filestore should 
crash while the file is being written, then this extra space 
remains allocated to the file. 	Since disc pages are not 
initialised before being provisionally allocated to the file, this 
extra space will contain old contents of pages from deleted files 
of other users, preliminary copies of exam questions, for example. 
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Figure 1 	Topology of Edinburgh Filestore Network 
Isys 80 systems 	 Current Topology 
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Initially, the filestore supported two machines (a PDP9 and 
PDP15) at a virtual disc level (actually, a virtual dectape), 
provided an archive store for two machines with their own small 
discs, and provided the filing system for a small editing station 
which had no other connections (see figure 1). 
At this level of use, few problems were found since the 
connected client systems did not exercise the filing system enough 
to reach its limitations. 	All its clients had either no 
pre-existing filing system or an even more rudimentary one. In any 
case, none of the clients with existing filing systems made any 
attempt to integrate the filing system of the filestore. 
Used in this way, the filestore had no real impact on the way 
people chose to use the machines. The functionality available on 
the connected systems had only increased marginally. 
Currently, the filestore supports about ten single user clients 
which have no other disc storage, and it is accessible by two 
time-sharing systems (see diagram). 
The connection of further clients is limited by the lack of 
space in the processor chassis for the communication link interface 
boards; a broadcast network will solve this particular problem. At 
present it is partly solved by using another machine as a 
multiplexor. 
This second generation of connected systems has had a major 
impact on the way in which people work. Processors which had been 
sitting idle in cupboards became the most popular machines on which 
to work, eventually supereding the existing local disc system. 
Noone would now construct a processor or operating system without 
considering how to connect it to the filestore. The filestore has 
thus been very successful; nevertheless experience with it has 
indicated several weaknesses in the design. 
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The major change in the use of the filestore came in its use 
when wewrote Legos [MCL78), a personal operating system which ran 
on clients connected only to the filestore, to a terminal and to an 
extra uncommitted communication link. This provided an environment 
which made all of the facilities of the filestore directly 
available to users. Several client machines ran Legos and it was 
used by research groups for the development of suites of 
application programs. 	Since Legos was conceived after the 
filestore, there was no conflict between its view of the filing 
system and that provided by the filestore; it merely inherited the 
filing system of the filestore and propqgated its flavour through 
to users. Device names on Legos are local to each system; it is 
not possible to name the keyboard of another system, for example. 
The one area in which Legos needed its own textnaming scheme was 
for naming commands. Apart from a very few built-in commands, a 
command was just a file textnaine. 
The biggest problem for program development was the poor 
textnarning scheme. 	The population of potential users has never 
seriously approached the limit on the number of ownernames but the 
restriction to 614 filenames per owner has been far too severe. 
Further, the lack of a properly structured naming system made 
equating file textnames and command names difficult when the user 
was working in a rich environment drawing commands from a number of 
places. Searching under several usernames is cumbersome and has 
often Ltto finding an incorrect file of the same name. 
The lack of any client-definable file attributes caused a 
problem too. A command on Legos can either be executable code or a 
further file of commands, known as an obeyed file. The decision as 
to which was made by examining the first bytes of the file. The 
differences in the way in which executable code and obeyed files 
are handled are so 	 that it is a problem discovering so 
deep in the system which has been delivered. A system derived from 
Legos, Isys8O [DE8O], insists that the textnames of such files are 
extended to indicate whether they are to be executed or obeyed. 
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While this solves the identification problem, the number of file 
textnames to be considered when searching for a command is doubled. 
As has already been mentioned, most files can only be read and 
written serially whereas a second class of files can be directly 
accessed on a page basis. 	However, the lack of any consistency 
guarantees ruled out use of such randomly accessible files for many 
applications which could have made great use of them. The problems 
about handling the files in a crash resistant way outweighed the 
advantages of using them. Consequently, large files were serially 
scanned in their entirety to extract small portions, and the whole 
file was rewritten to update small parts of it. File directories 
are not files and are updated in a manner not available to clients. 
Nevertheless, only very weak guarantees can be given about 
directories across failures and the filestore has once crashed 
whilst writing a directory, leaving a four page directory with one 
new page, one unreadable page and two pages remaining from the old 
directory. 
Consideration of how to develop Legos further has exposed more 
weaknesses in the filestore design. All tokens generated by the 
filestore for logged-on users and for open files are associated 
with the client which requested the operation. Transmitting these 
tokens to another client, a compiling machine for example, is not 
sufficient to transfer the authority. The compiling machine will 
itself have to log on to the filestore. 	That these tokens of 
authority are not transferable makes devolving further function 
from client operating systems difficult. 
From our experience of constructing the filestore, there are 
four areas of weakness that any network filing system should 
address. 
Firstly, the textnaming scheme should be as completely without 
restriction as possible, and special types of files should be 
distinguishable. 
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Secondly, the behaviour of the filing system should be 
predictable over crashes of both clients and file servers. 
Thirdly, tokens which the filing system generates for use in 
further commands should be transferable to other clients. 
Fourthly, the authority and security mechanisms should make it 
possible for a program to run with the authority of its creator 
rather than the authority of the person running the program. 
Finally, there should be clear consistency guarantees; that is, 
statements about what is and is not guaranteed if the server or a 
client should crash. 
Universal file servers 
This generation of file servers [BIR79,DlO80,SI79 attempts to 
solve the basic problems in a different manner. 	Rather than 
implement a complete filing system with textnaming, security and so 
on, they implement a universal filing system. This is a sort of 
kernel filing system which, hopefully, provides suitable primitives 
out of which it is possible to implement any filing system. 
The first such system was WFS [SW179]. 	The only abstraction 
which WFS supports is that of a file, an indexed set of 492 byte 
pages. on creating a file, a large integer is generated by the 
filing system and returned as a token with which to access the 
file. Any further access to the file required this token to be 
produced; producing the token is sufficient authority to access the 
file. The token is a 32 bit integer and so it is hard to guess. 
Unfortunately, losing a token precludes deleting the file it 
identifies. As one would expect, pages in a file may be read and 
written, new files created, old files deleted and so on. 
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The data transfer primitives are to read and write a page from a 
file. There is no concept of an open file although there is a 
scheme to lock a file for exclusive access. 
There is no textnaxning scheme; this has to be built on top of 
FS. There is no real security scheme. Possessing the token for a 
file is sufficient authorisation to do anything to it. 
Consistency is handled by giving sufficient limited guarantees 
to make it possible for a client to handle the consistency [PAX79). 
Each command to WFS is limited in its effect on the disc. 	This 
makes it easy to make each command atomic, so that it either 
succeeds completely or fails completely (even over a crash). For 
example, each page must be removed from a file by the client, one 
command for each page, before the file may be deleted. 	The 
guarantee that each action is itself atomic makes it possible (but 
tricky) to construct larger atomic actions. 
The main way in which WFS differs from its predecessors is that 
it uses a connectionless protocol. The commands are self-defining 
and require no context of logged-on users or opened files. This 
simplifies the amount of state information which needs to be 
maintained at client and server, and makes further distribution of 
applications amongst multiple clients easy. The one exception to 
this stateless protocol is the file lock. A file may be locked and 
a key is returned which gives exclusive access to the file (there 
are no shareable locks although there is nothing to stop a key 
being shared). If the file is not accessed for a minute or so then 
the lock is broken by the server on the assumption that the client 
has crashed or otherwise lost the key. 
The Cambridge file server [BIR79,D1080] also has a notion of a 
file, this time an unstructured sequence of bytes. 	Files are 
identified by 614 bit integers, 32 bits of which are random making 
the token probabilistically unforgeable. Unlike'WFS though, there 
is a concept of a file index. Clients cannot put anything other 
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than tokens in file indices and are expected to pair off an 
ordinary file with each index for their own administrative data. 
If a file has no token preserved in an index then it will be 
deleted. Apart from this restriction, tokens may be preserved in 
any way. 
As far as data transfer primitives, naming and security go, the 
Cambridge file server is similar to WFS. The protocol is about as 
connectionless as that of WFS. There is a concept of a locked file 
but a file can be accessed without explicitly locking it. Shared 
and exclusive locks are distinguished under the usual multiple 
reader single writer discipline. 
As far as consistency goes the Cambridge file server is much 
better than WFS or the earlier servers. A file may be marked as 
important and in this case it is updated atomically; any writes 
made while the file is locked are either all performed or not 
performed at all when the file is unlocked. This is true even over 
crashes of client or server. However, no guarantees are made about 
atomically updating several associated files (other than that each 
file will be independently updated atomically). Naturally, all the 
files maintained by the file server itself, such as file indices, 
are marked as important (and hence updated atomically). 
The vestigial naming graph maintained in the mdi es is not 
restricted in form and so cycles can be formed necessitating 
occasional garbage collection. This is done in a separate client 
machine without interruption of service [GARBO]. 
The concept of a universal file server as the kernel of a full 
filing system has been successful. To some extent, however, the 
lack of prescribed higher levels has resulted in a tower of Babel 
of higher level filing systems .,erected on the same universal 
filing system, none of which can communicate with any other. Since 
files on one filing system are not nameable on other filing systems 
they cannot be accessed. The only way to access a file on another 
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filing system is to drop down a level and use the token for the 
file. Unfortunately, doing this interacts unfavourably with the 
file security scheme. 
Distributed filing systems 
There have been a number of distributed network filing systems 
and distributed databases built. 	Note that a collection of 
separate file servers all accessible from a client does not 
constitute a single network filing system. It is necessary that 
the servers conspire together to give the illusion of a single 
filing system. It should be possible to run a program on a client 
which takes a filename as a parameter and then nominate any file on 
any server. 
It is worth noting that a distributed database differs in 
character from a distributed filing system. 	The purpose of a 
distributed filing system is to implement the abstraction of a file 
and hide as much as possible of the implementation; in particular, 
the implications of distribution. 	Filing systems are general 
purpose. On the other hand, databases are usually special purpose, 
to the extent that they can achieve considerably better performance 
by being completely aware of the implications of distribution. 
Further, a distributed database is not usually accessed directly by 
client application programs. Client application programs access a 
large database access program, possibly running in the client but 
almost certainly written by those responsible for maintenance of 
the database. 	The point at which the decomposition to the two 
sides of the network occurs is thus not really visible to clients 
and has sophisticated programs maintained by the same people on 
both sides. For example, central databases usually have some query 
processing which attempts to select the best way to answer a query, 
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often by deciding in which order the sub-queries should be dealt 
with. In a distributed database, the best way to answer a query 
depends on the distribution of the data around the various sites 
holding the database, especially when parallel processing of the 
subqueries is taken into consideration. This decomposition will be 
done by a complex program in the client or perhaps by one of a 
number of query servers. Nevertheless, some of the techniques used 
for implementation of distributed databases are applicable to the 
design of a network filing system. 
One of the earliest recorded distributed filing systems was 
RSEXEC [TH073. 	This did not run on special servers but on a 
number of Tenex systems [B0B72] connected by the Arpanet. 	The 
textnaming scheme spanned host boundaries and allowed a user to 
nominate files on any of the systems participating in the scheme. 
This is an example of a scheme where only the textnaming of files 
is distributed. 	The underlying filing systems have no 
communication with each other below the level of the distributed 
textnaming scheme. 	Data transfer, security and consistency are 
just those of the underlying Tenex filing system. 
Most networks supplied by mainframe manufacturers, such as 
Decnet [EC80 or IBM system network architecture [C1P78], have 
made some attempt to make nameable files at other sites accessed 
over a network. This is done by extending the file textnaxne with a 
machine site name. 	The names are even less distributed than 
RSEXEC; for example, it is not possible to have a directory 
spanning several machines. 	The filing systems are actually 
completely independent, the extended naming being accomplished by a 
remote third party process with knowledge of both the remote filing 
system and the network. 	It is almost impossible to interface a 
different sort of filing system to the scheme since too many 
restrictive assumptions have been made about file formats, 
textnarnes and so on. 
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Another distributed filing system is DFS [STU80]. 	This is 
actually implemented on top of WFS described earlier and at the 
same level whereby files are accessed by 32 bit tokens. There is 
no textnaming or security scheme; these must be built upon DFS. 
DFS is oriented towards distributed databases. The motivation 
for its construction is the variation in processor power to disc 
storage space available by splitting the storage space among 
separate processors. Thus a DFS system is expected to consist of a 
number of servers on the same network. 	It is a little dubious 
whether the gains in processor bandwidth achieved by having 
multiple processors are not outweighed by the communication 
required to coordinate them all. 	It certainly requires a very 
sophisticated client application program to cope with the 
complexities of the locking and unlocking of data, and with the 
unsolicited messages which the servers may deliver at any time. 
The main difficulty of using DFS is the complexity of the file 
locking scheme. 	DFS allows locks to be broken under many 
circumstances and it sends unsolicited messages to clients telling 
them that this has happened. The client is then expected to reread 
the data to see if it impacts on the results being written. There 
is no way that this can avoid being pushed up for the application 
program to handle. Normally, this application program will be a 
database access program handling queries on behalf of the real 
application program and so it will be specially designed to cope 
with these complexities. 
The primary facility which DFS provides is good control of 
consistency. This is achieved by providing the concept of an 
atomic transaction [LAM79,GRA77,BER79,E3w76], a series of reads and 
writes which are performed indivisibly and without interference 
even in the face of crashes and competitive access by multiple 
clients. The concept of an atomic transaction is becoming accepted 
as a good general way of controlling both crash and deadlock 
control, and of administrating competing access among multiple 
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clients. 
There are two parts to implementing atomic transactions, one 
part corresponding to each word. Firstly, there is the problem of 
ensuring the atomicity whereby the transaction succeeds in its 
entirety or leaves no trace of its passing. These two cases are 
described as the transaction committing or aborting respectively. 
Secondly, there is the implementation of a transaction so that two 
concurrent transactions competing to access the same data do not 
interfere. 
In a distributed system there are two stages to building the 
atomicity. Firstly, each site has to be able to perform actions 
atomically, and secondly we have to ensure that all sites make the 
same decision about commitment or abortion of the transaction. 
Single site atomicity is concerned with taking a non-atomic 
storage medium and making it atomic. 	The problem is to do this 
without incurring unacceptable inefficiency. 	One suggestion 
[LAM79] is to write all critical pages to two connected places, and 
to choose either of them. If one page is unreadable then the other 
is used. The algorithms have to be sufficiently incremental that 
using either of the two pages is not incorrect when the pages are 
not identical due to a crash interrupting the writing of the second 
page. Writing everything twice seems unattractive in a filing 
system. In a database an update is usually very small and 
localised so this approach is more reasonable whereas in a filing 
system it will often be a whole file or a large part of a file 
EW1L721. This will be true even in the common case where the 
change is small and local - deleting a single line from a 1000 line 
source program, for example. 
Writing everything twice is only necessary since a page cannot 
be reliably updated in place. If pages are always written to new 
sites then an unreadable page is not a problem and the number of 
writes to achieve atomicity is halved. However, more storage is 
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used although suitable reclamation schemes can be devised easily. 
This technique will be expanded on later. 
One motivation for writing everything to a new site comes from 
the prospect of write-once video discs where this is the only 
option. After all, reusing the same pages is an economic 
consideration based on the fact that pages are considered a scarce 
resoure. Removing this assumption leads to a policy of 
non-deletion [SCH77,COP80,REE79] in which everything is preserved 
forever (or as near to forever as can be managed). 
Keeping everything forever leads to a naming problem which is 
most easily solved by using timestamping [REE79,TH076]. This leads 
to the problem of distributing time to perform these timestamps. A 
complete analysis [LAM78) leads to the conclusion that 
synchronisation is more difficult the more erratically the message 
transit times vary. The variation in transit times will normally 
correlate with the distance between the communicating sites. This 
will turn out to be just what is required, since the size of the 
error in synchrony that can be tolerated is closely related to how 
frequently the sites can interact. 
The second part of implementing atomic transactions is the 
concurrency control. 	The non-interference of two competing 
transactions is defined in terms of serializability, whether or not 
there is some serial ordering of the transactions which has the 
same effect LGRA771. We would like a scheme which only holds up 
transactions when they would otherwise violate this serializability 
condition but unfortunately no such scheme is known [5ER79]. There 
are a number of schemes which guarantee that competing transactions 
will not interfere, although they all sometimes interfere when 
serialisability is not at risk. 	Some of these involve a 
transaction announcing in advance all the data which it will 
access, allowing the scheme to decide whether this conflicts with 
other transactions already started. Such a scheme is not useful 
for a network filing system since, in general, a program only knows 
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in advance what accesses will (or at least could) be made if 
opening a file from within a program is not possible. For example, 
it would be impossible for a compiler to implement a scheme for 
including a declaration file nominated from within the source text 
of the program. 
Other schemes abort one of the transactions when a conflict 
occurs, on the assumption that such conflicts will be rare. This 
is not an attractive solution for a filing system either. If two 
clients attempt to edit the same file then we would like to see one 
of two things. Either the second client is told to wait until the 
first has finished, or the second client merely receives no reply 
from the file server until the first has finished. Which we want 
to happen will probably depend on whether there is a person waiting 
or a program waiting. What we do not want to happen is that the 
second user be permitted to edit the file and then have the edits 
thrown away on attempting to leave the editor. 
The most widely used scheme, since it permits the locking of 
data to take place as it is needed, is the two-phase locking scheme 
[ESW76]. In this scheme, data is locked whenever it is accessed by 
a transaction and has not yet been locked by that transaction. 
These locks are held until the transaction commits. 	The way in 
which this interacts with other aspects of the filing system will 
be discussed in more detail later. 
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Summary 
We have looked at the state of the art in network filing 
systems. These have either b-tsingle server filing systems or else 
oriented towards the construction of distributed databases. 	The 
construction of a distributed network filing system inherits 
problems and some solutions from both of these areas. We reiterate 
our five main problems. 
The first problem is that of the primitives provided for the 
transfer of data. This is bound up with precisely what is meant by 
a file. Network filing systems have tended towards the view of a 
file as an unstructured vector of bytes, but we shall see that this 
does not solve all the problems when a file is accessed by more 
than one client operating system. 
The second problem is that of textnaming files. Little work has 
been done on distribution of textnaming and even many traditional 
filing systems coresident with their operating system make it 
necessary to know on which disc volume a particular file resides; 
some even make it necessary to know on which drive the volume is 
mounted. 
The third problem is security in a network filing system. This 
is not particularly affected by the number of servers comprising 
the filing system but by the desire to functionally distribute as 
much as possible to the client machines without their having to be 
trusted. 
Next, there is the problem of maintaining consistency. This is 
a problem in any filing system but it has rarely been properly 
addressed except in database systems. Crashes are more likely in a 
distributed system than in a centralised one, although any crash 
should have a less disastrous affect. 	Problems with the 
preservation of consistency are thus more frequent than in a 
centralised filing system. 
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The fifth problem is how to make good use of local discs at 
clients. 	This problem is meaningless in the context of •a 
coresident filing system, although a similar problem can arise 
there when considering how best to use very fast fixed head discs 
or drums. 	The problem lies in resolving how to increase 
performance and autonomy of client systems without requiring them 
to be trusted. 
There are, of course, other problems common to both network 
filing systems and to coresident filing systems. For example, what 
unit of allocation should be used for disc space and how should it 
be chosen from all those available? 	That these points are not 
considered is not to imply that there is an acknowledged best 
solution, but rather that any solution is unaffected by the 
problems of distribution. 
49 
Chanter : Data Transfer Primitives 
The prime purpose of a network filing system is to store data 
from client machines and redeliver it on request. How the data is 
presented to the file servers, and how it is retrieved will have a 
major impact on the performance of the network filing system since 
these are far and away the most common operations. 	Our design 
criteria include a requirement for good performance. 
There are two main problem areas. Firstly, the file server is a 
shared resource and so it may well not be sensible to use it for 
computationally intensive operations such as unblocking records, 
which could equally be done in the client machine. 	Secondly, 
different operating systems use different data representations for 
the same information. 	Since one of the purposes of a network 
filing system is to make sharing of file amongst different users 
and machineeit is a pity if the contents of these files are not 
so easily shared. 
Where to do the work 
A file consists of some pages in the stable storage of a file 
server. These pages contain bits of data which are a 
representation of some information structure. 	Turning pages of 
bits into information may involve transforming it in some way, and 
preserving a certain amount of state information about what has 
already been transformed. 
For example, Unix [R1T72] allows an arbitrary sequence of bytes 
to be read from the current position of a file. 	Assume someone 
wants to access a few bytes from the middle of a file which has not 
previously been accessed. 	First the file is opened, a seek is 
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performed to the required position in the file, the bytes are read 
and the file closed. 	In more detail the following has to take 
place. First, the file textname is resolved to get an internal 
file number. This internal file number is checked to see whether 
the requestor should have access to the file. The in-store data 
structure of active files is examined for a conflicting concurrent 
access. The housekeeping data for the file is set up in an 
in-store data structure, and a current position variable set to the 
start of the file. The seek is received, which merely alters this 
current position variable. 	Next, the read is received. 	The 
current position is examined to see which page or pages will be 
needed to satisfy the request. A check is made to see if these 
pages are beyond the end of the file. The pages are fetched from 
the disc. A check is made to see if the last bytes requested are 
beyond the last byte of the file should the last page be amongst 
those fetched. The actual bytes of data are extracted from the 
page. The current position is updated to the byte following that 
delivered. Finally, the file is closed by updating the in-store 
data structure. 
This immediately raises a number of points, some of which are 
due to problems with naming and security which will be covered 
later. Should the file server have the concept of an open file or 
should the internal file number be provided in each request? 
Should the client or the file server maintain the current position 
pointer? Should the client or the file server extract the bytes 
required from the pages which contain them? Should the file server 
have a concept of the length of a file, and if so how is it 
determined when a file is created or updated? These questions are 
much simpler if we only have to deal with Unix-like systems, but 
this is not necessarily the case since we are not making such 
restrictive assumptions about client operating systems. 
However, all systems are not like Unix. Multics [BEN721 and, 
more recently, Pilot [RED80 access files by casting them as 
virtual memory segments. 	A file is actually accessed when an 
address translation fault occurs and the operating system steps in. 
The operating system decides whether the excepted address is within 
the file, selects a suitable part of the file including this 
address, fetches it from the filing system, updates the address 
translation tables and restarts the interrupted process. There is 
no concept of the current position in a file (at the operating 
system level anyway). 	There is no requirement to extract bytes 
from the pages since each page is either completely resident in 
store or completely at the file server, assuming that the 
granularity of virtual memory mapping is a multiple of the network 
file server page size. The length of a file probably needs to be 
known when the segment is first mapped rather than upon the first 
attempt to access a page not in the file. 
Local area networks have a very low error rate, low enough that 
a good strategy for handling errors is to retry the operation if a 
suitable reply is not received in a reasonable time. For this to 
be a workable recovery strategy it is necessary that operations are 
idempotent. If the current file position is held at the file 
server then this is not the case. If a request to read some data 
is received but the data is lost in transit, then a subsequent 
repeated request will cause new data to be sent and the first lot 
to be lost. It is therefore much more sensible to keep any file 
pointers resident in clients. Besides, as we have seen with mapped 
files, the concept of a current position within the file is not 
always useful and would mean that handling a virtual memory 
exception would incur an extra message exchange to set the 
position. 
With no concept of an open file, as in WFS [SWI80], there is no 
file locking. Unintended conflicts of file access are rare but not 
unheard of and so this seems unacceptable. On the other hand, the 
requirement to open and close a file in order to extract all or 
part of it in one go seems unnecessary. A good compromise seems to 
be that adopted by the Cambridge file server [DIO80] where a file 
may be opened (and locked) or it may be accessed without being 
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opened (in which case the file server does an automatic implicit 
open and close). 
Even if we have a connectionless protocol and files are not 
opened, some form 	file creation primitive will be required. 
This may well interact with the file textnaming scheme since most 
operating systems interpret opening a file for writing as implying 
creating the name (and the file) should it not already exist. If 
there are different types of files then creating a file is 
significantly different from writing an existing file, even if all 
the old data is updated. 	Creating a file requires extra 
information about the type of the file being created. 
The length of a file is clearly one of its most important 
attributes. A file has other attributes too, but these only exist 
to be examined and do not interact with the data transfer 
primitives; for example, the date of creation of a file does not 
affect the response to requests to read parts of it. The length of 
a file is a rather odd attribute because of its interaction with 
data transfer. Most files are written and read sequentially and so 
we would certainly like a file written to, to automatically inherit 
a length such that the same bytes will be delivered when it is 
reread. 
There are two different ways in which the file length can be 
decided. Firstly, it can be a function of how the file was written 
- the high water mark of bytes written to the file for example. If 
files are only written in pages then an extra mechanism will be 
needed to cope with partly filled final pages. 	Secondly, the 
length can be set explicitly by the program writing the file. The 
best solution seems to be a combination of the two. The length of 
a file is the high water mark of all bytes written although it can 
be set by a command to truncate the file (discarding unwanted data) 
or to elongate the file (to create a large file without the bother 
of writing it all). 
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The most contentious issue in the selection of data transfer 
primitives is the actual unit of transfer. 	There are two very 
compelling, but conflicting, arguments. 
General programming practice argues that if a file is an 
unstructured array of bytes, then the unit of transfer should be an 
arbitrary block of these bytes. A file is an abstraction, and one 
of the purposes of such abstractions is to hide its implementation. 
If we let implementation specific details through into the 
implementation, such as pages or cylinders, then we may force an 
unsuitable unit on clients or restrict ourselves should a later 
server wish to use hardware with different characteristics. This 
approach is taken by the Cambridge file server [D10801. 
On the other hand, our two criteria for efficiency and for 
maximum functional distribution press for the disc page, or perhaps 
sequence of disc pages, as the unit of transfer. 	If clients 
blindly choose an incompatible unit for transfer, then the transfer 
becomes inefficient. This argues for the page size to be visible 
to clients, but then it. is only a short step to arguing that other 
details, such as disc addresses, could usefully be made visible. 
Furthermore, accessing arbitrary blocks of bytes forces extra work 
on the shared processor of the server in extracting them (when 
reading) or in reading the old page and injecting them (when 
writing). This last case is particularly important since many 
files will be written sequentially. 	e certainly want to avoid the 
server rereading the last page of a file on each request, to add 
some more bytes to the end. This approach is the one adopted by 
FS [3W179], although its bizarre page size of 1492 bytes is 
unlikely to be convenient for client systems. If we opt for this 
scheme, we may need a way of writing a partial page to finish off a 
file. This is most easily dealt with by allowing a partial page to 
be written at any time, the rest of the page being filled with some 
standard byte (probably zero). 
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One further consideration is that the designers of client 
systems are likely to tune them to the network file server. Even 
if the page size is not pushed through into the command interface, 
client systems are likely to access files at page boundaries by 
choosing suitable in-store buffers. 
The arguments for and against making the page size visible are 
sufficiently strong to make a choice very difficult. 	To some 
extent they depend on the ratio of processor power to 
communications bandwidth, since there is little point in shifting 
stuff across the network for the client to handle if the network is 
too slow. 	In the future, bandwidths of networks are likely to 
increase and the number of clients being serviced is likely to 
increase. The processor of the server is likely, therefore, to 
become a bottleneck and the second approach, where clients can only 
access single pages, or perhaps multiples of a page, seems more 
attractive. Nevertheless, it is a slightly uneasy decision. 
Standards and translation 
One important purpose of a network filing system is to permit 
files to be shared. 	In particular, it must permit high level 
language source files to be shared amongst different systems on 
which they may be compiled and run. This requires either that all 
systems adhere to a common standard for such files, or else that 
the network filing system massages the file data for each different 
system or group of systems. 
In fact, these are just two cases of the same thing. 	If the 
view of a file by the time it reaches the application program (or 
its run-time system) is different from the representation of the 
data at the file server then it has to be transformed somewhere. 
If this is performed at the client, then the interface at the 
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server is standard. Alternatively the data could be transformed at 
the server. 	This second option is very unattractive since such 
operations are likely to be processor intensive, and our criterion 
for distribution makes it desirable that this is done in the 
unshared client. 
If the transformation takes place within the application 
program, within a database management program for example, then 
there is not really any problem. If the program itself is portable 
between different client systems, then the transformation should 
impose the same interpretation on the same raw data on both 
systems. The problems arise with files where the transformation is 
done either in the operating system or within a very pervasive 
run-time system. 
A common standard is attractive but there is no certainty that 
pre-existing systems will be able to live with it. For example, 
systems which regard a file as a sequence of bytes usually have 
some conventional line separator character such as a linefeed. 
Other systems have the concept of a record more deeply defined and 
no explicit separator character but rather record lengths preceding 
each record.. Under this regime it is possible for any character to 
occur in a record, in particular, whatever character might normally 
be regarded as a separator. 	It is thus an information losing 
operation to take a file of such records and replace all the record 
lengths with record separators; it is not necessarily possible to 
regenerate the original records accurately. This is most obviously 
a problem with files such as compiler object code, which are not 
required to be shared anyway. 	However, the problem frequently 
occurs with files destined for high-quality printers or plotters, 
which may be required to be shared between the system generating 
the file and the system controlling the appropriate peripheral. In 
any case, application programs do not necessarily distinguish such 
near-binary files from more universal ones. 
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A further consideration with a common standard is that a client 
system with a very different internal standard will have a very 
expensive interface. File formats will be translated both on being 
written to the filing system and on being read back, even though 
most files will not be accessed from elsewhere before they are 
altered again. 
So it seems that the best that can be achieved is to have a 
standard for certain types of files, most importantly text files 
and files destined for peripherals, and accept that some client 
systems may be unable to live with it and that others may find it 
rather expensive. This is rather negative, but results from the 
greater weight placed on the uniformity of the network filing 
system (hence, how well files can be shared) rather than on 
efficiency of use by any particular client system. 
Conclusions 
There are two separate areas where the data transfer primitives 
impact on the design and use of the network filing system. 	The 
first area concerns the primitives actually provided by the file 
servers for the transfer of data. The second area is the need for 
client systems using the network filing system to stick to standard 
data representations for data which is potentially shareable with 
other systems. 
A file is just an vector of pages of vectors of bytes. 	The 
imposition of further structure on this raw data is the concern of 
client systems and programs. The considerations about whether or 
not to make the page divisions visible to clients seem to be fairly 
evenly balanced. 	Even if they are not made visible by the 
primitives used to access files, it is likely that client systems 
will be tuned by taking the actual page size into account when 
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relevant, such as when deciding on the size of buffers. 	This 
factor seems to tip the balance in favour of only making files 
accessible a page at a time, although very restricted client 
machines may find this problematic if the page size is large. 
Text files should be shareable between the different systems 
attached to the network filing system. 	This requires the 
cooperation of client systems since the network filing system 
imposes no restriction on what raw data can be stored in files. 
This cooperation means that there has to be a canonical form of a 
text file. Only for the strongest of reasons should client systems 
store text files in internal formats thnacceptable to other 
systems. When at all possible such files should be converted by 
client systems. 
Chapter 5: Naming 
Files have to be named. 	That is, there has to be a scheme 
agreed between the clients and the network filing system whereby 
certain symbols appearing in messages are interpreted as files (or, 
strictly, references to files). If a file is not nameable by a 
client then it is not accessible by the client, so if files were 
not named then they would all be inaccessible to all clients. Note 
that we are not (yet) talking about conventional file textnames, 
but about a more general concept which covers textnaines, file 
capabilites and internal file identifiers (such as the i-numbers of 
Unix). 
The file server implements files in terms of names agreed with 
its disc controllers, physical disc addresses. One function of the 
filing system is to administrate the conversion from a filename and 
page within file pair, into a physical disc address. It does this 
by resolving the page within file number in a context, a different 
context for each file, giving the disc address as the resolution. 
Depending on what strategy the filing system has chosen for laying 
out files on the disc, the exact form of this context will vary. 
Similarly, the name of a file is resolved in some context to get 
the administrative data for the file and so, ultimately, the data 
that it contains. However, unlike the disc addresses, this context 
is distributed amongst all the servers of the network filing 
system, which considerably complicates the issue. 
The file server's requirements 
Files have some internal name, such as the number of its file 
header or a directory and slot number pair; this is what gets 
returned by the lookup filename procedure of the file server. 
These internal names are used as the ultimate resolution of 
textnames in any textnaming scheme which may be implemented. 
Note that these internal names may only have an agreed meaning 
between the textnaming scheme and the underlying file access 
scheme. Whether client systems are allowed to meaningfully use the 
internal names in commands is a different question. For example, 
internally both Unix and DEC files-11 name files by a header number 
(i-number or fid). On Unix, this number is only used between the 
textnaming scheme and the underlying file scheme - it is not 
possible to open a file by header number, but only by textname. On 
files-11, this number has meaning outside too; although resolving a 
textname is the usual way to discover the number, any other route 
is acceptable since ultimately files are only accessed by header 
number. 
Names in any particular context have to be unique; for example, 
there is only one page corresponding to a given physical disc 
address on a particular disc. 	Our criteria for autonomy and 
distribution mean that file servers need to be able to generate 
names unique in the context of the whole filing system, without 
having the whole context available (to check the uniqueness) and 
without using a central agency issuing unique names. Instead of 
generating these names, they may be supplied by client systems, but 
the problems of checking uniqueness are essentially the same. We 
cannot have two files with the same name. 	There are two 
fundamentally different ways of achieving this. 
The first way is to make the name depend on the server to which 
it is presented. Essentially, the global context is partitioned 
into a number of local contexts. 	Since names only have to be 
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unique within this local context, each file server can ensure 
uniqueness easily. Under this scheme, each server can have a file 
with the same name and, provided that there is never any need to 
communicate with one file server about a file which is at another, 
there is no conflict. 	Unfortunately, at some stage the client 
system has to decide which file server provides an appropriate 
context for resolution of the name, and a wrong choice may not 
provoke an error message but merely access the wrong file. 
This is the situtation with very loosely connected (or even 
disconnected) systems. There is no confusion between files of the 
same name on all the. Unix systems in existence, nor with the 
i-numbers of such files on all the different Unix disc volumes. 
This is because the contexts for resolution are carefully 
recognised and separated. As a result, it is not possible to name 
a file on one volume in a directory on another, let alone name a 
file on one system in a directory on another system. 
The second way to ensure uniqueness of names is to generate them 
in such a way that they cannot be anything but unique. The easiest 
way is to arrange for each server to have a unique number and to 
use this number as part of the name. Allocating these numbers (and 
hence ensuring their uniqueness) requires a central agency, but 
since this only happens when a new file server is first added to 
the filing system, it is only a minor transgression of our design 
criteria. If the network addresses are eternally unique, as are 
those proposed for the commercial Ethernet [DEC801, then servers 
already have unique numbers. In this scheme, to resolve a name, a 
client merely presents the name to a file server. 	There is no 
confusion if the wrong server is selected, but there is no 
guarantee that any particular server will have the appropriate part 
of the global naming context accessible to perform the resolution. 
These two schemes seem very similar, but they differ in a subtle 
way. The name of a file and its location are two different 
concepts. The first scheme couples them tightly since the name of 
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a file also carries its location. If a file should move then its 
name would change. The second scheme divorces the two concepts. 
True, a location has been used in the name, but only to ensure 
uniqueness. A file can move freely without changing its name. 
However, because the name of a file and its location are 
independent there is a problem about finding it quickly (it can 
always be found slowly by trying each file server in turn). 
The second scheme is also more error tolerant. Because names 
are unique rather than unique within each server, presenting a name 
at the wrong server is not disastrous. It is certainly detectable, 
but, more importantly, the name is meaningful at that server since 
the context for its resolution (although not necessarily all the 
data needed to resolve it) exists there. The first scheme splits 
up the naming context itself; the second scheme merely partitions 
the data needed to implement the context, a more satisfactory 
solution. 
It is clearly desirable to be able to have multiple copies of 
files, both to increase tolerance to file server failure and 
because file servers are not accessible uniformly fast from 
clients. This introduces further problems into the naming scheme. 
Maintenance of multiple copies of writable files is an area of 
current research, especially for infrequently updated databases and 
for databases which are strongly partitioned with people in 
different places responsible for each partition. 	Problems arise 
when a file is updated and it becomes necessary to distribute the 
update. It is not really acceptable to lock all copies of the 
database from starting an update to its being distributed, since 
they may not all be accessible, and most updates can wait for a 
massed distribution without causing any problem. However, if this 
is not done, two updates done around the same time may clash and 
some technique will be needed to resolve them. 	Resolution 
techniques of this kind are clearly outside of the filing system 
used to hold the database. Whilst clearly important, we shall not 
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consider multiple copies of such files further. If multiple copies 
are needed, then each copy will need a separate name and the 
responsibility for consistency of the different copies rests with 
some other agency (such as the database management program). 
At first sight, one class of writeable files for which we would 
like the ability to distribute multiple copies has less stringent 
consistency problems. 	That is those files about which we are 
concerned that the update gets done eventually, but not 
particularly worried about precisely when. 	For example, the 
executable code of a compiler is rarely updated. Furthermore, when 
it is updated, we are not especially concerned that all copies are 
simultaneously updated but rather that the change propagates 
through the system acceptably fast. However, more often, updating 
the executable code of a compiler implies a new release. Both the 
old and the new release are often available in tandem for a time. 
Thus updating a compiler is not a true update of the executable 
code file, but a change in the release (and hence the file) used by 
default. 
Releases of compilers are thus never updated. 	They are one 
example of a large number of read-only files. These are 
unalterable (although there may need to be a scheme to get rid of 
them eventually). 	Since they are unalterable, there are no 
problems about consistency between the various copies. Since they 
are identical, it seems appropriate for them to have the same 
internal filename. 	They form a particularly important class of 
files, since they can be cached on local discs at clients without 
complex locking problems. This will be discussed in detail later. 
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The user's requirements 
Users like to choose their own textnames for files since names 
chosen by the network filing system are unlikely to prove 
memorable. These textnames have to be unique within the context in 
which they are resolved and so either users have to agree a scheme 
among themselves to keep the textnames unique, or else multiple 
contexts for resolution are necessary. We will call the contexts 
for the resolution of textnames directories. They will often be 
implemented as files (with security to prevent unrestricted 
scribbling on them). 
The minimum workable scheme for having multiple contexts is to 
have one context per user [SAL77]. If users are to share files, 
then a user needs to be able to specify that a particular textname 
is to be resolved in another user's directory. Traditionally, this 
is done by giving each directory a textname (unique amongst all 
directories) and allowing file textnames to be suitably prefixed 
with directory textnames. 	Thus "john.abc" is the file "abc" in 
John's directory. 	This scheme is used in all the early file 
servers . 
Many users amass so many files that the restriction that their 
files must have unique names amongst all their files is too severe. 
Further levels can be added to the naming so that each textname has 
three (or more) components. 	Now textnames have the form 
"john.pascal.abc" and it is only necessary that "abc" be a unique 
name amongst all the files with names starting "john.pascal"; there 
could be a "john.algol.abc", for example. 
The restriction to a fixed number of components soon becomes 
restrictive. If it is large enough to cope with the worst 
requirements of users, then it is tedious for users with few files. 
So, the number of components is made variable, giving a full 
pathname. Now "john.pascal.abc" and "john.temp" can both coexist. 
Depending on whether directories are made visible as files, 
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"john.pascal" is either a file or else is inaccessible (except by 
special primitives). Since users often produce inventories of all 
the files that they possess, it simplifies things if "john.pascal" 
is a file which can be read, for otherwise special primitives will 
need to be implemented for production of inventories. In any case, 
"john.pascal" is the textname of a context suitable for the 
resolution of "abc". 
The first component, "john" above, is resolved in a 
distinguished global context. In a coresident filing system this 
is not problematic since there can easily be a unique master 
directory holding this context. In the case of a network filing 
system we want to avoid centralised resources such as single master 
directories. There is already a master directory of sorts, 
implemented by outside agencies such as name servers, which 
resolves textnames for services into network addresses. 	These 
change infrequently enough that the consistency problems caused by 
duplicating it are far less than the reliability and performance 
problems caused by centralising it. So we use the server names as 
the first components of pathnames ("serverl.john.pascal.abc"). 
Note that using the server name in this way does not constrain 
where the file itself resides, but merely defines a starting 
context for resolution of the textname. It is quite possible that 
"serverl.john.pascal" and "server2.john.pascal" are the same file. 
It is clearly tedious to have to type complete pathnames all the 
time, and so there is usually a way to omit some of the early part 
of the pathnaine and have it understood by some means. For example, 
most systems have a concept of a default working directory which is 
added to the start of incomplete pathnames. In effect, the working 
directory defines a context in which the textname can be resolved. 
e shall write incomplete pathnames by starting them with a period, 
".abc". In practice, when pathnames are often typed at terminals, 
it is more convenient to use the opposite convention and only 
prefix full pathnames with a period. 
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Users do not normally work with files themselves, but use files 
(and parts of files) as representations for objects in which they 
are interested, such as programs, integrated circuit designs or 
telephone directories. 	This is because files are generally the 
only long-term storage available to them. These objects often have 
names themselves and it is convenient if the textnaming scheme of 
the filing system is versatile enough that it is not necessary to 
have separate schemes for naming the objects and the files in which 
they are represented. Otherwise, separate contexts will be needed, 
outside of the filing system textname scheme, for resolving the 
name of objects to get their containing file. For example, many 
command interpreters find it convenient to use file textnaxne 
directories as dictionaries for command words, rather than 
constructing a separate scheme to turn a command word into the name 
of a file containing the program which implements it. 
There are clear advantages to the user if the textnaming scheme 
is 	sufficiently versatile that addition a1 textnaming schemes are 
unnecessary. This saves both the effort needed to understand 
another scheme, and the effort involved in writing the code to 
implement it. 	In a distributed environment this can be 
particularly important since the additional naming scheme may need 
to run on a number of different types of computer. It is clearly 
undesirable if the accessibility of objects such as telephone 
directories should depend on having an appropriate compiler for the 
language in which the naming scheme is written. This could be a 
particular problem when an application is itself distributed across 
a number of different types of client. 
The problem is further complicated by the fact that objects can 
contain references to other objects. 	For example, a number of 
programs use the same external module, a number of integrated 
circuit designs use the same standard cells or a telephone number 
program uses a number of telephone directories. If the textnaming 
scheme is versatile enough that it can be used for these 
references, then each of these examples reduces to a file 
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containing the textnames of other files. 
To see that problems can occur with such a scheme, consider a 
telephone number program which looks up telephone numbers in 
telephone directories. To avoid confusion with file directories, 
we will call these telephone lists. A sensible approach would be 
to represent a telephone list using a file. 	We would like the 
program to be sufficiently general that it can work with any 
suitably formatted telephone list. 	This means that the program 
cannot have embedded within it the full pathname of the telephone 
list, such as "eu.phones.numbers", since it will then always use a 
fixed directory. On the other hand, we do not want to have to type 
(nor even know) the textnames of the common telephone lists. On a 
system with a coresident filing system, we may be able to get away 
with a scheme where a default telephone list specified by complete 
pathname can be overridden by the user running the program. In a 
distributed environment this does not work. The default telephone 
list in London and Edinburgh are unlikely to be the same. 
If the program does not contain a full pathname but a partial 
pathname, ".numbers", then there is confusion about what context 
should be used for resolution. 	There are two obvious contexts, 
either of which may be appropriate. 	The first is the working 
directory of the user running the program. 	In this case, the 
user's directory is expected to contain the file "numbers". It is 
clearly inconvenient for every user to have to set the working 
directory appropriately before running the program. 	The second 
context is that of the directory in which the telephone program was 
found. Now the program and the directory form a closure (as in the 
Lambda calculus [CHU411), that is an object containing names 
together with a context in which the names are to be resolved to 
objects. The directory containing the program (strictly, the last 
component of the textname of the program) should also contain the 
component "numbers". The way in which the program is invoked thus 
determines which telephone list is used. If a user wishes to use a 
personal list, then the program and the list must be put into the 
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same directory. Note that both of these solutions use the filing 
system textnaming to perform the resolution, and both require 
multiple names for files if the filing system is not to fill up 
with a proliferation of identical telephone lists and programs with 
different textnames. 
Another way to solve the problem is to construct a completely 
new naming scheme in addition to file textnaming. 	Programs are 
then written using these special names, such as "streaml" or 
"sysin". Before running a program these special names are 
initialised and bound to the real pathnaxnes to be used. 	When a 
program attempts to access a file "sysin", "sysin" is resolved in 
the special scheme to get the pathnaxne to be used. Unfortunately, 
if files can be accessed using either these special names or real 
pathnames there is a lot of confusion. Is "sysin"  a pathname or a 
special name? If an application is split over more than one client 
machine do they share a global "sysin" or each have their own? 
Such a scheme looks unattractive in a network environment, unless 
it is actually implemented within the textnaming scheme of the 
filing system. 	For example, in addition to a current working 
directory, each user could have an additional directory holding 
these special names. 
The problem is more complex with references between program 
modules. Here there are conflicts between the intentions of the 
author of the program and intentions of the person running it. The 
author of the program may split the program into modules, perhaps 
because some of the modules are used in several different programs. 
For example, Jack creates a program which uses another module of 
his, called "common". 	When Jill runs the program the textname 
"common" has to be resolved to 'find the code of the module. This 
has to be resolved in Jack's context, not Jill's, since Jill should 
not need to know about "common" and may even have a module of her 
own using the same name. One way of resolving the problem is to 
insist that Jack resolves all the references to code before letting 
Jill use the program. Jack now has to pass the program through a 
special program, usually called a linker, resolving all the 
references and removing all the textnames. 	Apart from the 
undesirable implications on space if "common" occurs in many 
programs that Jack makes generally available, if Jack updates 
"common" to correct a bug then all the programs using it have to be 
relinked or they will remain oblivious of the change. 	Including 
the name of an object in a program is not the same as including the 
object itself, unless the object can never change. 
Note that the problems which arise about naming, such as those 
of resolving outbound references just mentioned, are in the 
province of the client operating systems and not of the network 
filing system. However, the way in which clients may choose to 
solve the problems have implications for any textnaming scheme 
which the network filing system may implement. If the textnaming 
scheme is not suitably general then it may not even be sufficient 
for a client system to use for textnaming files. For example, an 
increasingly popular thing to do is to build systems which look 
like Unix to the user at a terminal. 	To construct a Unix-like 
client system using the network filing system is certainly a 
possibility. One feature of Unix is that files may have multiple 
textnames (links). If the textnaming scheme of the network filing 
system did not allow this then it would be necessary. either to omit 
this feature from the implementation or to implement a separate 
textnaming scheme outside of that provided. Neither is desirable. 
For similar reasons, a restriction (actually imposed in Unix) that 
directories may not be multiply named may be unacceptable to some 
client systems. 
Almost all systems give textnames to file-like objects, such as 
peripheral devices or communication channels [RAS80]. 	This is 
because it is convenient to have an abstraction of an i/o device so 
that application programs can use the same procedures, 
independently, for example, of whether output is to a file or to a 
printer. Sometimes the textnames are recognised as devices before 
resolution, and sometimes the name is resolved and it is the 
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resolution which is recognised as a device. The second scheme is 
superior since it means that all the facilits of the file 
textnaming scheme can be used to handle the names of devices. In a 
network filing system, the distinction is as to whether the device 
textnames appear in the filing system textnaming scheme at all. If 
they do not, then the names of devices either need to be built into 
client systems, or else kept in a separate naming scheme. Because 
this is undesirable, it therefore seems essential that the network 
textnaming scheme be able to name file-like objects. In turn this 
means that files must have attributes which can be used by client 
systems, even if only to distinguish file-like objects from genuine 
files. There is no guarantee that all different client systems 
will recognise these special files as such; a file which may be a 
wire-wrap machine to one client may just be an empty file to 
another. This is unlikely to be a problem any more than a file of 
executable code to one client being just a meaningless string of 
bits to another. 
The scheme for preserving files in directories so far described 
uses early binding. Given the textname of a file and a directory, 
the filename is resolved to an internal filename and preserved in 
the directory. The component of the patbname has been bound at 
this early point, rather than later when the component is resolved. 
The alternative, late binding, requires the full pathname itself to 
be-preserved as the resolution of the component. This scheme was 
used in CAL [LAM76] where it was called a soft link (the early 
bound component was called a hard link). There are intermediate 
schemes, although it is hard to see uses for them, where some of 
the resolution (say all except the last component) is done to 
provide a textname and the internal name of a directory in which to 
resolve it. 	 - 
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Reggirements of the naming scheme 
The naming scheme breaks into two parts. Firstly the internal 
naming scheme by which a global identifier for the file is used to 
access the file. And secondly, the scheme by which textnaxnes are 
resolved to give internal identifiers. The first scheme certainly 
has to be implemented within the file servers. The second scheme 
does not. 
We have already seen that the differing requirements of 
different client systems mean that the textnaming scheme of a 
network filing system cannot afford to have unnecessary 
restrictions, for otherwise some client systems may be forced to 
implement their own textnaming scheme. This, of course, conflicts 
with our criterion that all files should be uniformly accessible 
from all clients. 
Naturally, it is possible to dream up suitably baroque 
requirements for two different client systems such that no 
textnaming scheme could satisfy them all. However, the textnaming 
schemes of all realistic filing systems have so much in common that 
it does seem to be possible to satisfy them all. 
The alternative approach, as used in WFS [SI80) or the 
Cambridge file server [D1080], is not to implement any textnaming 
scheme at all but leave it up to each client system. Although this 
gives the authors of client systems complete freedom to handle 
textnaming as they see fit, it means that files are not easily 
shared between filing systems. 	Certainly, presenting one filing 
system with the textname of a file from another is meaningless. 
The only way to share files is to drop down to the lower level and 
use the internal name. 	Since this is likely to be something 
suitable for computers, such as a 54 bit number, it is unlikely to 
be convenient for users. 
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The construction of a textnaming scheme is thus a compromise. 
On the one hand we do not want to cramp client systems' style; on 
the other we want all files to be accessible from all client 
systems. There seems to be no point in constructing a textnaming 
scheme for use by client systems unless it is going to satisfy 
their demands, for otherwise they will implement their own. Thus 
the two options seem to be to implement no textnaming scheme (but 
provide hooks for client systems to do so) or to implement a 
comprehensive naming scheme. 
The requirements are really quite simple. 	Most of the 
complexity occurs in some aspects of the implementation, especially 
in handling pathnames which cross from one server to another. 
Directories are just files which bind character strings 
(components of pathnames) to other filenames, either internal 
filenames or other pathnames. Directories could be special types 
of file inaccessible in the usual way. with foresight, this would 
make the next criterion difficult to satisfy. There should be as 
few restrictions as possible on these character strings. It seems 
reasonable to restrict them to being strings of printable 
characters but not to restrict them to 6 characters, nor to insist 
that they must not contain dollar signs. 
There is no restriction on which files can be bound to which 
character strings. 	In particular, files can have multiple 
textnames. This also applies to directories; directories may have 
multiple textnames. Further, files may be bound into directories 
on servers other than the one holding them. 
There is a global context, probably outside of the network 
filing system proper, in which the first component of a fully 
specified pathname can be resolved to the internal filename of a 
directory. 
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The requirements for the internal naming scheme are still 
simpler, although there are implementation problems associated with 
locating files and, as with textnaming, deciding when a file can be 
destroyed. 
Every file should have an eternally unique internal name. Once 
a file has been created with an internal name then no file will 
ever again anywhere be created with the same name. If internal 
names are to be used by clients, it is sensible to draw them from a 
sufficiently sparse space that the probability of a faulty client 
system producing a valid name is effectively zero,. This is most 
easily done by extending the meaningful part of the internal name 
with extra random bits. Unless security is also controlled by the 
internal name, making it a sort of capability for the file, then 
this is just a defensive measure. 	Accidentally conjuring up a 
valid internal name and then having access to the file is even more 
unlikely. 
Note that the two levels of the naming scheme are conceptionally 
independent to the extent that the textnaming scheme could be 
implemented in a separate server. The textname servers would all 
be identical and so there is no requirement that they correspond 
one-one with the file servers. If textnaming proves a bottleneck 
then we can have more textname servers than file servers proper. 
Alternatively, a local network may only need one textname server 
and several file servers. 	The textnaming could be implemented 
within the file server itself. We could also have a mixture, where 
some file servers and textname servers coreside and some are 
functionally distributed. 
Most of the textnaming can even be moved to client machines. 
There is no problem about aspects of the textnaming scheme which 
only involve read access to directories, such as resolution of 
textnames. If write access to directories is also to be moved, 
then there is scope for trouble. The network filing system cannot 
trust the client systems to write directories correctly. However, 
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users have a strong incentive to ensure that they only use client 
systems which do maintain directories properly since their files 
will otherwise become inaccessible (if not destroyed). If access 
to directories is controlled by a proper security scheme, rather 
than by a self-imposed regime of the textnaming server, then a 
client system will not be able to corrupt directories of other than 
its own users. 	This ignores Trojan horse problems of client 
systems deliberately saving up passwords which pass through them. 
A crash of a client system while updating a directory could also 
cause problems; proper control of consistency will remove this as a 
potential source of trouble. 
To implement the naming scheme, it is necessary to increase the 
locality and independence of the file servers without breaking down 
the illusion of a single coherent scheme. This inevitably leads to 
some compromises. 
Location of files 
Having resolved the 	textname to an internal name for a file, 
we have to locate the file. Normally it will reside at the same 
server as the internal name was discovered, but for a binding 
across servers this will not be the case. 
The key decision is whether or not the internal filename 
contains sufficient information to locate the holding server, and, 
if not, from where this information is to come. 	Note that any 
procedure concerned with the location of files is simply a way of 
increasing efficiency. 	The actual location of the file can 
certainly be found by a request to the server which holds it, and 
so searching all servers will always succeed (unless the file does 
not really exist). 	Procedures for locating files are merely 
conventions which speed up location by restricting the servers 
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which need to be considered. Because they do not directly affect 
the functionality of the network filing system it is appropriate to 
use heuristic techniques to perform location. It is in the nature 
of heuristics that they may occasionally fail, and then a full 
search may need to be invoked. 
If the internal filename contains the server in some way, then 
deriving the location of the file from its name is easy. 
Unfortunately, we lose two desirable features. Firstly, we cannot 
move a file between servers without its name changing. Secondly, 
we cannot have multiple copies of a file without each copy having a 
different name. 
The Cambridge file server [D10801 goes further than this and has 
the internal name of a file include the disc address of its header. 
This is even more restrictive since the file cannot even be moved 
around within the server, to compact a disc for example. 	It is 
also difficult to see how an archive and recovery scheme could work 
since recovering a file from archive requires a particular disc 
page to be free. 
If the internal name does not include the server holding the 
file then the file will need to be searched for. 	In a suitably 
rich network environment this search could include many widely 
scattered servers. 	An unrestricted search is unacceptable, 
especially in the case where the internal filename has been 
incorrectly quoted and does not, in fact, exist. 	The only 
acceptable alternatives are to restrict the search to a tractable 
size or to construct another method for discovering the location of 
a file. 
Most files will not move from one server to another, so it is 
sensible to include the site at which the file was created in the 
internal name. This may, in any case, be necessary to ensure that 
internal names are unique in space. 	This still does not cover 
files which move between servers nor files which are read-only and 
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multiply incarnated, but it covers all but a tiny percentage of 
files. 
It is difficult to construct alternative methods for deciding 
the location of a file, without requiring a central file location 
atlas. One solution to the files moving [LAM81] is to have the 
creating server maintain a table of all files which have moved on 
elsewhere. Occasionally, every server reports all the imported 
files that it holds to their creators, to ensure that these tables 
are kept up to date. If very few files move, then this mechanism 
is cumbersome. 	Nevertheless, it can cope with a wide range of 
movement, and cope with it automatically. 
Another way of performing the location is to leave it all to the 
client. when a file is not found in any expected place, then the 
client searches for it. Users can guide this search since they may 
have a good idea of where the file is to be found. Once located, 
the client puts the couplet of internal filename and holding server 
into a lookaside exception list, a sort of cache of files which are 
in unexpected places. The search can then be bypassed if the file 
is acced again sufficiently quickly. 
The alternative approach is to restrict file movement. We have 
already considered the ultimate restriction that files may not move 
at all. For example, a sensible restriction might be that a file 
could only move between its creating server and the archive server 
covering it. 	This restriction would be too severe in some 
circumstances. 
Note that both approaches (an alternative location scheme and 
restricted movement) only attempt to deal with files which move. 
Files which remain at their creating server are found directly. 
Although most files are at their creating server, files are not 
uniformly accessed. Many of the files actually accessed will be 
copies of read-only files such as the executable code of compilers. 
Mow they are handled depends, to an extent, on how they are created 
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since this can affect their naming. 
Read-only files will need a special instruction to create them 
from a file which is writeable, the clone file. This instruction 
can take one of three forms. Firstly, a writeable clone file can 
be declared to be henceforth read-only. 	Secondly, a write-once 
file can be created, which becomes read-only after it has been 
initialised. Thirdly, an instruction can request a new read-only 
copy be created of a given clone file which, itself, remains 
writable. The second and third approaches seem preferable. This 
is because it will almost certainly be convenient for read-only 
file to be identifiable as such from their internal name. This is 
especially important if the internal name contains the identity of 
the creating server, for this is fairly meaningless for a read-only 
file which may exist at every server. 
On .resolving a pathname to the internal name of a read-only 
file, the strategy to locate the file will need to be different. 
Since the internal name carries little hint as to a likely server, 
it is sensible that read-only files are kept at the closest server 
to any client likely to use them. This is sensible, in any case, 
from a performance point of view. A read-only file is thus always 
expected to be found at a nearby server. 	One particularly 
important place that a read-only file might be found is on a client 




When a file is created, a file server issues an eternally unique 
internal name for the file. To access the file for any purpose, 
this internal name is presented to the file server. 	One such 
purpose might be to delete the file. 	The internal name is 
invalidated and the space used to hold the file can be recovered 
and reissued (if the storage medium is multiply writable). 
If the internal name is mislaid, then the file becomes 
unnameable. Because no client can name the file, it cannot be 
deleted. The file server cannot tell the difference between an 
internal name lost (for all time) and an internal name which has 
not been used for some time. It cannot, therefore, autonomously 
delete the file, even though no client would be able to detect that 
this has been done. We will call such a file a "lost" file. 
As with location of files, this section is concerned with 
efficiency considerations, rather than functionality. It is always 
safe to preserve a lost file. It is desirable to be able to reuse 
the pages allocated to a file should it become lost, and even a 
write-once medium is likely to benefit from keeping its tables free 
of the internal names of lost files. 
Almost by definition, it is not possible to enumerate the lost 
files. The only way, therefore, to detect lost files is to 
enumerate all those files which are not lost, then enumerate all 
the files (both lost and otherwise); the difference is the lost 
files. It is safe to delete these files since it will be 
undetectable (there is no internal name with which to perform the 
detection). This is just the same as the garbage collection 
approach used in the implementation of applicative languages. 
Unfortunately, it is not directly possible to enumerate all the 
files which are not lost since they may be preserved In very 
inaccessible places such as sheets of paper or burnt into memory in 
client machines. 	It is therefore necessary to use a narrower 
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definition of lost. A file is lost if its internal filename is not 
preserved in a place accessible to the network filing system. 
The most common approach to doing this is to bring the 
textnaming scheme further into the filing system proper, and then 
to insist that every file has at least one textname. The explicit 
delete command is then done away with, and a remove textname 
command used instead. When the last textname is unbound, the file 
is unnameable (by textname) and hence unnameable by internal name 
(an assumption); so it can be recycled. 
Unfortunately, detecting the removal of the last textname is 
insufficient on its own. Two directories can contain textnames for 
each other with no further directory containing a textname for 
either. Although the last name of neither directory file has been 
removed, both are lost since there is no full pathname to them 
(nor, perhaps, to other files for which they contain textnames). 
There are two ways to handle this. 	Either to ensure that such 
situations cannot occur, or to have a program which scans the 
textname graph and disposes of such cases. 
The simplest way to arrange that lost files cannot occur is to 
insist that the textnaming graph is acyclic. 	If it is, then a 
reference count scheme will suffice to detect unnameable files. 
This is most easily achieved by barring more than one textname for 
a given internal name, or barring directories from having more than 
one textname. 	This second solution is that used in Unix, for 
example, although a particular form of cycle is allowed since every 
directory contains a link to its parent. 	Under either of these 
conditions, the textname graph will be an acyclic tree and a simple 
reference count scheme will suffice. 
There are strong arguments ESAL771 for not making arbitrary 
restrictions like this since the textnaming may become too 
restricted for some purpose that we might use it for, necessitating 
further special purpose textnaming schemes within files. 
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Furthermore, if bindings are permitted to be made by giving the 
textname component, the internal name of the file, and the internal 
name of the directory, then it will be very difficult to detect an 
attempt to create a cyclic structure. If textnaming is handled in 
some client systems, they may not bother even to try to detect it. 
A true garbage collection may need to be done to destroy all lost 
files. Without the acyclic guarantee, it is possible to have a set 
of files with non-zero reference counts which are not reachable 
from the top-level directories in the filing system. A necessary 
condition for garbage collection to be rcy.u.red is the removal of 
a binding to a directory with a non-zero reference count. This 
garbage collection turns out to be less complex than it might 
appear and can be done without taking the filing system out of 
service [51R78 , GAR8O]. 
An alternative to garbage collection is to distinguish one 
textname for each file, the principal name [LAM76]. If the file is 
deleted using this name then it is deleted; otherwise the name is 
merely unbound. If any file accounting is done, either for money 
or to encourage frugality, then this scheme works quite well since 
the owner of the principal name pays for the storage. Most of the 
other schemes interface poorly with any form of accounting for 
storage costs. 
If an approach is taken where the textnaming of files is outside 
of the filing system, then lost files are a worse problem. Garbage 
collection consists of marking all the reachable files and deleting 
the rest. 	The first stage is still easy enough, but since the 
unreachable files may belong to another filing system they cannot 
be deleted. 
For example, in WFS [S179] files are identified by a unique 
integer which must be presented to delete the file. Since there is 
no other mechanism for deleting files, losing this integer 
precludes ever being able to delete the file. This was originally 
not considered a problem but eventually this lax approach had to be 
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tightened up. Any files not held in the standard naming system 
implemented on top of WFS might be deleted [LAM81]. 
A compromise solution is that adopted by the Cambridge 
file-server [D1080,B1R79]. 	Here, 	the 	textnaming 	is 	the 
responsibility of clients but the file server maintains a vestigial 
copy of the naming graph. A file is lost if it is lost from this 
naming graph, even if the internal name exists elsewhere. 	This 
does not completely solve the problem since a client server may 
consider a directory to be empty while the file server considers it 
to contain files. These files are reachable from the point of view 
of the file server but not from the point of view of the client 
filing system which will never attempt to reach them. 	Although 
this is a single server filing system, the garbage collection is 
done asynchronously (but occasionally) by another machine on the 
network [GAR80]. 
In a network filing system this garbage collection is 
potentially far worse. 	We have already decided that it is 
desirable to allow textnames on one server to be bound to internal 
names for files at another. Any garbage collection thus needs to 
cover all servers, which may well be an intractable task. 	It 
should even involve storage volumes which are offline. 
Even if this garbage collection could be correctly performed, 
the unrestricted binding of textnames to files at other servers may 
be undesirable. A large file may be preserved at one server merely 
because someone has a remote binding about which they have 
forgotten; at best, the file should be shipped off to their local 
server but the binding is probably unnecessary. 
The best way to restrict the binding is to have a graph of 
storage volume relationships. 	We say that a storage volume A 
"influences" a storage volume B if a textname on A bound to an 
internal name on B is sufficient to guarantee preservation of the 
file. Note that two volumes may influence each other. 	Such 
volumes are called "coupled" and a cycle can occur in the 
textnaming graph across such volumes. 
Now the way to do the garbage collection is clear. 	Since a 
cyclic structure can only occur on a single volume or in a cycle of 
volumes each of which is coupled to the next, we must garbage 
collect a coupled set of volumes. There is nothing to be gained by 
restricting the naming so that coupled is not a transitive 
relation. If volume A is coupled to B and volume B to C, then we 
gain nothing by not coupling A to C. 
First we scan all the coupled volumes in the set and note all 
reachable files. 	Next we scan all the influential volumes for 
inbound bindings to the storage volumes being garbage collected. 
Finally, any files remaining unreachable are garbage and can be 
destroyed. 
Of fline volumes used for archive purposes will have no coupled 
volumes (which would imply non-archive files being named from 
archived directories) but will be influenced by some online volumes 
containing the archive directories. Unbinding the name from one of 
these archive directories will result in the file being deleted 
from the archive when it is next garbage collected. 
If any volume is offline (or its holding server is not running) 
when a remote binding is removed then there is no problem. 	The 
file may be preserved unnecessarily until the next garbage 
collection but it certainly will not be deleted in error. There 
is, however, a problem when creating a binding if the volume 
holding the file management data is inaccessible. If the teiame 
reference count is not updated then the file may be deleted in 
error whilst it still has outstanding textnaines. It is tieretore 
necessary to prevent creating such a binding if the reference count 
of the file being bound is inaccessible. 
82 
Multiple servers on the same local network will be coupled and 
will have unrestricted binding amongst themselves. Binding to a 
file on a distant server, while not disallowed, is not sufficint 
in itself to preserve the file. 	Note that we cannot have the 
desirable setup where each server is coupled to those near it. 
Because coupled is effectively transitive, this means that all the 
servers would need to be garbage collected together, the task we 
are trying to avoid. 
If the server uses write-once optical discs, then the garbage 
collection will take place when a disc is nearly full and needs to 
be condensed to a new disc to gain more unwritten working space. 
This happens rarely and is the only time that information can be 
lost from such a filing system so there is no need to maintain 
reference counts. The concept of influential storage volumes is 
still needed to limit the size of the garbage collection, 
especially because optical discs are so large. 
A workable textriaming scheme 
Files are identified by internal filenames, which are actually 
large integers. Given such an internal filename it is possible to 
extract the identity of the server which created the file, and 
whether or not the file is a read-only file which (potentially) 
exists on many servers in the network or on local caches held by 
clients. No other explicit method of location of files than this 
exists, although it may be sensible to search in a few likely 
places if the creating server denies knowledge of a desired file. 
Influenced volumes also provide useful hints for likely servers to 
hold the file. 
There is a textnaming scheme as follows. Each server maintains 
a particular distinguished directory, the root directory, a 
separate root directory for each server. An external textnaming 
scheme for servers exists so that the first component of a full 
pathname can be resolved to the root directory on a particular file 
server. In practice, this would be implemented by a name server or 
by having the names of servers well-known, in the sense that any 
client could convert a server textname into a network address and 
the internal filename of its distinguisehd directory. Resolution 
of a textname normally starts in the global context of the 
textnaines of the servers comprising the filing systems. 	In some 
cases, resolution will be required to start in a specific directory 
and this is achieved by specifying the internal name of the 
directory file. 
Each entry in a directory binds a component of a textname to one 
of three things. 
The first thing to which a component can be bound in a directory 
is the internal name of another directory. 	This is normal for 
early components of a long pathname. The component of the pathname 
just resolved is removed and the rest of the name resolved starting 
from the directory found in the resolution. 
The second thing to which a component can be bound is the 
internal name of an ordinary file. Any file other than a directory 
is ordinary in this context. Only the last component of a textname 
will normally resolve to an ordinary file since such a file does 
not directly provide a context for further resolution. Since files 
have attributes, an empty file together with its attributes can be 
used as a representation for other objects. 	For example, one 
attribute might be the network address of a textnamed network 
service. 
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The third thing is another pathname. 	This is the soft link 
discussed earlier. The pathname found is inserted as a prefix onto 
the remainder of the pathname being resolved to give a new 
pathname. This pathname is resolved starting back in the global 
context. 
Some examples are in order. 	Consider resolving the textname 
"serverl2.paul.abc". The first component, "server12" specifies the 
server whose root directory is to be used to resolve "paul". This 
could, in turn, resolve to a directory in which there will be a 
component "abc" which is bound to an ordinary file. Alternatively, 
"server l2.paul" could be bound to the soft link "server l3.peter" 
which restarts the resolution back in the global context with the 
pathname "server 13 .peter .abc". 
Finally, consider the resolution of "server12.magtape.abc". The 
first resolution, of "server12.magtape", could be an ordinary file. 
Since this is not, a context for further resolution, the internal 
name resolved • together with the remaining part of the pathname, 
"abc", are passed back to the client. The attributes of file with 
that internal name specify a network address. This is passed the 
remaining pathname and checks that the volume label of the mounted 
tape is "abc". The magnetic tape server then returns some handle 
by which the mounted tape can be accessed, the final resolution of 
the textname. 
The storage volumes at some servers influence those at others. 
This influence is known at both servers but not necessarily 
elsewhere. When a new binding is made to a file on another server 
(directory or ordinary), and the server holding the binding has 
influence over the server holding the file, then a reference count 
for the file is incremented. The server holding the file must be 
accessible to increment this count at the time that the binding is 
made. When a binding is removed the reference count is decremented 
if possible. The other server does not need to be accessible at 
this time. This asymmetry arises since it does not compromise the 
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correctness of the filing system if a file is unnecessarily 
preserved, since this turns out to mean preserved when noone can 
detect that it is being preserved. On the other hand, destroying a 
file early is detectable; again, almost by definition. 
Occasionally, a garbage collection is done to destroy unnameable 
lost files, as described in more detail earlier. 
This occasional garbage collection, also enforcesthe uniformity 
of the textnaining scheme, even if it is implemented in client 
operating systems. In this case, the garbage collector has to be 
tolerant of finding rubbish in files which purport to be 
directories. Directories just bind textname components to the 
internal filenames for files (binding to a pathname does not affect 
the garbage collection). If the directory is corrupted then this 
is either obvious, or the internal names are those of non-existent 
files, or they are internal names of the wrong files. All of these 
are safe, in the sense that it is not possible for a client system 
to overwrite a directory in a way which causes files from other 
directories to be destroyed in error. 
Most of the compromises in this scheme arise out of the fact 
that a global view of something as large as a distributed filing 
system is intractably expensive. 	It is not possible to garbage 
collect a filing system of forty servers spanning as many networks. 
It is not even sensible to search them all to find a file without 
being expressly requested to do so. This means that in minor ways 
we have had to forgo the criterion that the location of a file is 
transparent. For example, the concept of influential volumes 
conflicts directly with this. 
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Summary 
The naming scheme developed is much more general than those of 
most filing systems. It starts from the full requirements of the 
naming scheme and only restricts these when necessary to make 
implementation possible. 
Most other systems restrict the context of the internal name of 
a file to the volume on which its textname is preserved (and so, 
the volume on which it is found). 	This goes against our desire 
that the facilites and guarantees about a file do not depend on its 
location. Even if most systems did otherwise, their control of 
consistency in the face of crashes is so poor that naming across 
volumes would be very difficult to set up reliably. 
There are three main compromises necessary to make the naming 
implementable. Firstly, unrestricted movement of files from server 
to server is not handled well. Secondly, a file is only preserved 
if its internal name is bound to a reachable textname. 	And 
thirdly, the concept of reachable in the last compromise is further 
restricted by only considering certain storage volumes to be 
reached from a given volume. 
All of these compromises seek to restrict the global view of the 
naming scheme as little as possible, whilst increasing the autonomy 
of each file server so that the illusion of the global view is 
implemented out of local concepts. 	whether the rather intuitive 
restrictions will prove to be problematic in practise is something 
which cannot be discovered other than empirically. 
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Chapter 6: Security 
Most filing systems require some sort of security scheme since 
not all users wish their files to be uniformly accessible to all 
other users of the network filing system. 	Even in a very open 
environment where noone is worried about secrecy, it is a sensible 
defensive approach not to allow arbitrary users to (accidentally or 
deliberately) overwrite existing files. 
Security interacts directly with sharing and naming. If there 
is no way for a user to name the files of another user then we have 
complete security but files are unshareable. 	If all files are 
shared and nameable by other users then there is no security. The 
problem is how to restrict access to files so that being able to 
name a file is not a sufficient condition to access it. 
Levels of security 
Security is never absolute. The aim of a security scheme of any 
kind is to make access to the secured data so hard that other 
approaches to compromising its information content are more 
attractive to an intending rogue. In turn, this means that we want 
to make the system secure against all believable methods of attack. 
This means that the level of security may differ according to 
how important the data to be protected is seen to be. The defence 
department of a country probably processes information by computer 
which they feel can justify any expense to protect. This means 
that computer rooms need to be in metal cages to prevent stray 
radiation from disc drives being picked up, stringent restrictions 
on who can enter buildings housing computers and terminals and so 
on. On the other hand, a university department may wish to keep 
pending exam questions in a computer filing system. 	Picking up 
stray radiation from the computer room, or tapping terminal lines 
are hardly believable methods of attack, for they are probably more 
difficult than non-computer approaches such as breaking into 
offices. Doing the work required to answer the questions is 
probably the easiest method of attack anyway. 
Local networks raise a special problem as far as intercepting 
data is concerned. 	Almost all local networks are inherently 
broadcast. A message is sent to all stations on the network. 
Hopefully one station recognises the destination address and passes 
the message to its host. 	With minor hardware alteration, and 
possibly even by software command, a station can be configured to 
receive all messages on the network (this is a useful feature for a 
monitor station). A station configured in such a way is clearly a 
security risk. 
The only solution to this eavesdropping problem is to encrypt 
all messages. There are a number of ways of doing this, depending 
on the encryption scheme being used [NEE781. 	Most encryption 
schemes rely on a key of some sort, for example the data encryption 
standard of the US national bureau of standards [NBS77]. This key 
has to be agreed between both parties to the encryption and so it 
needs to be inconveniently transmitted by another route (the 
network being insecure). The most attractive scheme is one of the 
public key cryptosystems [D1F76]. These avoid the problem of key 
transmission since the keys used to encrypt and decrypt are 
different. Depending on whether the encryption is being used for 
unforgeably signing a message or for concealing its contents, only 
the encryption or decryption key respectively needs to be secret; 
the other is published foi' intending communicators. 	An elegant 
scheme using two such key pairs can be used to conceal the contents 
of an unforgeable signed message. 	Public key cryptosystems are 
unfortunately computationally very expensive, hence very slow 
without hardware support. 	A single chip implementation of the 
algorithms [R1V80] can currently encrypt (or decrypt) about 1200 
bits per second. Hardware using hundreds of chips can do better, 
but is too expensive to consider adding to every network station. 
It is worth noting that a public key system can be used to transmit 
the key for use with a less computationally demanding scheme to 
achieve higher bandwidth. Nevertheless, current encryption rates 
are several orders of magnitude less than the data rates typical of 
local area networks. 
From now on we will assume that the network is secure. We will 
also assume that the file servers are secure; that is, that a rogue 
cannot run an arbitrary program in a file server machine and hence 
access the long term storage directly. We will also ignore such 
possible breaches of security as collecting radio interference from 
computers or the network, of tapping phone lines used as part of a 
long haul network and so on. 	In fact, we will restrict 
consideration to the case of a rogue user running a malevolent 
program in a client machine. The operating system of the client 
machine is not trusted though. 
Traditional aooroaches 
Traditionally, complete security schemes are not implemented and 
it is doubtful whether their usefulness would justify their 
complexity. A complete security scheme would need the rights to 
access a file to be transferable, that any particular right of 
access already granted could be revoked (together with any rights 
passed on to others) and so on. 	A more pragmatic approach has 
resulted in more restricted schemes. 	Access to a file can be 
permitted to individual users, to the general public, to people who 
know a secret password, to programs marked in a special way and so 
on. These rights of access are not transferable in any generalised 
way and so can be revoked comparatively easily. 
With a coresident filing system, the most common way to 
implement security is for the operating system to supply 
information about the identity of users accessing the filing system 
and about the use to which the data will be put. In a distributed 
filing system, performing this identification is much more complex. 
If the network has a comprehensive authorization scheme, or if the 
network filing system implements one of its own by insisting that 
users go through some logon ritual involving passwords, the 
identification of people is not too hard. 	Identification of 
programs being run by people other than its author is still tricky. 
For example, many operating systems allow a file of executable 
code to be protected so that it may be executed but not read for 
any other purpose. Effectively, access to the file is restricted 
to the code loader program, and some facilities for examining 
memory locations are inhibited. There are two problems about this 
in a distributed environment. 	The first concerns how to 
distinguish requests from the loader program from requests from 
other programs intent on stealing the code. The second is that it 
is hardly worthwhile anyhow, since having correctly loaded the code 
a user can dump the store contents of the client machine and unpick 
the code at leisure. 
The case where a loaded program writes a file, rather than reads 
it in some way, is not so amenable to attack by dumping the store 
of the client. 	Consider a mail program which updates files of 
messages only accessible to the mail program. The only parts of 
the file which ever appear in the store of the client machine are 
those to which the user has access anyway. 	However, the mail 
program has to be self-identifying since there is no trusted third 
party to perform the identification. - Whatever the means of 
identification, whether an encryption key or a password, it has to 
be contained within the code of the mail program, even if it is 
contained in a complex way and for only a short period. 	In any 
case, at some point the mail program will have to transmit the 
identification across the network to a file server. 	Although we 
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are considering the network to be secure, we are not considering 
the client operating system to be secure. Unless the mail program 
can get the key into the network without using the client operating 
system then there is scope for interception. The scheme can be 
made more complex by making the key an algorithm with the server 
providing some input data and checking the output. 	Intercepting 
the result is now less useful since the server is unlikely to 
supply the same input data next time. This is analogous to how we 
might check someone's identity over the phone by asking them one of 
a large number of unlikely questions such as what their mother's 
maiden name is. Nevertheless, the fact that the key is contained 
in the insecure container of the code of the program makes it 
vulnerable to attack. 
For a program like this, security can be achieved by running it 
in a separate server. For something as useful and widely used as a 
mail program, creating a mail server is probably a sensible act of 
functional distribution. However, many programs which the creator 
may like to invest with extra powers cannot justify their own 
server. A traditional example is to implement a league table for 
the game of Moo CALE711 which can be updated by the Moo program but 
not by individuals attempting to fraudulently improve their 
positions. 
If we ignore this problem of extracting secret keys from program 
code, which only occurs when a user is running a program invested 
with some file access which would otherwise be denied to the user, 
then there are still a number of ways in which the security scheme 
could be implemented. 
The first scheme is that of access lists. Associated with each 
file is a list of the users who may access it. Often this list is 
very stylised, perhaps dividing the universe of users into the 
owner of the file and everyone else. There are two points at which 
this access list can be checked. when resolving the textname of 
the file the access list is checked to see whether the use to which 
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the resolution will be put is allowed. Or when accessing the file 
the access list is checked to see if the attempted access is 
allowed; resolution is unrestricted (actually, since directories 
are usually files then resolution is itself partly protected by the 
same scheme). 	One of these two access list schemes is used in 
almost all coresident filing systems, and in all of the early file 
servers. 
The biggest problem with access lists for a network file server 
is the requirement for a global scheme for naming and validating 
users. For Jack to permit one of his files to Jill, it is 
necessary for him to send a message to the file server holding the 
file. This message has to nominate Jill in such a way that the 
server can safely recognise her when she attempts to access the 
file. This requires that a complete copy of the user list for the 
entire network filing system be held at each server, or else at a 
number of authorisation servers. 	Furthermore, the scheme for 
verifying identity needs to be held at these sites too; usually 
this entails holding an encrypted password associated with each 
username. Neither of these solutions is attractive, especially 
when adding a new user. 	Apart from the restriction that all 
usernaxnes must be unique, the new user list must be distributed to 
all sites holding it. 	If the network filing system is very 
geographically distributed, it is unlikely that centralising the 
authority to create new users is acceptable and so there is 
potential either for conflicting updates or a need for a complex 
locking scheme. 
The second scheme is that of capabilities. Files are identified 
by tokens which are probabalistically hard to forge since they are 
drawn from an intractably sparse space of possible tokens. 	For 
example, they could be 64 bit integers. 	This is the scheme 
favoured by all of the universal file servers. 	Possessing the 
token for a file is itself sufficient to access the file. In other 
words, the files which are accessible are just those which are 
nameable. This causes a problem since directories are files; 
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knowing the token for a directory is sufficient to read the 
directory and so discover the tokens for all the files which it 
contains. It is thus not directly possible for a user to give 
access to a file to another user by the usual means of transmitting 
the textname via some external means (such as post, electronic mail 
or speech). If the recipient user can resolve that textname then 
any other textname in the directory is also resolvable since the 
token for the directory must be known. The actual token has to be 
transmitted, and people do not easily remember 64 bit numbers (one 
motivation for having the textnaniing in the first place). However, 
there is no problem about identification of users. Users know the 
token for their top level directory which then gives access to all 
their files. More probably, they actually get this token from some 
other trustworthy server in exchange for a memorable password. 
To avoid this inconvenient way of sharing files, the filing 
systems built on top of capability filing systems, for example the 
CAP filing system EDEL801, recast the capability access as an 
access list scheme. Only the filing system uses the tokens for 
directories, and it keeps them hidden from users. The fact that 
the client filing system possesses the token for a file by 
resolving a name in a directory does not necessarily mean that the 
user can access the file; the filing system may choose not to 
reveal the token for the file. 	This is how a coresident filing 
system works, where the filing system can access any file, but it 
administrates which users can access which files. Apart from the 
problem of hiding anything in the code of an untrustworthy system, 
there is another problem. There has to be an agreed conspiracy 
amongst all the client systems to uniformly restrict access. 	A 
filing system can only sensibly release the tokens for high level 
directories to programs which will not themselves publicly reveal 
hidden tokens which are easily discovered by traversing the 
directory structure. In practice, this means that all the filing 
systems end up being independent and never release tokens for 
directories. It is difficult to see how to implement a single 
textnaming and security scheme in such an environment of mutual 
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suspicion. 
Even the tokens for ordinary files (as opposed to textname 
directories) cannot be freely released to users by the filing 
system. We will normally want other users to have only limited 
access, such as read-only access, to our files but the token gives 
all access. 	Unless we have multiple tokens for files granting 
different kinds of access then we still have problems organising 
that another user has access to our files. These multiple tokens 
themselves are a problem since they have to be stored somewhere 
too. Further, since they may also be stored in places unknown to 
the filing system, it is not possible to guarantee being able to 
revoke a granted access. 
A hybrid scheme 
The problem with the access list approach is that it is clumsy 
to use over a network. The problem with the capability approach is 
that it is too inflexible to have only one token for each file 
since any finer grain of protection has to be provided outside of 
the filing system by agreed restriction within client operating 
systems. Even having multiple tokens for files only solves some of 
the problems. A solution lies in using a more hybrid approach. 
In some ways the access list scheme and the capability scheme 
with multiple tokens are much more similar than appears at first 
sight. Access list schemes restrict access to a list of users. 
These users identify themselves by presenting their name and 
password either to the file server itself or to a third party which 
exchanges them for some form of hard-to-forge authorisation token. 
Since users demonstrate their identity with passwords, it is only a 
short step to regard authorisation lists, not as lists of users, 
but as lists of passwords. To access a file it is necessary to 
have an appropriate internal filename and password pair, and these 
are hard to guess since the passwords are drawn from a large sparse 
space. 
Correspondingly, the file capability scheme also constructs such 
pairs. Although it may not be possible to directly extract them 
from the token, a token splits into two parts, one which identifies 
the file and the other which is hard to forge which both validates 
the first part and discriminates among the different possible 
tokens for the file. 
Both schemes therefore check the validity of access by requiring 
extra information, which we shall call a key. In the access list 
case, the keys are chosen by the users concerned; in the capability 
case they are chosen by the filing system. Even if the keys are 
chosen by the users, the internal filename will need to be drawn 
from a sparse space to ensure that an out-of-date internal filename 
is not rediscovered and accepted in error. 
The second scheme, where the keys are chosen by the filing 
system, has a major disadvantage. 	Since the keys have no 
significance to users, they will need to be kept somewhere in 
directories. These directories are themselves files and so they 
will also have keys. Directories thus contain keys and so cannot 
be read by untrusted programs, which is something which we are 
seeking to achieve. 	Also, each user has to either remember at 
least one key, or rely on a trusted third party to provide it in 
exchange for validated identification, probably a name and 
password. 	 - 
The second scheme, with keys chosen by users, is very much 
better. Now, since the keys are remembered by users, they do not 
need to be stored in directories. 	Directories can thus be 
comparatively unprotected objects since discovering the internal 
filename for a file from a directory is not a sufficient condition 
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to be able to access it. There are, however, two problems. 
The keys are just passwords, or more probably transformed 
passwords. Since passwords need to be typed in public places and 
are occasionally written down, they occasionally become 
compromised. Users therefore need the ability to change their 
passwords. It is convenient if this does not require re-keying all 
their files, although changing passwords is rare enough that this 
might be an acceptable overhead to avoid further complication. 
The second problem is that a user needs to be able to permit 
access to a file to another user without knowing the recipient 
user's password. 	One way to do this would be for donor and 
recipient users to choose a key (password) specially for this 
purpose, although this raises the problem of key transmission if 
electronic mail or the telephone system are considered insecure, 
and the two parties are too remote to meet. 	The need for this 
advance agreement may, therefore, be inconvenient. One situation 
in which no problem arises is when the author of a program wishes 
to permit it access to a file. Here donor and recipient (user and 
program) are really one individual, and so there is no problem 
about agreeing and transmitting a key. 
Both of these problems can be attacked by creating a trusted 
identification server, and adding a level of indirection. 	Instead 
of keying files directly by the password, they are keyed by special 
hard-to-guess authorisation keys. Since these are never typed nor 
displayed, they do not need to be changeable. 	A user (or the 
client operating system) aquires their authorisation key from the 
identification server, probably by presenting a name and password 
although it could be by inserting a physical key or card, or by 
some more futuristic identification scheme such as fingerprint 
recognition. 
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Now users are free to change their passwords without significant 
overhead. Permitting access to a file requires the donor user to 
request the identification server to add the recipient user's 
authorisation key to the file's access list, without revealing this 
key to the donor. This is really the way coresident filing systems 
work, with the operating system performing the functions of the 
identification server. 
Unless the network has identification servers for other reasons, 
which is possible but by no means certain, constructing them 
especially for file security is unattractive. This would require 
that the usernames, the authorisation keys and any data, such as 
passwords, needed for verification be distributed to them all. As 
already discussed, this leads to update problems. 	In the wider 
context of the rest of the network, this expense may be 
justifiable. For the filing system alone, it is not. 	Here the 
identification server is not so much for identifying users as for 
allowing a file donor to instruct a file server to add another 
user's authorisation key to a file without needing to know it (or, 
indeed, being able to discover it). Mere verification of identity 
can be performed without needing an identification server by using 
passwords as follows. 
The authorisation key that is used for file access is encrypted 
with the password, and the encrypted form is kept in a known (but 
insecure) place. Users aquire their authorisation keys by fetching 
the insecure encrypted form and decrypting it with the password to 
get the authorisation key. 	Changing a password is effected by 
re-encrypting the authorisation key with the new password and 
storing it back in the insecure place. Instead of keying their 
files directly with passwords, users key them with the 
authorisation key; since this is never typed or displayed it cannot 
be discovered easily and so need not be alterable. However, the 
current password is necessary to discover it. Passwords still need 
to be agreed to allow access to other users, but the massive 
re-keying necessary when users change their everyday passwords is 
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avoided. 
One problem with the presentation of keys still exists. Users 
have keys to access their own files and a number of keys to access 
other users' files. The client operating system presumably manages 
these keys but it has a problem deciding which key it is 
appropriate to present to the file server. Access to the files of 
other users i.o either the exception (under normal circumstances) 
or the rule (when working on behalf of the other user) and so 
cycling through the keys in an order defined by the user will 
normally be efficient. 	Alternatively, multiple keys can be 
included in file access requests to the file servers. 	Two keys 
seems a good compromise, although almost any number can be 
justified by a suitably contrived example. 
This leaves us with the following scheme, which has the required 
versatility as far as permitting access to files goes. Further, it 
allows textnaming to be handled in client systems without 
compromising the entire textname graph. 	Other systems either 
perform all textnaming at the server or rely on client textnaming 
systems to adhere to a self-imposed scheme to restrict file access, 
due to naming and security not being distinguished. 
Files are identified by an internal filename drawn from a 
sufficiently sparse space to make it difficult for an invalid 
filename to be accidentally accepted. For reasons connected with 
naming rather than security, these internal filenames should be 
unique across the whole network. 
Associated with each file are a number of keys, and associated L4.fl& 
each- key are some access rights. 	These rights permit or bar 
various operations on the file, in particular, to write the file, 
to read the file, and to issue further keys for the file. when a 
file is created a key is provided by the user which will grant all 
rights to the file. One of these rights is the ability to create 
further keys and so additional keys can come into existence, 
presumably for the use of others. 	Granting a key of zero any 
rights at all, conventionally grants the associated rights to all 
keys; this can be used to make a file readable by the general 
public, for example. 
Whenever a file is accessed, a key must be presented which must 
grant the type of access being attempted. 	Directories are just 
ordinary files, but they have an attribute which marks them as a 
directory since the textnaming scheme needs to be able to 
distinguish them. 
Changing a password requires the key on each relevant file to be 
changed and so it is an unfortunately expensive operation. This is 
done by adding a new key granting all rights and then rescinding 
the old one. 	To reduce the overhead in the case of a user's 
ordinary password, the technique of encrypting the authorisation 
key (as described above) can be used. Forgetting a password, of 
course, renders any password alteration impossible. 	In the same 
way, forgetting a password on a conventional terminal system 
prevents access to reset the password. In both cases, some form of 
system manager has to intervene. This requires the existence of a 
loophole of some sort, a universal password which grants any access 
to any file. 	All filing systems have some similar facility 
although it is usually little discussed since it exposes the 
security in an obvious way. 
Permitting access to another user requires an agreed 
intermediate key. A key is added granting the appropriate access 
and the recipient presents the key when performing the access. 
In practice, a client system might make the facilities visible 
as follows. A user logs onto the client system by presenting a 
username and password. 	These serve to set defaults for working 
directory textnames, and to set the first key. 	Other operations 
such as obeying some startup command file may then take place. At 
any time the user has a set of quoted passwords, each of which is 
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turned into a key by some standard well known algorithm, the same 
algorithm for all client systems. 	Passwords may be added or 
removed from this set. 	When attempting a file access, these 
passwords are used in turn if the access fails through presenting 
an incorrect key. The scheme is thus fairly transparent to the 
user (apart from having to quote the passwords) although 
occasionally the password search path could get long, and hence 
slow. When a client logs off the client system, all passwords are 
erased to prevent a passer-by inheriting access rights. 
To permit file access to another user a password is agreed. The 
recipient may have a comparatively low security password used for 
such purposes anyway, or else a new one could be invented. 	The 
donor adds the password (turned into a key) together with the 
required rights to the access list for the file, and the recipient 
adds the password to the set of quoted passwords when access is 
desired. If the donor user decides to rescind the access, then the 
password (turned into a key) is removed from the access list for 
the file. 	To allow free access to the file, a null password 
(conventionally turned into key zero) is added to the access list 
granting the appropriate rights. 
Alternatively, a client system could choose to cast the security 
scheme more traditionally, where file access is permitted to named 
users. It could do this by having a means of associating a key 
with each user (either by secret algorithm or by a special file 
containing a table). 	To permit a file to a given user, the 
recipient user's key is added to the access list. 	When users 
successfully log on to client systems, their keys are set up for 
inclusion in all access requests. The permitted access would only 
be available through the particular client system implementing the 
scheme. This is preferable to the case where the security is 
breached by switching to a different client operating system. 
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Summary 
This scheme is fairly simple to implement in both the client and 
in the server, it is easy to understand at the user level and it is 
efficient in almost all cases. It is really an extension of the 
scheme which we used in our early filestore, where directories were 
protected by quoted passwords. 	Overall, it is well-suited to 
distribution since the global security scheme is constructed out of 
independent local implementations at each server. There is also no 
requirement for third party servers to validate identity. 
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Chapter 7: Consistency 
One of the major problems in the design of any filing system is 
that of preserving consistency in the face of equipment failure and 
competing access by several clients. 	We would like the filing 
system to remain consistent at all levels at all times. This is 
unlikely to be achievable since almost all changes which take the 
filing system from one consistent state to another do so through a 
number of inconsistent states. For example, when creating a file, 
there is almost certainly a stage at which some free disc pages 
have been allocated to the nascent file but which have not yet been 
properly inserted into the file location map. 
It is, however, possible to create the illusion of consistency. 
This will involve careful control of just what data is visible to 
clients at any time, and a carefully designed recovery strategy to 
cope with the system returning after equipment failure. 
This problem is far worse in a multiple server network filing 
system than in a coresident filing system. 	Firstly, only a 
proportion of the servers may crash and we want the crashed servers 
to recover without interrupting service at the others. Secondly, 
locality considerations mean that it is so much more difficult to 
check consistency (by running any sort of file structure verifier, 
for example) that it has to be prevented from occurring. 	This 
means that cooperating servers need to be synchronised in case one 
of them should crash before completing its share of the operation. 
This section starts from the loose concept of consistency and 
develops the outline of an implementable distributed filing system 
which preserves consistency. The way in which this is done depends 
on a number of assumptions. 
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Firstly, it is assumed that the guarantee of consistency is a 
good thing. 	Even though some of the events which may cause 
inconsistency are rare, the lack of a guarantee forces an 
inappropriate style of programming and operating system 
development. Ostensibly simple operations become very complex if 
applications programs have to preserve consistency themselves. 
Secondly, it is assumed that the efficiency of the filing system 
s important. 	The servers of the filing system are shared 
resources and many of the operations that they perform are done in 
synchrony with client programs; a user will often be waiting at a 
terminal. 
Thirdly, it is assumed that having multiple versions of files, 
as found in DEC files-11 [DEC78] or Tenex [B0872] is desirable. 
Apart from the obvious advantages of being able to look back at the 
past history of a file, one particular advantage that this gives is 
the ability to write a new version of a file whilst reading the old 
version; this saves the contorted way in which editors and similar 
programs (in systems without this facility) have to write a 
temporary file and then-either copy the data back to the original 
file or rename the temporary file to replace the original file. 
Further, it gives users the confidence to run a program to create a 
new version of a file, safe in the knowledge that the old version 
will still be around even if the new one is erroneous in some way. 
Finally, it is assumed that disc storage is cheap enough for the 
ideas to be workable. 	Many systems already provide multiple 
versions of files, even files for which multiple versions are not 
really required. Systems which do not provide multiple versions of 
files often use storage up in more hidden ways, when users create 
their own multiple versions using different textnames. 
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Notions of consistency 
Consistency is a rather vague notion and covers a huge range of 
constraints. At one extreme, these consistency constraints merely 
reinforce our idea of what a filing system should do. If we write 
a file and read it back again, then the filing system is 
inconsistent if we get data from a file that we have never seen 
before. At the other extreme the constraints are those common in 
the implementation of databases. The classic example is the bank 
balance problem. We withdraw a sum from an account held in one 
file and credit it to another; the system is inconsistent if the 
total of the amounts held in the two accounts taken together 
varies. Consistency is thus a guarantee that a filing system 
performs to our expectations; to put it another way, it is the 
things that we expect to be true. We are unlikely, as an ordinary 
client, to be able to verify whether they are, in fact, true, so we 
need guarantees from the filing system instead. 	Even in cases 
where we can check consistency, guarantees are more useful. 
Detecting inconsistency is only half the problem since it needs to 
be corrected; it is far better not to allow inconsistency to 
develop in the first place. 
In another sense, a well designed filing system is always 
consistent. All that varies is the level of consistency. When the 
filing system goes from one consistent state to another, it will 
normally do so through inconsistent states. If these states were 
really completely inconsistent, then it would be impossible to 
perform any sort of recovery following a crash. These states are 
merely less consistent. However, this lower level of consistency 
should allow us to recover to a higher level, and from there to a 
still higher level and so eventually to the level which we 
guarantee. 
It is sensible to have a more precise definition of .just what is 
meant by consistency. Consistency is a set of assertions about the 
state of the filing system. The filing system is consistent if 
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every assertion in the set is true; if any is false then the filing 
system is inconsistent. It is important to note that some of the 
assertions will be at client application program level, and hence 
unknown to the filing system. 
Consistency can be viewed as a two-dimensional concept. 	One 
dimension describes which data within the filing system is 
acceptable as a domain for the consistency assertions. The other 
dimension describes which data outside of the filing system is also 
acceptable in the domain. 	Loosely, one dimension describes the 
strength of the consistency and the other the context in which this 
strength can be tested. 
Levels of consistency 
The levels of consistency form a continuum. A precondition to 
even testing for consistency at one level is that the filing system 
is consistent at lower levels. Out of the continuum of levels of 
consistency, three levels in particular stand out. We shall call 
these levels zero, one and two. They correspond to allowing the 
domain of the consistency assertions to be physical addresses of 
the stable storage, the filing system structures themselves (but 
not the data in the files) and the data within the files. 
Correspondingly, the assertions allowed therefore correspond to 
those which we will guarantee to be always true, those which the 
filing system itself can test, and those which are unknown in 
detail to the filing system. 
Level zero consistency allows the domain of the assertions to be 
the physical addresses used to recover data from the stable storage 
of the filing system. The important exclusions from the domain of 
level zero consistency assertions are the structure or contents of 
any data structures held in the store of the file server or client 
machines, and the actual contents of the stable storage. 	The 
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in-store data structures are considered too volatile to form any 
basis for recovery. 	In the absence of such in-store data, the 
stable storage of the filing system consists of a lot of bits and 
to deduce any structure requires a context in which to interpret 
them. This context is provided by the level zero consistency 
assertions. 
Note that we have already assumed some assertions to be true to 
reach this level. For example, magnetic discs actually consist, 
not of bits, but of magnetic patterns, and it requires a context in 
which to interpret these as bits. Loading a disc written with one 
disc controller into a drive using another controller makes it 
clear that this context is not preordained. 	Since we are 
interested in the design of filing systems and not of controller 
logic, we assume the ability of the stable storage hardware to 
correctly interpret the stable storage. 	For current controllers 
this is a reasonable assumption. If there were a disc controller 
with a completely writable microprogram then we would need 
additional assertions about the microprogram to be used to ensure a 
uniform interpretation of the magnetic patterns as bits. 
We assume that the hardware, on being given a physical storage 
address, will deliver either a bitstring or an error status. The 
level zero assertions relate certain physical disc addresses to 
interpretations of the bitstring, or parts of the bitstring, so 
delivered. 
We need this almost trivial definition of level zero 
consistency. Since any part of the system may crash at any time, 
there have to be assertions which can be guaranteed when crash 
recovery begins, before accessing the stable storage. During the 
recovery process following a failure, the recovery program can take 
as a guaranteed precondition that the stable storage is already 
consistent at level zero; all the level zero assertions are true. 
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Most filing systems have only a few level zero consistency 
assertions. For example, consider the Unix [R1T714] filing system. 
The two critical disc storage structures are the super-block, which 
contains the parameterisation of the disc and some of the chain of 
free pages, and the i-list, an area of disc containing all the file 
headers. The level zero assertions are that page 1 on the disc is 
the super-block and the i-list is a contiguous area of disc 
starting in page 2. A crash recovery procedure can thus locate the 
super-block and the i-list, an essential first step. A more subtle 
example is given by the operating system for the Alto ELAM7I41. In 
the filing system of this operating system, disc pages are labelled 
with a few bytes of housekeeping data; the level zero assertion is 
simply that each label does in fact correctly describe the data in 
its page. 
Level one consistency is file structure consistency. The domain 
of the consistency assertions are the stable storage structures 
managed by the programs comprising the filing system. The notable 
exclusion from this domain is the contents of files that are 
maintained by the filing system as uninterpreted raw data. Changes 
to the state of the filing system which take it from one level one 
consistent state to another will do so through states which are not 
consistent at level one. For level one consistency to be useful we 
require that it is reconstructable. If the system should stop in a 
level one inconsistent state, then it must be possible both to 
detect that this has happened and either back out to the old 
consistent state or continue to advance to the new level one 
consistent state. By definition, it will be consistent at level 
zero. On its own, this is not enough. We also need assertions at 
a level of consistency intermediate between zero and one. 	These 
relate to the type of level one inconsistent states which may 
arise. They will normally be concerned either with the order in 
which critical changes are made when moving from one level one 
consistent state to another, or else with the reconstruction of 
redundant data. If this intermediate level of consistency is well 
designed, then it will be possible to reconstruct level one 
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consistency following a failure, either by returning to an old 
level one consistent state, or by completing the changes needed for 
the new level one consistent state under construction at the time 
of the failure. 
For an example of level one consistency, consider the Unix 
filing system again. One level one consistency assertion is that 
every page on the disc is either in a file, or in a chain of pages 
for allocation. 	One of the intermediate level consistency 
assertions is that if a page is both in a file and in the chain of 
pages for allocation, then it is really in the file; if a page is 
neither in the chain nor in a file, then it is really in the chain 
of pages for allocation. Since part of this chain of pages is held 
in store, a sudden stop of the whole operating system may leave the 
filing system in a state where the level one assertion is violated. 
One way to restore level one consistency would be to delete any 
file containing a page also in the chain of pages for allocation, 
and to create a special file containing all the pages which are 
neither in a file nor in the chain. 	The intermediate level 
assertions make this the wrong thing to do. It should be restored 
by reconstructing the chain of free pages to be all pages not 
contained in any file. 
Level two consistency is file-data consistency. At this level, 
the data in files is consistent at all levels of abstraction 
imposed by clients. 	In the absence of competition from other 
clients and of equipment failure, this level of consistency is the 
responsibility of client application programs. 	Since the filing 
system can only directly control level one consistency it must 
provide suitable primitives to clients to allow level two 
consistency to be couched in terms level one consistency. 	These 
primitives must ensure two things. Firstly, no two clients must be 
allowed to interfere with each other since only in the absence of 
such interference can a client guarantee level two consistency. 
Secondly, that if a crash should occur, then the filing system is 
in a state where it may either be restored to the old level two 
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consistent state or advanced to the new level two consistent state. 
As an example of level two consistency, consider a file 
containing a large number of records giving names and phone 
numbers. Two secondary index files contain tree structures to map 
respectively names and phone numbers to record numbers in the main 
file. A level two assertion would be that these secondary index 
files are correct. 	Every record in the main file is correctly 
indexed in the secondary files; every entry in the secondary files 
does correspond to a record in the main file. This is not trivial 
to guarantee if, for example, the system should crash whilst adding 
a new record. 	Since this requires alterations to three files, 
things may well get out of step. The problem is clearly further 
complicated if the files are held on different servers (admittedly 
unlikely in this example). 
Contexts for consistency 
The other dimension of consistency is that of the context in 
which it can be seen to be correct. 	The notions of consistency 
presented so far have taken no note of anything outside of the 
filing system. Perhaps the most important outside factor is that 
people using filing systems remember (or write down) the textnames 
of their files, or remember (or write down) their contents. 
Whether we permit data from outside of the filing system to be in 
the domain of the consistency assertions greatly affects their 
practical usefulness. We will distinguish two contexts for viewing 
consistency. 
The weakest context is when we do not allow any external 
information to be part of the domain of the consistency assertions. 
We shall call this internal consistency. On its own, this is not a 
particularly useful level of consistency since it can easily be 
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achieved by drastic measures such as reinitialising all discs to be 
empty following a crash. Since the purpose of a filing system is 
the long-term storage of data, achieving consistency by losing data 
and then erasing all trace of its having been there is not 
particularly useful. It is, however, the only context in which the 
filing system can test the consistency assertions. 
On the other hand, we can allow information from outside of the 
filing system to be in the domain of the consistency assertions. 
We shall call this external consistency. Since we could duplicate 
elsewhere any data stored in the filing system, and have assertions 
that the duplicate is in-step, external consistency is a strong 
requirement for long-term storage. 	Once the filing system has 
confirmed successful storage of some data, then it must never 
autonomously lose it since it would violate an assertion that the 
copy elsewhere was the same as the stored copy. This is a much 
stronger guarantee since it places restrictions on the operations 
which crash recovery can use. 	Naturally, if the system should 
crash, then there will be uncertainty about whether some initiated 
operations have completed. Internal consistency implies that they 
must succeed completely or fail completely. External consistency 
requires that it must not have been possible to find out which 
until it was certain. 	In particular, confirmation of operations 
must not be given until they have reached a point of no return 
which crash recovery will not undo. For levels lower than one, 
there is no external data which could sensibly be added to the 
domain of the assertions. 
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Table 1: Summary of consistency. assertions 
Levey 
Internal example 	\Externa1 example 
o Axioms. The first readable 
page on the disc 
gives the disc 
addresses of the No relevant 
roots of all the external data. 
filing system 
structures. 
0..1 Assertions The freepage bitmap 
about how is always flushed No relevant 
level one to disc before the external data. 
inconsistenc3 allocated pages are 
is permitted recorded as part of 
to occur. a file. 
Assertions No page is in two There is a file 
about filing files. called A in 
system existence. 
structures. 
2 Assertions The contents of file The contents of file 
about file A are a copy of the A are a copy of this 
contents. contents of file B. paper tape. 
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Failure modes 
In the event of a crash of the filing system, the recovery 
procedure will restore consistency to some level and some context. 
We would like to be able to provide guarantees as to exactly what 
these will be, but to do this requires some consideration of the 
way in which the system can fail. 
The simplest failure of the system is a sudden stop of a file 
server. This can occur for a large number of reasons ranging from 
a detected hardware error such as a memory parity error, to a 
failure of the mains power supply. In a multiple server filing 
system the situation is complicated by the fact that varying 
numbers of servers can fail and by the fact that the recovery 
procedure should not involve loss of service on the servers which 
have not failed. 	The characteristics of a sudden stop are that 
some of the servers in the filing system are reset to a standard 
state ELAM791, normally by reloading the code which runs in them. 
They then have to recover the consistency using only the 
information in their stable storage and at other servers which have 
not crashed. This is the most common failure, occurring anywhere 
from once a day to about once a year, and any filing system should 
be able to survive it. It should be less common in a file server 
than in a filing system coresident with its operating system. Most 
crashes in this case are due to the underlying operating system 
collapsing. 
Another similar failure to the sudden stop of a server is the 
failure of the network. This is much simpler to deal with than the 
failure of servers in the filing system. If the network restarts 
quickly and cleanly enough, then this failure may require no 
recovery at all. On the other hand, a complete clean up of all 
servers may be needed if the network is broken for so long that 
operations in progress are not considered to be worth restarting 
where they left off. This is fairly simple, since the servers will 
not have lost their in-store data structures (unless they have also 
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crashed in the meantime). 
The next simplest failure is that of a sudden stop with some 
corrupt stable storage. 	Magnetic discs are divided into units 
which we will call pages. A page is the smallest amount of data 
which may be written to the disc. Error detection is done on a 
per-page basis. If the power to a disc drive is out whilst it is 
actually writing a page, then it is possible for that page to be 
left in a state where neither the old data in the page, nor the new 
data being written is readable. The implication of this is that 
some data must either be duplicated or not updated in place. In 
either case we can guarantee the availability of either a good copy 
of the old data, or a good copy of the new data. We do, however, 
assume that the page is detectably bad. Modern disc controllers 
write an error detecting code of enormous width with each page and 
other forms of stable storage such as optical disc or bubble memory 
have similar characteristics since the data has to be divided into 
units for error detection purposes. 
The most difficult failure to deal with properly is that of data 
loss. This 	lies in a continuum between two cases. At one end, 
there is a single page degrading. 	A page on the disc which 
previously read without error (probably immediately after being 
written) becomes unreadable. At the other extreme is whole volume 
loss. All the data on the disc becomes unreadable. This can be 
due to a head crash or other mechanical failure destroying the 
physical media, or due to a disc controller error destroying large 
quantities of data (by leaving the write head turned on, for 
example). Many external catastrophes, such as a destructive fire, 
would come into this category too. Modern Winchester discs have a 
much lower head pressure than older discs, and can survive the head 
coming into contact with the disc. 	While not completely 
eliminating head crashes they make whole volume loss much rarer. 
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To preserve consistency in the face of such a failure is very 
difficult, since it clearly requires multiple copies of all the 
data written. 	The normal compromise between proper journaling 
EAST761 and no multiple copies at all is to take occasional 
snapshots of part or all of the filing system, usually to some 
cheaper medium such as magnetic tape or offline disc packs. In the 
event of loss of data, then any lost data can be restored to its 
state when the last snapshot was taken. These backup snapshots are 
usually taken in a rather ad hoc way, so that few guarantees can be 
given about consistency after a restoration. Whether more drastic 
measures are needed is a question of the balance between how 
catastrophic each disaster might be, weighed against its small 
probability of occurrence. 
If we decide that regular backup provides insufficient safety, 
then some form of journal is required which preserves duplicate 
copies of all pages written to the disc (together with a certain 
amount of housekeeping data). For a filing system, it is probably 
too expensive to keep a journal using one of the techniques from 
database implementation. A database journal usually preserves all 
the updates. 	In many databases these are comparatively rare. 
Furthermore, only the updated records need be journaled, rather 
than the entire physical disc pages in which the records occur. 
The data which the filing system sees as changed, the disc pages 
written, is large although the data actually altered may be small. 
It is clearly more economic to preserve the editing commands from a 
session than both the old and the new files, though it would be 
almost impossible to detect these automatically within the filing 
system. If regular backup snapshots are taken, then it is only 
necessary to preserve duplicate copies of all data written which 
has not yet been backed up. 	If only the latest copy of any 
particular page is preserved then the space required may be 
acceptable. This other copy should be kept on a different disc 
drive in case of head crashes; ideally, it should be kept on a disc 
drive on a different disc controller in case of an undetected 
controller failure; ideally, on a different processor and so on. 
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Complete safety is an unattainable goal; few of these backup 
measures would survive a nuclear war, an event with a depressingly 
non-zero probability. Even to survive other catastrophes such as a 
fire, the second copy should be kept spatially remote from the main 
copy. However, the most likely failures can be countered by 
keeping the backup copy on a different disc drive from the main 
copy. The probability of errors too drastic for this to be safe is 
tiny; in many environments, such errors would be disasters on a 
scale where the loss of the filing system would be a minor part of 
the total cost. 
Most filing systems offer few guarantees in the face of failures 
of one sort or another. Although such failures are rare, the lack 
of guarantees has much wider repercussions. 	Filing systems 
themselves minimise the effects of failures by carefully 
controlling the order in which pages are updated on the disc. User 
application programs become extremely contorted if they have to 
take the same sort of precautions without being in the same 
privileged position. For example, on systems which keep a cache of 
disc pages it is often impossible for an application program to 
discover whether or not a given updated page has reached the disc. 
Most filing systems preserve internal level one (file structure) 
consistency over most crashes, doing their best to provide external 
level one consistency. This is achieved by running some form of 
check or rebuild program, and often following this with some 
wizardry requiring fairly detailed knowledge of the filing system 
should trouble be detected. 	For example, Unix ERIT7' 	has two 
programs, dcheck and icheck, to check that all the filing system's 
level one assertions are true. The system manager is exhorted to 
run them after every crash [BEL791 and in a worst case accident, 
user files may be deleted to ensure that the filing system is level 
one consistent. Not only is no level two consistency guaranteed, 
external level one consistency is sacrificed to recreate internal 
level one consistency, since existing files may be deleted. 
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With only a guarantee of level one consistency, a client recasts 
any desired level two consistency as level one consistency by only 
ever altering whole files. 	Files are completely read and 
completely rewritten, even when it is inappropriate to do so. The 
problem is then pushed down into the filing system; either the new 
file has been created or the old one still exists. This procedure 
is usually unsafe since the filing system takes no particular care 
to guarantee it. 	Luckily, crashes are rare and crashes which 
corrupt a particularly critical filing system structure page are 
rarer. A strategy such as this which minimizes the number of 
critical pages is often, therefore, successful. This very success, 
in the absence of strong guarantees, can itself be a problem. Due 
to overconfidence, no other method is used to preserve consistency, 
and the feared catastrophe of losing both the old and the new 
versions can be extremely costly. 
In the case of catastrophic data loss, most filing systems 
enable files to be restored from a previous backup snapshot. This 
is, unfortunately, done only to internal level one consistency. We 
would like internal level two consistency (assuming that journaling 
has been considered too expensive to make recovery to 'external 
level two feasible). Thus two files may be restored to different 
previous states. Luckily, most files are unrelated to others and 
this may not be a problem. However, even source files of programs 
are often inter-related and it is certainly undesirable to be 
presented with a set of sources which will not compile together. 
We have not considered the possibility of software error causing 
a failure. 	This amounts to assuming that all errors due to 
software are detected before they affect the contents of the stable 
storage of the filing system. 	At this point they are either 
corrected or a suicidal system crash is induced. This assumption 
is, at best, questionable. A certain amount can be done to make 
the on-disc data structures more resilient by carefully 
constructing them so that it takes more than one error to destroy 
the structure [TA79]. 	In the case of a filing system, this 
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translates into a requirement that more than one erroneous disc 
transfer is needed to cause trouble, and checking for the 
occurrence of trouble is quick and simple. 	Ultimately, however, 
there is no substitute for correct software. 
Table 2: Summary of failure modes 
Failure Example causes 
System suddenly stops. Processor fault. 
Detected software 
error. 
System suddenly stops Power supply 
and corrupts the page failure. 
of stable storage 
being written. 
A page of stable Very rare; air 
storage degrades and filter failure on 
becomes unreadable. magnetic disc drive. 
A whole volume of Magnetic disc head 
storage become crash. 
unreadable. Optical disc melts 
in a fire. 
Many volumes of Natural catastrophe 
storage become unreadable, such as fire or 




Many filing systems have some notion of multiple versions 
(sometimes called generations) of a file [DEC78,B0B72). These are 
normally files of the same name, but with a distinguished version 
number. They are usually unrelated in anything but name and are 
certainly not viewed as different states of the same object, as a 
sort of history of the file. Unfortunately these multiple versions 
only exist for files which are completely rewritten and not for 
files which are updated, and so they are of no direct use for 
preserving consistency. 	Their main use is in correcting user 
errors by allowing a single file to be rolled back to a previous 
state, or by allowing a comparison of the current state with a 
previous state. This is not unimportant since the main cause of 
loss of data from a filing system is accidental user requests to 
destroy files. However, the most structured files tend to be those 
we update in place. It is these files from which it is easiest to 
lose information by losing the structure, either due to user error 
or due to failure. 	Multiple versions are thus of limited 
usefulness while they exclude these structured files. 
On the other hand, there is a class of files for which multiple 
versions are completely unnecessary. 	These are redundant files. 
Redundant, in the sense that their contents can be regenerated from 
other files within the filing system. For example, the object code 
of a compilation can be regenerated from two files, the source code 
of the program and the executable code of the compiler. 
Preservation of multiple versions of such files - indeed, 
preservation of consistency at all - is usually more expensive than 
the regeneration of the file in the unlikely event that it should 
be lost. 
Traditionally, filing systems have split files into these two 
classes: files which are rewritten completely and files which are 
updated in place. 	The consistency guarantees are completely 
different for these two classes of files. 	Files which are 
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rewritten completely are not rewritten in place; that is, new disc 
pages are.allocated for the new copy of the file so that a fallback 
to the old is available in the case of failure. 	Many filing 
systems also preserve these old versions for additional safety. 
Files which are updated in place have no old versions preserved and 
have no guarantees about their state if a multiple page update 
should be interrupted by a failure. 
However, there are two classes of files for which users would 
like different consistency guarantees: ordinary files and redundant 
files. This corresponds to a split in the way the user sees the 
files, rather than a split in the way the filing system sees the 
files. We are prepared to pay for strong guarantees about 
non-redundant files by requiring no guarantees at all about 
redundant files. With the exception of the Cambridge file-server 
[D10801, current filing systems only allow this distinction between 
normal and redundant files to be made, if at all, for archive 
purposes. Redundant files are marked as vulnerable and not to be 
archived. It is, though, a more useful distinction than this; they 
are so vulnerable that no special care is needed about their 
preservation at all. The Cambridge file-server guarantees external 
level two consistency for updates to individual files if they are 
marked as important. 	If a client updates two such files, then 
although each one is either completely updated or unchanged, there 
is no guarantee that both are updated or unchanged; one could be 
unchanged and one updated. 
If we make this distinction, then a file can be regarded as a 
two dimensional object, it now has a time dimension. The multiple 
versions of a file form a history in much the same way as 
Minkowski's life-lines in the theory of relativity. 	With the 
prospect of write-once video discs, and the decrease in the cost of 
disc space, this idea has started to gain respectability 
EREE78,3CH77,COP801. However, there is an important difference 
between the state of a file and the life-lines of relativity. We 
want our files to move discretely from one state to the next, not 
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continuously. We construct the new state elsewhere and 
instantaneously instantiate it. 	In the event of failure we can 
discard the half-built version. Provided that we maintain multiple 
versions of all non-redundant files, then these life-lines begin to 
form the basis for a filing system which preserves level two 
external consistency at all times. 
If we always create new versions, then there is no update in 
place - no page is ever overwritten with a new updated version of 
itself (we need to except redundant files). 	This is desirable 
[SCH78,COP801 since update in place loses information and is merely 
one way of achieving a balance between long-term storage costs and 
other costs. As the cost of long-term storage drops, discarding 
information for economic reasons becomes less necessary. 	With 
write-once video discs on the horizon it may even become 
impossible. 
If more than one file is updated by a client, we want to make 
sure that either all the new versions, or none of them, are 
instantiated. Moreover, since the versions are distinguished by 
their time components, we want their times of instantiation to be 
identical. If not, there will exist times in the past when our 
consistency assertions will fail. 	If we choose to examine the 
states of the files at a time between instantiation of the first 
and instantiation of the last, we may detect inconsistency. This 
is particularly important since backing up files for safety is 
likely to make extensive use of the ability to access old versions 
of files. If we backup all files as they are at midnight then we 
get a consistent version of all files. Furthermore, this can be 
done without taking the filing system out of service as, typically, 
needs to be done with current filing systems. 
Rather than using time to distinguish different versions of the 
same file, we could have created a new internal name. 	Every 
version of every file has a different name. This suffers from the 
same disadvantage as is common with applicative languages in that 
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changes have to be propagated throughout data structures. If we 
give a new version a new name then the new name will need to be 
stored in a directory; this is a file so we will get a new name for 
the directory which will need to be stored in the next higher level 
of the directory structure, and so on up to the root of the filing 
system. Directories would also need to be much larger, since the 
names of all existing versions would need to be stored rather than 
one name for all the versions. Using a single filename with a time 
component actually reduces the amount of directory manipulation 
since there is no new name to be stored in the directory; the new 
name is the same as the old. Directory manipulation only needs to 
take place when a file is created or finally destroyed. 
Multiple versions of files updated in place do not require vast 
amounts of disc storage for the different versions nor the overhead 
of creating them. By choosing a suitably indirected disc structure 
for the representation of a file, pages can be shared between 
consecutive versions if they are unchanged. It is not necessary to 
write more than a handful of pages to update a single byte in a 
megabyte file; certainly, it is not necessary to write a megabyte 
to create the new version. 
Time 
If we are going to control the association of versions of 
different files using timestamps, then we need a clear view of what 
these timestamps actually mean. We want the timestamps to provide 
a global view of time but unfortunately time is a local concept. 
This is true in the real world, but it is only a problem when the 
transmission speed of a message (of some sort) is of a similar 
order of magnitude to the accuracy with which we wish to measure 
the time, and so it is not a problem in everyday life. It does 
become a problem though in, for example, relativistic physics or in 
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the design of synchronous integrated circuits. 	Taken to an 
extreme, it is clearly ineffective to synchronise watches by post. 
To derive some constraints on how we must manage time locally to 
give the illusion of global time, it is sensible to consider the 
ways in which a view of global time may break down. 	The most 
obvious way is for time to be seen to run backwards. 
For example, two events A and B which are detectably ordered 
with A preceding B are assigned timestamps which indicate that B 
preceded A. 	For example, a program source file is updated and 
receives a timestamp of 3pm. This source file is then compiled and 
the object code file receives a timestamp of 2.59pm. The-illusion 
of a global time has broken down. This is an internal failure in 
that the inter-relationships of the files are all stored within the 
filing system itself. 
There are also external failures of the global view of time when 
at least one of the inter-relationships of files is external to the 
filing system. A file is updated and receives a timestamp of 3pm. 
This fact is communicated to another client which logs it in a 
second file which receives a timestamp of 2.59pm. 	If this is 
unconvincing, it is because it is hard to imagine files which are 
loosely enough related that they are not updated together but 
closely enough related that the timestamps matter. 	Provided our 
clocks are reasonably synchronised (not hours apart, for example) 
external failures of time are not a problem. After all, a crash 
could intervene to prevent the second update happening at all. 
The internal failure modes are failures of a sort of causality 
constraint. If the new version of file A is dependent on 
information held in a version of file B, then the timestamp for A 
must be later than that for B. 	The external failure modes 
constrain by how much local time at different sites may be out of 
synchrony. This error must be less than the time from creating one 
new version, communicating that fact and creating another new 
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version of a different (or, indeed, the same) file. This will be 
some function on the speed of the network, the speed of the disc 
and the details of the implementation. As a lower bound we can use 
speed of light constraints, but these are rather too severe to live 
with. 
The internal failure modes constrain events which are known to 
be associated. The external failure modes constrain events which 
could be. Whilst they are not known to be associated, they are 
spaced apart enough in time that thea could be. 	There remain a 
class of events which are not associated, and, furthermore, are so 
close together in time that they could not possibly be associated; 
it would be impossible to communicate the occurrence of the first 
event to the initiator of the second. 	We call such events 
concurrent, and their timestamps may occur in either order. 	For 
example, if two people, one in New 'Lark and one in London, create a 
file on their local server within a fraction of a second of midday 
GMT, then these events are concurrent. 	There is not sufficient 
time for the creation of one file to influence the creation of the 
other (the intention to create may have influence, but not the 
confirmation that this was, in fact, done). 
The timestamps actually serve to order events. 	In [LAN78] a 
theory is developed for arbitrary events. We shall restrict events 
to the creation of a new version of a file within a filing system. 
To order two events, we compare their timestamps. If we compare 
the timestamp for version A of one file with the timestamp for 
version B of another, then there are three outcomes. 	Version A 
came into existence before version B, they came into existence 
simultaneously, or version B came into existence before version A. 
If the two timestamps are taken from different clocks, inevitably 
only synchronized approximately, then there are again three cases. 
Version A must have come into existence before version B, even if 
the clocks have drifted to be out of synchrony by the maximum 
amount. Version B must have come into existence before version A 
under the same worst case conditions. 	Versions A and B were 
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created within the error window of the two clocks. These three 
cases do not directly correspond to the three orderings of the 
timestamps and so we have a problem. We want to ensure that if the 
timestamp of event A is less than the timestamp of event B then A 
preceded B or was concurrent with it. 
Assigning timestamps to new versions of files places us in a 
considerably better position than a system assigning timestamps to 
arbitrary events. Associated with each new version of a file are 
three times. 	Firstly, the time at which we actually complete 
production of the new file. Secondly, the time which we assign to 
the new version; in effect, the time at which we say that we 
created the new file. Finally, the time at which we allow the new 
version to become visible to the outside world. If we ensure that 
this last time is later than the other two, then these other two 
events can occur in any order. 	In particular, we can assign a 
timestamp to a new file for a time which has not yet occurred. For 
example, at 2.59pm by our local clock we can create a new version 
of a file timestamped at 3.00pm, provided we let noone see it until 
3.00pm. 
Many of the problems associated with timestaxnping events can be 
obviated by delaying the time at which they become visible outside 
of the system. 	We cannot, however, delay visibility for much 
longer than it takes to create and instantiate a new version of a 
file. Otherwise we may update a file and then receive a request 
from a remote server to create a further version with an earlier 
timestamp. This problem only occurs when the second update is 
initiated remotely; this gives slightly more latitude in the 
acceptable clock error in a desirable way. The further apart the 
two servers are, the larger is the acceptable error in the 
synchrony of their clocks. 
The requirement for close synchrony can be considerably relaxed 
by having all servers involved agree on a suitable time before 
starting to instantiate the versions. Unfortunately, it will turn 
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out that this agreement cannot easily be combined with the messages 
needed between servers to coordinate the instantiation. Either the 
timestamp needs to be known from the start, which requires a 
message between the servers to decide it, or else each new version 
will need to be written twice, once to protect against a crash and 
once to timestamp the version correctly. 
The other key thing which we get from this strategy of delayed 
visibility is the ability to create versions of more than one file, 
all of which receive the same timestamp, even if the different 
files are held on different servers with different local times. 
This is particularly important. 	If several files are updated 
around 3.00pm and a backup taken later in the afternoon of all 
files as they were at 3.00pm then we probably do not particularly 
care whether we get the new versions or the old versions; but we 
certainly do not want a mixture due to the different versions 
receiving different timestamps. 
This technique of delaying visibility directly handles the 
internal failure modes since it is possible to know how long it is 
necessary to delay. We can only avoid the external failure modes 
by actually keeping our clocks acceptably synchronised. In ELAM781 
an upper bound on the drift out of synchrony is developed. 	The 
maximum drift is a function of the unpredictability in the transit 
time for a message, the frequency of messages containing 
timestamps, the connectivity of the site to site communication 
graph, and the drift in the hardware if the clock if left to run 
freely. For sites on the same local network, every site is 
directly connected to every other. Even if we assume that they 
communicate as slowly as once a day, for a crystal controlled clock 
the error is dominated by the unpredictbility in the transit time 
for a message. For distant sites, perhaps accessed through gateway 
machines to a long haul network, the error is likely to be 
dominated by the lack of communication as well as the 
unpredictability of the transit time for a message across the 
network. Two clocks at different sites are difficult to keep 
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synchronised if the sites only communicate once a week across a 
network with very variable transit times. This may be especially 
problematic since two clients to the servers on this network may 
have a very fast backdoor communication link. They may be in radio 
contact, for example. 
All this study of clOcks assumes that the clocks are 
independent. This is rarely the case. Whilst local clocks may be 
crystal controlled on a battery in the event of power failure, they 
normally use an external time-base for reference. 	In Britain, 
there are two important external time-bases: the mains frequency 
and the VHF time signals broadcast from Rugby. 
The 50hz mains frequency can vary locally according to the mains 
loading, especially if load varies suddenly. 	However, over long 
periods, the number of cycles in the mains is accurate. Two clocks 
counting mains cycles anywhere in Britain will not have any long 
term drift. 	At any point in the future the expectation of the 
error (in the probability sense) is zero. This is not the same as 
the absolute error in the clocks since this depends also on the 
initial error when the clocks are set and started, and on 
short-term local perturbation in mains frequency. 
The VHF time signals consist of astronomical time derived from 
an atomic clock and distributed by radio. They are thus a single 
timebase distributed at the speed of light. Even at the highest 
levels of tolerance, it is not possible for a site to receive a 
time signal, then send a message to a second site which arrives 
before the time signal; two sides of a triangle are at least as 
long as the third. Similar accurate distributed timebases exist in 
other countries, and they are kept mutually synchronised to 
astronomic time by the most sophisticated techniques available. 
Two sites receiving such a radio timebase will be synchronised to a 
tolerance less than the time it takes them to inter-communicate. 
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Using all the above techniques we can distribute time with 
acceptable error. For two sites on the same local area network the 
error is limited to the unpredicatability of the transit time of a 
message, the difference between the fastest possible transit time 
and the slowest possible transit time. A weaker condition, since 
it is not a guarantee, is that. the actual error will depend on the 
actual maximum transit time less the minimum possible; this is 
likely to be considerably better than the worst possible case. Due 
to the delay between timestamping a new version of a file, writing 
it out to disc and sending the minimum number of messages to detect 
an external inconsistency, this is probably acceptable for the 
current types of network in use. 	Sites on different networks 
connected by a slower long-haul network can maintain this global 
view of time using a standard distributed timebase such as the VHF 
radio time signal, or by using mains frequency after an initial 
accurate setting. 	This initial setting can be effected by two 
means. A clock can be taken to one site and there synchronised to 
it; it is then taken to the other site and used to set the clock. 
This is analogous to setting your watch to the office clock, and 
then using it to set your kitchen clock at home. The other means 
is to use one of the widely available distributed timebases, such 
as the speaking clock or the pips broadcast on some radio channels 
on the hour. Using these means we can distribute time globally to 
some fraction of a second, and locally to a better tolerance than 
this. 
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If we are to use timestamps to identify different versions of 
files, we are forded to be able to hold off competing concurrent 
access. Although it can be disguised in a number of ways, we have 
to be able to lock files to ensure exclusive access to a single 
client when necessary. Ideally, we would like to be able to lock 
arbitrary amounts of data within a file but this may prove to be 
impractical. Most updates to a file depend on more than just the 
contents of the particular version of the file read; they also 
depend on the fact that there is no later version in existence. 
Since an update normally takes a file from one version to the next, 
it is essential that any data read from the file to create the new 
version comes from the current version. In effect, the data read 
to create the new version must still be accurate at the moment the 
new version is instantiated. Further, noone must be allowed to see 
the new version before it is instantiated since it may be 
subsequently altered further, and worse, it may not even be 
instantiated. 
There are cases when an old version of a file is acceptable or 
even necessary. In these cases no locking will be necessary. It 
is not possible to change a file version or its timestarnp, merely 
to alter how many subsequent versions exist. For example, we may 
want to copy all of our files as at midnight to a backup medium. 
If some of them are active it does not affect the data which we 
want to read. 
In this context, an old version may also be the current version. 
Not locking it merely means that we do not insist that it remains 
the current version. 	For example, if we compile a program we 
probably do not need to lock the executable code of the compiler 
against alteration while the compilation proceeds. It is hard to 
think of cases where it would be important that the version of the 
compiler in existence at the time that the object code of the 
compilation was instantiated was the one used for the compilation. 
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From now on we will consider locking whole files. There are 
strong arguments for large granularity of locking [R1E771 but they 
depend heavily on the locks being placed accurately [R1E79]. For a 
filing system, it is rare for whole file locking to be 
unacceptable. The exception is where a database is maintained on 
the filing system. In such a case it is unlikely that a locking 
scheme based entirely on the physical storage layout of the 
database is acceptable, and there are good arguments [HOA74] for 
not using the low-level scheduling provided by data locks to 
implement high-level scheduling decisions, such as who should get 
the data next. For this case, a database lock manager (perhaps 
itself distributed) should lock the file containing the database, 
and then implement whatever locking policy is desired. 
Alternatively, the database can be suitably divided amongst several 
files so that whole file locking remains appropriate. 
One feature which arises in any locking scheme is that of 
phantom records [ESW76). A phantom record is a record which would 
have been locked had it existed. The information locked is the 
non-existence of the record. For example, consider maintaining a 
phone directory under a record locking scheme. 	Two competing 
people may see if John Smith is in the directory, discover that he 
is not (no records locked so far), each create a new record 
(independently locked) and add their new record to the directory. 
Since neither of the newly created records is examined by the other 
person, no locking conflict occurs and Smith is added twice. In 
this simple case it is likely that the conflict will be discovered 
when the alphabetic index is updated, but it is easy to invent 
complex examples. 	We are concerned only with locking files, so 
phantom records will manifest themselves as phantom files. 	The 
problem is simple in many cases, since what we test is not the 
existence of the file but the presence of the textname in some 
directory. If directories are files then the directory will be 
locked while this happens, and only one of the competing creators 
will get write access to the directory (we ignore the deadlock 
possibility for now). If files have a low-level name independent 
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of any textnaming scheme, then there is no problem if the server 
chooses the names for created files (they are more likely to be 
large integers than textnames). In this case, it is not sensible 
to ask whether a given filename exists since either the name was a 
lucky guess and the contents of the file will be of no interest, or 
it was discovered somewhere and so must already exist (and so can 
be locked). 	At the other end of life, a file may have been 
deleted. This is no problem since the access allowed to the latest 
version of a deleted file will forever be the same as the access 
permitted to a non-existent file. It is inaccessible. 
There are many locking schemes proposed [BER79] but most are 
inappropriate in our case, either requiring advance knowledge of 
all locks that will be claimed, or failing one client in the event 
of a conflict. 	One locking scheme which is provably [ESW76] 
sufficient is a two phase one. 	This will ensure that a client 
cannot see an inconsistent view of the data due to a competing 
client. A client will, of course, be able to see an inconsistent 
view of the data due to itself as it takes the data from one 
consistent state to another through inconsistent states. 	In the 
first phase, all the locks are auired. In the second phase, they 
are all released. No lock may be released in the first phase and 
no new locks auired in the second phase. 	This is a slightly 
stronger condition than necessary since some data read may have no 
effect on the data written. For example, a program might search a 
file for any all-zero page in which to insert some new data; the 
contents of all the non-zero pages examined in the search do not 
affect the data written. Under these circumstances it is safe to 
release the read locks and allow others to update the data read. 
However, knowing that this is the case depends on the contents of 
the files and not on the operations performed. 	It is thus not 
something which the filing system can detect and so we ignore it. 
We merely note in passing that we might permit clients to unlock 
data which they detect that they read in error. Consistency will 
depend on their never unlocking data which they should not. 
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The first phase, the growing phase, is the phase in which the 
client performs all the reads and writes necessary to evaluate the 
contents for the new versions of the files to be updated. At the 
end of the first phase, all the files read are read locked (under 
the usual multiple reader and no writers discipline) and all the 
files written are exclusively locked. 	At this point, the new 
versions are complete but not yet instantiated. The second phase 
begins. All the read locks can safely be released. 	Each new 
version is instantiated and then all the write locks can safely be 
released. Under this scheme, no interference between competing 
clients is possible. Note that the second phase is entirely under 
the control of the servers comprising the filing system, once it 
has been initiated by the client. 
We will formalise the loose concept of the files touched by a 
client into a transaction. A transaction serves mainly to name the 
set of files read and updated by a client. 	Later, it will be 
integrated with crash recovery techniqes to form an atomic 
transaction which either succeeds in its entirety or has no effect 
at all. A client starts by issuing a create transaction request to 
the filing system. All the reads and writes of files during the 
transaction cause the file to be locked, and marked as owned by the 
transaction if they are updated. 	Finally, at the end of the 
growing phase, the client issues a commit transaction request to 
the filing system. 	The filing system then autonomously 
instantiates the updates and releases all the locks. 	The 
transaction is then finished. For convenience, we also allow the 
client to issue an abort transaction request, which is an 
alternative second phase in which all the updates are discarded and 
the locks released. Under certain circumstances, such as deadlock, 
the filing system will take it upon itself to abort a transaction, 
exactly as if an abort request had been received. 
As in any locking scheme, deadlock must be considered. Indeed, 
one such situation has already been hinted at. Two clients read a 
file directory to see if a given textname exists; on finding that 
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it does not they both attempt to write the new name but neither can 
have exclusive access to perform the write since the other holds a 
read lock. As with any deadlock, there are a number of different 
approaches to take to handling it. Firstly it may be detected in 
advance, often called deadlock avoidance. This requires examining 
the graph of transactions and locks held or wanted for cycles. 
This is most easily done by calculating the transitive closure of 
the matrix of lock interrelations. When more than one server in 
the filing system is holding files locked by a given transaction, 
this is unattractive since the matrix has to be collected from the 
various servers before the calculation can be done. 	The second 
approach is to detect that deadlock has occurred. This can be done 
when the situation looks suspicious and there are a lot of blocked 
transactions all waiting for locks. This suffers from the same 
problem that the matrix needs to be collected. 	Since it only 
happens occasionally we may be prepared to accept the overhead. 
Unfortunately the most common deadlock in a distributed system 
arises when clients crash. This is not detectable by examining the 
lock graph, since no cycle will be present (in effect, the dead 
client may only be sleeping and on the point of waking to release 
the lock). 	Since, by definition, crashed clients are not in a 
position to announce that they have crashed, this has to be 
detected by other means. 	Some network protocols have an active 
idle state and detect a site crashing when it ceases sending 
anything at all. Most local area networks do not have any such 
state, and in any case it only detects those crashes which inhibit 
the lowest level network software. In any event, a network filing 
system has to be able to cope with a client undetectably crashing. 
If the crashing client holds any locks, then they will, at best, be 
released when the client recovers; at worst, they will never be 
explicitly released. 
The only means for handling this case is that of timeouts. This 
is rather unsatisfactory since it is difficult to predict in 
advance what is a sensible timeout to use. A program may write a 
heading to a file and then perform on-line monitoring awaiting an 
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event hours hence before writing the next line. For files which it 
is intended should be shared, it is almost certainly bad practise 
to hold a lock for a long time. The locks should be used as a 
low-level scheduling mechanism, perhaps to implement a higher-level 
locking scheme if necessary. Apart from the small resource used in 
the server to maintain the lock, locking a sharable file is only a 
problem when an attempt is made to share it. The timeout mechanism 
handles, if somewhat crudely, the other forms of deadlock caused by 
a cycle occurring in the graph of locks held or desired. 	This 
cycle can only appear when attempting to place a lock on an already 
locked file whilst already holding a lock on a file on which 
someone is waiting. This is not a necessary condition, merely a 
sufficient one. All this points to a two level timeout. If a lock 
has been held for an excessively long time then break it. 
Otherwise, only break the lock if it has been held for a reasonable 
time and a conflict occurs; someone attempts to set a competing 
lock. The easiest way to break a lock is to abort the 
transaction(s) which own it. 	There are schemes [STU801 for 
notifying clients of broken locks rather than aborting the 
transaction, and there are good reasons for doing so. For example, 
consider a program attempting to total all the accounts in a bank 
duririg.the working day; it has little chance of not being aborted 
before it has finished. Many of the problems of always aborting 
are obviated by allowing old versions of files to be read. If the 
bank accounts are changing then the total is only momentarily valid 
so why not calculate the total as valid at the time the program 
commences rather than completes. 	This requires no locks since 
historic states can never change, even if they also happen to be 
the current state of the files. 
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Atomic transactions 
So far, we have introduced transactions as a means of 
associating locks on files. This restricts the access to files in 
a way which means that it is hard for clients to interact 
undesirably. The outcome of a transaction is that it commits 
successfully or aborts completely. We would like this to be so 
even in the face of failures of components of the filing system. 
We call this an atomic transaction. 
We are thus also going to use transactions to control the 
granularity of the operations which are seen as atomic by the 
client. It is not necessary that the unit linking file locking and 
unlocking, and the unit of atomicity be the same. 
One way round, we may perform an atomic checkpoint operation 
without releasing all the locks. 	No competing client can gain 
access although if a subsequent crash occurs, intermediate new 
versions of the changed files will have been instantiated. 	For 
this continuity of locking to be useful, it has to be guaranteed; 
for it to be guaranteed it needs to hold even in the face of 
crashes. This means that locks must be preserved on disc in a 
manner such that they can be reset during crash recovery. There is 
clearly a risk of creating locks which are not going to be released 
since they have been forgotten, and cannot lightly be timed out 
since the original program which set them may not be run until some 
time after the return of the server. There are applications in 
databases which may benefit from such a checkpoint scheme. It is 
hard to think of situations in which it would be particulary useful 
in a filing system. 
The other way round, we may have a number of transactions all 
regarded as a single atomic action. Since the atomic action may 
never eventually occur, the locks cannot really be released but 
merely seem to be to the owning transaction which completes 
normally. This is the useful concept of nested atomic 
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transactions. It can, however, be implemented wholly within the 
client. Nested transactions are useful since they enable parts of 
programs to be written with no knowledge of the transaction 
environment in which they will run. 
We shall only consider atomic transactions where the unit of 
locking and the unit of atomicity are the same. 	Nested 
transactions are useful but not primitive; long term locks are not 
useful enough in a filing system to justify their complications. 
If we use atomic transactions in this way, then we have a very 
strong guarantee: 
When a transaction completes it either has: 
* no effect 
or 
* the new versions of all the files are simultaneously (they have 
the same timestamp) instantiated; all the data read to create these 
new versions is unchanged at the moment of instantiation (no new 
version of any of them is created with a timestamp between the 
version read and the timestamp on the newly instantiated files). 
This guarantee holds even if the files are dispersed among 
several servers in the filing system. It also holds in the face of 
crashes of clients, servers in the filing system, the network. If 
we have designed the system to preserve suitable backup duplicate 
copies, it holds even in the face of data loss due to such failures 
as a disc drive head crash. 
This amounts to a statement that external level two consistency 
can be guaranteed after a crash, and that it will be impossible to 
detect a level two inconsistency while the system is running 
normally. The statement does depend on a 	client couching all 
desired consistency in terms of single transactions. If a client 
has more than one transaction then they are regarded as 
independent. Apart from being a recipe for deadlock, there is no 
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guarantee, for example, that data read in a transaction which 
commits early will be still be valid in a transaction which commits 
later; the second transaction has to read the data again (although 
one can devise mechanisms to obviate unnecessarily transmitting 
large amounts of unchanged data). 
Commitment protocols  
Achieving this guarantee when files are dispered among several 
servers and in the face of crashes is not trivial. There are two 
parts to achieving it. Firstly, there is a protocol by which the 
servers communicate to complete the transaction. Secondly, there 
is the protocol by which a server recovering after a crash 
discovers what to do about new versions of files which have not yet 
been instantiated, together with ways of storing these new versions 
to ensure that they are rediscovered. 	There may be a third 
protocol which the remaining servers in a transaction use to clean 
up when it is detected that one or more of the servers has crashed. 
The protocol used by the cooperating servers to complete a 
transaction is called the commitment protocol. There are several 
desirable features about any commitment protocol. It is part of 
the normal running of the filing system, and so we want it to 
involve as little work as possible, provided that we can still 
guarantee external level two consistency following a crash. Since 
crashes are, hopefully, rare we would like to have normal running 
simple at the expense of a more expensive crash recovery. That is, 
we would like fast commitment even if we have to tradeoff this for 
a slow recovery after a crash. 
A minimal protocol would be for the server receiving the commit 
request from the client to send commit messages to all the involved 
servers. This is clearly not good enough since some of the servers 
may instantiate their versions whilst other servers may crash 
before doing so. We need an extra round of messages to ensure that 
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the commit is possible [SKE8O,GRA77,LAM79]. 
A typical two round commit protocol proceeds as follows. 	The 
server receiving the commit request from the client becomes the 
master server in the protocol. It ensures that all new versions of 
files that it holds are ready for instantiation and marks them as 
such. It sends messages to all the other slave servers to tell 
them to do the same. If any server crashes or otherwise fails to 
successfully ensure that all new versions are on disc ready for 
instantiation, then the transaction aborts and the master server 
tells all the servers to destroy the new uninatantiated versions. 
Otherwise, the master server commits the transaction by 
instantiating the new versions of the files which it holds (we 
assume, for now, that this can be done in an atomic way). From now 
on, the transaction is destined to commit irrespective of any 
crashes. The master server tells all the slave servers to 
instantiate the versions which they hold. 	When they have all 
reported that they have done so back to the master server, then the 
transaction has successfully committed. The master confirms that 
the transaction committed to the client. 
Recovering from a crash is handled as follows. 	If a slave 
server crashes then it will discover the ensured new versions and 
enquire of the master server whether to commit the transaction and 
instantiate them, or whether to abort the transaction and destroy 
them. Any versions which have not reached the ensured stage are 
always destroyed and the containing transaction aborted. 	If the 
master server crashes, then on its recovery it sends all the commit 
messages again. These may be rejected since they may duplicate 
messages already sent and acted upon. 
There is a problem if, for example, the master server crashes 
together with all the slaves bar one. The remaining slave cannot 
decide whether to commit or abort the transaction, since the master 
is not available and other slaves may have committed or aborted the 
transaction, precluding a unilateral decision. 	The transaction 
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cannot proceed and is blocked. A protocol in which this can happen 
is called a blocking protocol. 	Construction of a non-blocking 
protocol requires three rounds of messages [SKE80,SKE81]. Such a 
non-blocking protocol always lets the remaining servers commit or 
abort the transaction without reference to the crashed servers. 
When the crashed servers return, they will need to discover the 
decision made in their absence, so files can become locked here in 
pathological cases where all the participating servers have then 
crashed. However, a crashed server will never have to reverse a 
final decision to commit or abort. The first round is as before, 
with the master and slaves all ensuring that the new versions of 
all files are ready on disc for instiation. The second round of 
messages is the extra round when the master tells all the slaves to 
enter an intermediate buffer state, prepare to commit (which must 
also be recorded on disc). 	In the third round of messages the 
master tells all the slaves to commit. 
If the current master server should crash, then one of the 
slaves becomes the new master server. This requires the set of 
servers involved in the transaction to be distributed to all slaves 
at the start of the protocol. 	The new master server decides 
whether or not to commit the transaction only according to its own 
state. If it has not started the protocol, it is ensured or it is 
aborted, then it aborts the protocol. If it is in the intermediate 
buffer state or it has committed the transaction (locally) then it 
commits the transaction. If it is not already in the commit or 
abort state then it first sends messages to all other slave servers 
to set their state to its own. The protocol is such that this will 
always be an acceptable thing to do. 	This round of messages 
ensures that if the new master server should crash, then the server 
taking over as master server will make the same decision. Then it 
sends a round of messages telling the other slave servers its 
decision (commit or abort). 	There are still some circumstances 
under which transactions may block. The most obvious is that if 
the network should fail then transactions will be blocked until it 
returns. The other obvious case is if all the servers involved in 
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a transaction should crash. This is much more serious since single 
server transactions are likely to be the most common type of 
transaction. If this single server should crash then the 
transaction will block. Since we expect single server transactions 
and single server failures to be the most common of each class, it 
is doubtful whether the extra overhead of the extra round of 
messages and the extra complexity of implementation are justified. 
These commit protocols are examples of centralised commitment 
protocols in which one server coordinates the operations of the 
others. There are also distributed protocols in which there is no 
distinguised server. These are less attractive since they usually 
involve significantly more messages being transmitted and are more 
complex to implement. 	For the current range of matches between 
processor and network speeds, constructing and decoding messages 
from the network uses a significant fraction of the available 
processor bandwidth. These protocols are thus expensive. However, 
the guarantees which they back up are strong enough to make them 
worthwhile, especially if they are infrequently invoked. 
Most distributed filing systems exhibit considerable locality 
since most users place all their files, or all their files 
concerned with a particular area of their interest, on a single 
server. The arguments for using multiple file servers on the same 
local network are very weak unless this is so, for they waste the 
time in cooperation that they save in parallelism. It is sensible 
if they have very different characteristics (fast-small and 
slow-large). However, there may be more than one network, 
inevitably more slowly accessed through some form of inter-network 
gateway and then multiple file servers are sensible. 	Overall 
though, most transactions will be single server and require no 
additional messages. 	This is, of course, to some extent a 
self-fulfilling prophecy since the overhead of multiple server 
commit protocols is a strong incentive to keep a high locality in 
file placement. 
140 
Single site atomicity 
The above discussion about commitment protocols started from the 
assumption that the update of one or more files at a single server 
in the filing system was already an atomic operation. We have to 
consider howto achieve this. It is such a frequent operation that 
it needs to be efficient. 	Between requesting a commit and 
receiving confirmation, the client will normally be waiting. This 
waiting time should not be excessively long. 	Again, we are 
prepared to pay for a quick commit, which is common, by accepting a 
longer crash recovery procedure, which is rare. 
This efficiency or otherwise of this single site commit is much 
more important than the multiple server case. As discussed above, 
most transactions will involve only a single server. 
There are many different ways of achieving this 
[ST076,1SR78,BAR78,PAX79]. Most of these 	rely on some form of 
deferred update. 	The pages to be altered are recorded in some 
rediscoverable place, such as a fixed area of disc, in a journal 
file or in a file created for just this purpose. These changes to 
be made are called an intention. There are a number of important 
properties required of an intention. 	Firstly, it must be 
constructed in such a way that it will always be discovered during 
crash recovery, or when an attempt is first made to use a file 
taking part in the transaction. 	It must be possible to tell 
whether or not it is complete. It must be possible to tell whether 
or not it has been completely dealt with. After writing out the 
intention completely, changes are made to the files as specified in 
the intention. Finally, the intention is marked as dealt with (or 
destroyed). During crash recovery, intentions are rediscovered. 
If they are incomplete then they are destroyed. Transactions which 
have only reached this point are aborted and backed out. If they 
have been dealt with, then they are ignored. If they are complete 
but have not been completely dealt with then they are carried out; 
the changes are made (possibly for a second time). Care needs to 
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be taken to make the changes idempotent so that they can be 
performed completely or partly many times. The intentions should 
be dealt with during crash recovery in a manner which is tolerant 
of further crashes occurring during crash recovery. 
This form of deferred update can be very expensive. 	One 
optimisation is to store the data pages to be altered in unused 
disc pages and then the intention consists only of changes to file 
map structures. Since many changes may be made to the same file, 
this may involve considerably less duplicate writing than putting 
the actual data to be changed into the intention. 
Another scheme for commitment uses the idea of a difference file 
[SEV76,3AR78]. Here, most of the data is kept unaltered in a 
read-only shrine and a writeable file of errata is maintained. 
This scheme seems to work well for updating a large record store, 
where the alterations are few and small. It is not clear how to 
sensibly extend the ideas to a filing system without being able to 
label disc pages. 	Most disc controllers do not directly support 
this labelling. To support it indirectly by using some of each 
sector to perform the labelling results in a page size which is 
inconvenient to clients. 
If multiple versions of files are created on one side, then we 
are only concerned with how they are instantiated. One way to do 
this is to make the versions self-defining and regard any atlas 
used to locate them as a hint [LAM74]. 	Since we are preserving 
both the old and the new versions of files when they are 
instantiated, we cannot update files in place. One simple approach 
is to have each file defined by a file header, a single page 
containing nothing but the management data for that file. It could 
also contain some data from the file, especially if the entire file 
is small enough to fit into the rest of the header. if disc pages 
can be labelled, then any pages can be used for such headers; 
otherwise, a special fixed area of disc will need to be allocated 
to hold them. In either case, the existing file headers can be 
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discovered as part of crash recovery. As an optimization, if a 
disc page is profligately larger than a file header we can group 
headers for new versions for the same transaction in the same page. 
This has little effect on the algorithm but may save some disc 
space. 
An atomic update of multiple files then proceeds as follows. 
The idea is to make the instantiation of all the new versions 
dependent on the instantiation of the new version of one 
distinguished file, and to perform this instantiation in a single 
disc write to an otherwise unused disc page. This last write is an 
atomic action in that it succeeds completely or fails completely 
(the page is unreadable or unchanged). 
One of the items of data held in the header is the state of the 
file, the point the owning transaction has reached. When a new 
version of a file is to be created, a file header with state 
"unused" is found (probably from a list of such headers). If it is 
necessary to write this header out to disc before commitment of the 
transaction begins, then it is written with its state set to 
"volatile" 
When a commit request is received, one file being updated is 
selected and becomes the master file for the transaction; say it is 
file number N. If no files are updated then the transaction is 
read-only and commitment only involves releasing locks. 	The 
timestamp for the commitment of the transaction is taken from the 
local clock; say it gives a time T. At this point, all locks on 
read-only files can be released. 
If there are new versions of other files to be instantiated, 
then they have their headers set to "dependent on N", and their 
timestamps set to T. A flushing step takes place during which it 
is ensured that these dependent. headers and any other pages from 
any of the files (including the master file) concerned in the 
transaction are flushed out to the disc. At this point, every page 
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altered in the transaction except one is up to date on the disc. 
The one page is the header for the master file, which, if it is on 
disc at all is not necessarily up to date and is marked "volatile". 
Finally, the master file header has its state set to "committed" 
and its timestamp set to T and it is flushed out to the disc. All 
locks held by the transaction are released. 	The transaction is 
committed the moment that this last page is successfully (readably) 
written to disc. 	Table 3 summarises a normal multiple server 
commit. 
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Receive commit X from client 
Release shared locks owned by X 
Select global master file G 
Get timestamp T from local clock 
Send ensure XGT to all slaves -> Releases shared locks 
Flush non-header pages 
	 Select local master Li 
Mark all files other than G 
	
Flush non-header pages 
as dependent on G,T and flush 
	
Mark all files other than Li as 
dependent on Li,T and flush 
Mark Li as dependent on G,T and 
flush 
Receive all confirmations 	<- Confirm to master 
Mark G as committing and flush 
transaction now irrevocably committed ----- 
Send confirmation to client 
Send commit X to slaves 
Receive confirmations 
Mark G as committed and flush 
Release exclusive locks 
-> Mark Li as committed and flush 
Release exclusive locks 
<- Confirm to master 
If a transaction is aborted, then the disc pages can be returned 
for subsequent reallocation. Headers which are "volatile" can be 
marked as "unused", but it causes no problems if this is not done. 
If a crash should occur, then the recovery procedure discovers 
all the headers of all the files on the disc. 
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Any file with state "committed" is a genuine version of that 
file; all older versions with states other than "volatile" are 
previous versions of the file. 
Any file with state marked as "dependent on N" with timestamp T 
is committed if a version of file N exists with a timestamp of T or 
later; all older versions with states other than "volatile" are the 
previous versions of the file. 
Any file with state "dependent on N" with timestamp T and no 
extant version of file N with a timestamp of T or later is a 
complete version of a file in an incomplete transaction; its header 
is reset to state "unused" and returned for reallocation. 
Any file with state "volatile" is an incomplete version of a 
file; its header is reset to state "unused" and returned for 
reallocation. 
As described, this algorithm requires a sort of lookahead, since 
it is possible to discover a file before its master file has been 
discovered. The decision about whether the version is genuine or 
not must be delayed. In chapter 9, details of an algorithm which 
actually converges properly on the correct state of the disc will 
be presented. 
Having decided which versions of files are genuine and which are 
to be discarded, a new atlas of the headers can be constructed. 
For a server with hardware paging this could well be constructed in 
store since it is regarded as volatile and lost on each crash. 
Finally, the free disc page list can be constructed by following 
each file page map to discover all the allocated pages; all the 
other pages are free. 	This reconstruction gives us another 
advantage. The atlas and the free page lists do not have to be 
accurately maintained on disc during normal running. They do, of 
course, need to be accurately maintained in store. 	Since files 
tend to be intermittently active, the freedom for the disc copy of 
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the atlas to be out of date is an advantage. 	Only when a file 
ceases to be active and the in-store tables are full do the new 
locations of the current headers need to be flushed to the atlas. 
If a file header contains only the roots of the file map pages, 
the titnestamp, state and size of the file, and some user 
attributes, then most of the data for the new header will be either 
unchanged from the previous version or else held in store while the 
version is being created. In this case, the new header will rarely 
be created until the transaction commits, and so there will be no 
writes to disc which would not take place to create the versions in 
any case. 	There is an overhead in maintaining the multiple 
versions. Updating a large file requires index pages to be 
written. Only for a large file updated in place will this be an 
extra overhead. The algorithm thus appears acceptably efficient. 
However, crash recovery is slow to pay for this. Let us assume 
a 300Mb disc of current speed (3600rpm, 8ms track to track) with 
512 byte sectors. We might reasonably have 50,000 file headers. 
If there is a shortage of main store, then we may have to rescan 
some of them; 10,000 is a pessimistic estimate. 	Perhaps two 
percent of the rest of the disc will be taken up with file map 
pages. For a full disc, about 10,000 pages scattered around the 
disc. If the file headers are contiguous then the 60,000 headers 
can be read at about one every 20ms (not much seek time) and the 
10,000 scattered file map pages at about one every 50ms. 	This 
gives a rebuild time of 1700 seconds - half an hour. 
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Extending to multiple servers 
The above atomic instantiation extends to multiple servers, 
using the two phase commit algorithm described earlier. The idea 
is the same, to make the commitment of the entire transaction 
depend on the commitment of a single file, which is a single disc 
write to an otherwise unused disc page, itself an atomic action. 
However, now the file is not necessarily held locally. 
The algorithm also depends on one server, the master server, 
knowing which other servers are involved. 	This is most easily 
achieved either by making a transaction number contain its 
originating site, so that a server receiving it for the first time 
can make itself known to the master server, or else by insisting 
that the client explicitly issue an instruction to add the server 
to the transaction. 	For simplicity, the commit request. is only 
accepted at the master server, the server which first started the 
transaction. 
On receiving the commit request, the master server selects a 
file which has been updated there. 	If there is none, as would 
happen if files were only read at the master server but written on 
other servers, then either it creates a file header specially, or 
it passes a server which does have an updated file the list of 
involved servers. If there is no such server then the transaction 
is read-only and there is no problem about consistency. Let the 
number of the selected file be N, and the master server site number 
be S. We call the file N the global master file. It may well be 
possible to deduce which server holds a file from its file number; 
in particular, to deduce S from N. 	This slightly reduces the 
amount of data to be dealt with in the commitment. 	The master 
server reads its local clock to get a timestamp for the commitment; 
let it be T. 
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The master server then tells all the other servers to flush the 
files in the transaction with master file N on server S at time T. 
Each slave server selects a local master file (if it has any 
updated files) and performs the flushing procedure described in the 
single site case, so that 	everything except the header for the 
local master file is flushed out to disc. It can also release all 
locks on read-only files. Finally, the local master file header is 
set to state "dependent on N on S at T", and a confirmatory message 
sent to the master server. 	Meanwhile, the master server has 
performed the flushing procedure marking all files except the 
global master file as dependent on it, but not flushing the header 
for the global master file. 
When all the confirmatory messages have been received, the files 
are all in a commitable state. All but one file on each server are 
marked as dependent on that one; for all but one server these local 
master files are marked as dependent on a global master file. The 
global master file is still "volatile". 
Now the transaction actually commits. 	The global master file 
header has its state set to "committing" and it is written to disc 
(to a new page). At this point, confirmation can be sent to the 
client since the transaction will commit whatever happens. 
However, it may be better to leave this until completion of the 
protocol. The master server can now release all exclusive locks 
owned by the transaction. Another round of messages ensues when 
the master server tells each slave server to commit. Each slave 
server sets its local master file to "committed" and writes it out 
(to a new page). This step is logically unnecessary, but serves to 
decouple the servers; it is now no longer necessary to send a 
message to the master server to find out whether a transaction has 
committed. It then releases all exclusive locks; if local time at 
the slave has not reached T, then this releasing should be delayed 
until then to avoid inconsistent views of time being seen. 	A 
confirmatory message is sent to the master server. 
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When the master server has received all the confirmatory 
messages then it sets the state of the global master file to 
"committed" and rewrites it (to a new page). Again, this step is 
unnecessary but serves to decouple the servers. 
If the transaction is to be aborted, then the master server 
sends messages to all slaves to tell them this. Any headers which 
have got past the "volatile" state are reset to "unused" and 
written back to their current location. 	This destroys the 
"dependent" header; if the write is interrupted or leaves the page 
bad then there is no problem. Crash recovery will continue the 
destruction of the new version. The new versions can be destroyed 
and any pages used returned to free page lists. 	The slaves can 
release any locks held on files participating in the transaction. 
Each slave confirms that the aborting is complete to the master 
server. 
If a crash occurs, then there are several cases to consider. If 
a slave crashes before the first confirmation has been sent to the 
master, then the master will eventually give up waiting for the 
confirmation and abort the transaction. 
If a slave crashes after this confirmation, then the transaction 
may commit or abort. As part of crash recovery, the slave will 
discover the file dependent on a global master file N on server S 
at time T and enquire whether such a file committed. It can then 
instantiate or destroy the new version, and any other new versions 
dependent, in turn, on it. 
If the master crashes, then the slaves must await its return. 
This is the weakness of centralised commitment protocols, they are 
very vulnerable to failure of the master server. 	If the slaves. 
ok1 
detect that the master has crashed then there are some fils)These 
are files which form part of a transaction for which the first 
confirmatory message has not been sent. 	They can be aborted 
locally since the transaction is certain to abort anyway. 
150 
The only complex case is that of a file dependent on a global 
master file held at another server. when the other server returns, 
the slaves must enquire whether or not the transaction with global 
master file N at time T committed. 	If the master server has a 
version of file N timestamped at T (it will have state "committed" 
or "committing") then the transaction committed; otherwise it 
aborted. p1O(-1.(. r 	"6""b-e T cL 
Space reclamation 
If we maintain all versions of all files then the storage 
requirement for the filing system will grow with time. There will 
come a time when the storage requirement for the filing system 
approaches the storage available. 	Ideally, we could drain old 
versions of files to a cheaper medium, with a slower access time, 
such as of fline disc, magnetic tape or a mass-storage unit. For a 
write-once device such as a video disc, this will require the live 
data to be copied to a new disc and the old disc remains, 
preserving the old states as long as it is kept. It would still be 
possible to enquire about the past history of a file, it would just 
take longer. If this is impractical then some old file versions 
can be destroyed. 	To distinguish this from deletion of a file, 
which does not destroy all the old versions but merely creates a 
new version consisting solely of a tombstone, this process is 
called digestion. In some ways, this is transference to the medium 
with the slowest access time and the cheapest storage cost of all. 
There are a number of ways of deciding which old versions to 
digest or drain to a cheaper medium. The simplest is to do this 
simply by age - the oldest versions are discarded first. This is 
the easiest to implement since an obsolete version can simply be 
added to the end of the queue for digestion when it is made 
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obsolete by a new version being created. However, it does assume 
that the old versions of files are equally important, an assumption 
which is unlikely to be valid. One other problem associated with 
making the decision automatically is that, in the absence of any 
other constraints, a user writing a large file (perhaps in error) 
can cause digestion of all the old versions held at the server. 
The alternative is to give clients control of the choice. The 
most flexible way of doing this is to allow clients to specify for 
any file either one or both of two constraints. Firstly, they can 
specify the minimum number of versions to be retained. Secondly, 
they can specify an age; files must certainly be preserved until 
they have been in existence this long. For such files as source 
files of programs, three versions are probably better than all the 
versions in the last hour. A mistake made last thing at night may 
be irretrievable by morning. For files which really do have a time 
component associated with them, such as the contents of a 
stock-room, all the versions in the last two hours are probably 
better, since they permit a time-consuming transaction to perform 
some form of stock-taking while the stock-room is active. For some 
files which are maintained automatically by a program, explicit 
control may be useful. There is little point in maintaining old 
versions of file textnaxne directories if the only difference 
between the old versions and more recent ones is the inclusion of 
the text-names of digested files. 
There is a subtle interaction between retention of files and the 
multiple server commitment algorithm described above. 	It is 
essential that no global master file version be drained or digested 
until its transaction has completed since whether the transaction 
committed or aborted is deduced from the presence or absence of a 
version with the correct timestamp. There is only one point at 
which this is likely to be a problem. If the master server commits 
a transaction but crashes before sending the instruction to commit 
to a slave, and that slave is crashed when the master returns. 
When the slave eventually returns, it is going to ask the master 
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whether or not the transaction committed. If it has been digested 
the master will reply that it was aborted when, in fact, it was 
committed. This is simple to detect since such a master file will 
be in a state of "committing" rather than "committed". 
Usability 
The primitives provided by this filing system differ from those 
provided by most filing systems. It is necessary to investigate 
how easily these primitives can be used in practise. 
Most application programming languages support the notion of a 
file in an abstract way. Programs which have been written should 
work using the primitives provided by the filing system we have 
described. 
The simplest way to do this is to arrange that the command 
interpreter start a transaction when it runs a program, and that 
any files accessed by the program are part of the transaction. 
When the program completes successfully, the command interpreter 
commits the transaction. 	Running a program is thus an atomic 
action; either all its output files are completely updated or none 
of them are. If the program should fail in some way, the user can 
have the option of committing the transaction, aborting the 
transaction or, possibly, investigating the state of the new 
versions before making a decision. 
More sophisticated programs may wish to do their own transaction 
management, and these will not be runnable on other filing systems. 
This is normal in a filing system; programs which make use of 
specialised features of filing systems are not portable. 
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Summary 
This section has started from the notion of consistency and 
defined it more rigorously. 	Existing filing systems have been 
criticised for failing to provide sufficient guarantees, forcing 
users into an unnatural style of programming. 	The notion of 
multiple versions of a file has been refined into the notion of a 
file with a history accessible through its time component. 	The 
distinction between ordinary files and redundant files has been 
introduced, partly as a genuine distinction but partly as an 
efficiency measure for those files for which old versions will 
never be required. A method of implementing atomic transactions 
has been shown to be feasible, at least in outline, using seemingly 
simultaneous instantiation of new versions of files, perhaps held 
at more than one server in the filing system. 	An efficient 
implementation has been outlined. 	This 	. implementation is 
considered in detail in chapter 9. 
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Chapter 8: Local Discs 
Making sensible use of local discs within our constraints is 
very difficult. Using a local disc for some file accesses clearly 
reduces the demand for network and server processor bandwidth. It 
also increases the autonomy of the client machines, perhaps to the 
stage where they can operate for long periods independently of the 
network filing system. 
It is worth reiterating that the term local disc is used in a 
general way to imply local large volume storage, almost certainly 
non-volatile. This includes all media such as floppy discs, small 
Winchester discs, large high-performance magnetic discs, laser 
optical discs, bubble memories. In some ways, it also includes the 
main memory of the client machine if it is sufficiently large (and 
the client operating system suitably organised) that an in-store 
cache could hold an appreciable amount of data. 	The important 
characteristic is that a local disc is a large sized cache. 
In the past, local discs have been used as the primary filing 
system medium, perhaps with network file servers also accessible 
but not integrated into the client filing system. 	Mobility of 
users is achieved by using removable media; users remove their own 
personal discs and take the discs with them. Sharing of files is 
done using an unsophisticated file server as an intermediate store, 
with special programs to transfer a file between file server and 
local disc. This is unattractive for several reasons. 
Firstly, carrying disc packs around is inconvenient for all but 
the smallest types of disc. 	In any case, Winchester technology 
discs tend to be non-removable, especially the cheaper designs. 
This sort of scheme only really becomes acceptable if users rarely 
move between client computers. In turn, this only happens when all 
the client machines are the same and all users have their own. In 
other cases, mobility is desirable. 
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Secondly, the sharing only works well for files which are never, 
or almost never, altered. Otherwise there is the perennial problem 
of keeping track of which version is current, which are old 
out-of-date versions, which are up-to-date backup copies and so on. 
When the textnaming scheme at the file server and at the client are 
different, this problem is even worse. Because the filing system 
at the file server is not integrated into the local filing sytem at 
the client, there is no help from the system in keeping track of 
files. Further, only because most active files reside on a 
particular user's local disc (inaccessible to everyone else) do 
consistency problems not arise with two users taking a copy of a 
file from the file server, updating it and flushing the resulting 
file back to the file server. 
As discs become more unwieldy, the alternative approach is 
better. Instead of using the local disc for the primary file 
system and tacking the network on the side, the network filing 
system is used as the primary filing system and the local disc acts 
as a cache. This has an immediate advantage to the client since a 
simple client operating system easily inherits all the power and 
guarantees of the network filing system. Since the client filing 
system is not trusted by the network filing system, great care is 
needed in using this cache if any performance gain is going to 
accrue. There are two clear-cut cases. 
The first is to cache read-only files, such as compiler and 
system executable code files, dictionaries and so on. Of course, 
occasionally a compiler is updated. However, this is not an update 
to the executable code file but rather a change in which file is 
used by default. The old release is usually kept around somewhere 
since compiler updates are regularly less invisible than users 
might wish. 	Releasing a new compiler is thus binding a new 
internal filename to the old textname rather than updating the file 
to produce a new version. Since read-only files cannot be altered, 
there are no consistency worries about whether the network copy is 
in step with the local copy. 
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The second clear-cut case for using local discs is for unshared 
temporary writeable files, such as compiler workfiles or outswapped 
virtual memory segments. Because these files are not shareable, 
there is little need for security or consistency control, and often 
no need even for a textname. This is especially true of outswapped 
virtual memory which may well be handled by a special mechanism 
outside of any filing system. A particular case of temporary data 
is the data accessed in a transaction. 	The locking strategy 
ensures that a cached copy of the data read will remain accurate. 
Data updated by the transaction will need to be written through to 
the network filing system before it completes, but intermediate 
alterations need not be. Once a transaction has committed and a 
new one started, the timestamps of cached files will need to be 
checked to ensure that they are still up to date. 
There is almost certainly a requirement for local discs to be 
fairly cheap, since they are very numerous. The prime candidates 
are therefore floppy discs or small Winchester discs of about ten 
megabytes. 
Unfortunately, most of the cheap local discs have just the wrong 
characteristics for this. There is a large volume of read-only 
files and so we want the local discs to be large; they tend to be 
small. The temporary files, almost by definition, can make 
extensive use of high bandwidth from client machine to its local 
disc; they tend to be slow. Experience with WFS and with our early 
filestore demonstrates that access to a local disc is often slower 
than access to a file server over a network, since the file server 
usually has faster discs and, perhaps, a significant amount of 
caching to increase performance. 	If the local disc is a floppy 
disc then the network file server is faster by an order of 
magnitude. 
The characteristics required of a local disc for holding 
temporary files is that it should be fast. 	A ten megabyte fast 
fixed head disc is likely to increase performance of a client 
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system much more than a much larger slow disc. An extra megabyte 
of memory might increase performance even more so. Already, the 
cost of dynamic memory chips has fallen to a level where a megabyte 
of memory is of comparable cost to a ten megabyte Winchester disc 
drive. 
The characteristic required of a local disc for holding 
read-only files is that it should be large. Read-only optical disc 
transports are very cheap, largely due to their development for the 
domestic television market. Three or four hundred pounds for an 
optical disc transport is cheaper than even the pack for an eighty 
megabyte drive. A single optical disc, costing only a few pounds, 
can hold about 3500 megabytes of data [LAU80]. This is more than 
sufficient to hold all the read-only files of even a large 
organisation. In many cases it will be sufficient to hold a 
snapshot of all the files held on nearby file servers of the 
network filing system. 	The actual discs are sufficiently cheap 
that they could be replaced every few months with an up-to-date 
issue, although the cost of writing large numbers of nearly full 
discs is unclear. 
Using a local read-only optical disc like this creates a rather 
inverted filing, system where the network file server acts as a 
cache for the active files, whilst the inactive files are all held 
locally. Nevertheless, a lot of file accesses are to rarely 
changed files and so will be local. Precisely how optical discs 
are best used, taking economic and performance issues into account, 
will need to wait until they are more widely available. 
Nevertheless, their enormous capacity and, to a lesser extent, the 
enormous bandwidth achieved by loading a disc, makes optical discs 
attractive as cheap local storage devices. 
The client operating system mangement of read-only files is not 
too complex. The client operating system needs to maintain a table 
(probably a large hash-table partially held on disc) of which 
internal filenames correspond to locally held files and where on 
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the local disc they are to be found. 	Accessing a file then 
proceeds as normal by resolving the textname to get an internal 
filename. If this internal filename occurs in the table then the 
local copy is used; if not, then the network filing system will 
have to be used. Any read-only file can be added to the local disc 
(if it is writeable) and any read-only file on the local disc can 
be discarded. Of course, as with any cache, making wrong decisions 
on these points will lead to a loss of performance but not to 
incorrect operation. 
If the client operating system can be trusted, for example, if 
it is in read-only memory or is otherwise as secure as the file 
servers, then the client machine may be able to run the file server 
code as a protected process. It would need to provide external 
service to requests received from the network to meet our design 
criteria, and to be able to transmit requests out into the network. 
In practice, these guarantees are only likely for a conventional 
terminal system attached to the network, with a lot of high 
performance local discs. 	Almost all access from the terminal 
system will be to its own discs and so its performance and that of 
other computers on the network is likely to be improved by this 
technique. It is, however, an important precondition that the 
system be able to provide a suitably protected process environment 
in which the file server code can run without compromising security 
or consistency. 
For an untrusted client operating system we are left with only 
being able to cache read-only files and temporary writeable files. 
We cannot keep the current version (from the point of view of the 
network filing system) on the local disc since there is no 
guarantee that it will ever become accessible from elsewhere or 
even that it will not be destroyed by an unreliable client system. 
One way of keeping more files locally is to keep file versions 
which are seen as current by the client system, but are seen as 
part of an incomplete transaction (and hence locked) by the servers 
of the network filing system. 	This approach is not without its 
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drawbacks. Because so much is cached locally, if the client or 
server should crash then it is unacceptable merely to abort the 
transaction and start again; an hour of work at a terminal could be 
lost. If the client should crash then it must be able to pick up 
the pieces of the transaction and restart from a checkpoint. If 
the server should crash, then without any persistent locks which 
hold over a crash, locked files will become unlocked and so liable 
to updating. To check this requires the client to compare all the 
timestamps of cached files with the current versions in the network 
filing system, relocking them as it reconstructs the transaction. 
It is not possible to avoid pushing the problem through to the user 
or to a running application program if this recovery phase should 
discover that the data has been updated in the meantime. 	This 
violates one of our overriding design criteria. 	More complex 
approaches, such as that taken by DFS [STU80], lead to a need for 
long term locks which, in turn, leads to a need for breaking locks 
under certain circumstances. Otherwise an errant client could lock 
a file for ever. it is similarly impossible to avoid this being 
pushed through to the application program. The chief problem with 
long term locks is this difficulty of breaking locks since it is 
difficult to distinguish between a client recovering successfully 
from a crash and requiring the locks to be held, and a client 
recovering unsuccessfully and requiring the locks to be broken 
without being able to enumerate them. 	The problem is further 
complicated if multiple clients, each with a local disc, are 
cooperating and sharing locks. 
The way in which cached copies of writeable files can be held at 
untrusted clients remains an open problem. However, performance at 
a client can be improved fairly easily by adding a suitably fast or 
large local disc to hold temporary or read-only data. 
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Chapter 9: Implementation 
Any system design has to demonstrate that it can be implemented. 
Further, when performance is a design criterion, it has to 
demonstrate that the desirable functionality has not been achieved 
at the expense of performance. 	This demonstration requires a 
particular implementation to be described in convincing detail. 
For the detail to be convincing, the contentious areas at least do 
actually have to be implemented. Only building a real system is a 
convincing demonstration that there are no hidden flaws or problems 
with the design. 
The implementation to be described is intended to demonstrate 
this point, that the system is efficiently implementable. 	It is 
not a complete product; this would require several times as much 
resource to construct [BB075] and have a large hardware 
requirement. The implementation is in terms of multiple processes 
on a terminal system using large files as virtual discs and the 
inter-process communication scheme as a network. 	Unreliablility 
can, however, be injected at suitable points to investigate the 
effect of crashes, network failure, loss of synchrony of clocks and 
so forth. As little dependence as possible has been made on the 
host operating system; the environment in which the file server 
code runs has no advantages which could not be provided by a tiny 
operating system in a dedicated processor. Each process on the 
host system runs code for either a file server or a client system, 
one host process corresponding to one processor in a real 
implementation. 
The implementation is, however, reasonably realistic. The file 
servers (processes) cooperate through the network (inter-process 
message system) to provide a network filing system on discs 
(files). They offer concurrent service to multiple clients, handle 
crash recovery and have suitable caching to increase performance. 
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The code of a file server is unexceptional. It is written as a 
single Pascal program EJEN741 with some underlying assembly code 
procedures. The assembly code procedures implement the virtual 
machine in which the program runs. Since the program is actually 
running as a process on an outer host operating system, much of the 
virtual machine is concerned with recasting requests for the host 
system. For example, a request to read a disc page which the 
server would regard as going to the disc device handler is recast 
as an operating system call to read a page from a file. 	The 
program is concurrent within the process on the host operating 
system. Some of the assembly code procedures are thus concerned 
with controlling this concurrency, switching the stack of the 
Pascal program, handling external events and so on. 	The 
concurrency is managed by monitors [H0A714,LAN80) although the lack 
of compiler support means that entry and exit calls must be 
programmed explicitly. 	External events, such as pages arriving 
from the file or messages arriving at the process, are recast as 
monitor signals. 
In a genuine implementation on a dedicated processor, these 
assembly code procedures would form a small multi-process operating 
system including device handlers. 	The functions which this 
operating system would need to provide are process switching (spawn 
a new process, enter a monitor, leave a monitor, wait for an event, 
signal an event), access to the disc (read a page, write a page), 
access to the network (await a message, send a message) and access 
to a clock (what is the time, wait for a prescribed time). 
Functions such as caching disc pages or scheduling transfers to the 
disc and the network are handled in the file server code itself. 
The implementation splits into two parts. 	The textnaming is 
almost completely independent of everything else. 	This is to 
enable directories to be readable and to enable the textnaming to 
be handled by separate servers or even client systems. There is no 
direct correspondence between the textname servers and the file 
servers. If the processor bandwidth of the textname server were a 
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problem then multiple textname servers could be provided for a file 
server. If the processor bandwidth of the textname server were 
very underused and there were multiple file servers nearby, then 
the one textname server could handle the textnaming for them all. 
Some client systems could handle their own textnaming while others 
could use the textname servers. On the other hand, there is no 
assumption that the textname server must be in a separate 
processor. The file server and the textname server could be in the 
same processor. 
Representation of files 
One of the key decisions in any filing system is how files are 
to be represented. The consistency scheme requires that individual 
pages in a file can be updated without requiring to rewrite the 
entire file. This means that some sort of indirection scheme with 
index pages is needed. To cope with large files a multilevel index 
is necessary; however, most files are small and so a multilevel 
index is not usually needed. 	It considerably simplifies 
implementation if the organisation of the indices does not depend 
on the number of levels required. For this reason a scheme based 
on that of version 7 of Unix [TH078] is used. 
Disc addresses are 31 bits and disc pages are 512 bytes. Page 
zero on the disc is never one of the pages in a file and so a disc 
address of zero is conventionally used to represent an absent disc 
address. A file is handled using eleven disc addresses. The first 
eight are just the disc addresses of the first eight pages of the 
file; in most cases this will be sufficient for the whole file 
since most files are less than 14K long. For a file longer than 11K 
bytes the ninth address is the address of a page containing the 
addresses of the next 128 pages of the file. For files longer than 
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68K bytes the tenth address is the address of a page containing 128 
addresses of index pages containing between them the addresses of 
the next 8192 pages of the file. If this is insufficient then the 
eleventh address contains the address of a triple indirection page. 
The maximum file size is thus about a gigabyte. Associated with 
each disc address in the scheme is a bit called, the "moved" bit. A 
disc address together with its moved bit is thus conveniently 32 
bits. The moved bit is used to indicate whether or not the page 
marked has been updated from the immediately preceding version of 
the file, and hence moved to a new place on the disc. 
All the administrative data for the file is held in a file 
header page. Headers are kept in a special area of the disc and so 
there is no confusion between a file header and a data page from a 
file. The administrative data consists of the internal file number 
(64 bit integer), the eleven disc addresses already mentioned, the 
timestamp, the number of inbound textnanie references the file has 
from influential volumes and the type of file (redundant, normal or 
read-only). The internal filename contains the holding server in 
certain bits but read-only files have a server number of zero. The 
header also contains the commit state and the internal file number 
of the master file; these are used to manage commitment of atomic 
transactions. The header number of the previous version of a file 
is held in each header. 	This is a hint rather than reliable 
information - if the header turns out to contain a previous version 
of the same file then it contains the immediately preceding 
version. If it contains something else then the immediately 
preceding version has been digested. The rest of the page (which, 
in practice, will be largely unused for most files) contains pairs 
of keys and their associated rights of file access, and file 
attributes together with their associated values. 
When a file is updated, a new header is always created. Most of 
the data it contains will, of course, remain unchanged from the 
previous version. Additionally, for a normal file, each updated 
page is also relocated. By this is meant that the data for a page 
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of the new version is never written to the same address as the old 
page. It does not mean that subsequent updates to the new page 
before the version is instantiated are written to new pages since a 
crash will cause the new version to be discarded in any case. This 
strategy is also used for updated index pages. 	The moved bit 
associated with each disc address indicates whether that disc 
address is a page in the previous version of the file (unset) or 
whether the page was updated from the previous version and so has 
been moved to a new site (set). 
Ignoring caching, which delays creation of a file header for a 
new version, updating a file proceeds as follows. 	Similar 
approaches have been used within databases [CEA77,L0R77,CHA81] but 
with the simplification that old versions are not retained. A new 
header is allocated and a copy of the old header copied into it 
with the header number of the previous version suitably assigned 
and with the moved bits of the eleven disc addresses •cleared. When 
a page is updated, a new page is allocated and filled with the new 
data. The disc address of the old page is altered to that of the 
new and the moved bit is set. 	This, in turn, might require 
altering an index page which is similarly modified by allocating a 
new page, updating the old disc address and setting the moved bit. 
This is repeated through the appropriate number of indirections 
until one of the eleven disc addresses in the header has been 
altered. If the page is multiply updated during the creation of a 
new version, detectable by the moved bit being set, then the page 
can be updated in situ without allocating further new pages. This 
is particularly important for index pages, which are often multiply 
upadated. When the update is complete, the old header still maps 
out the old version and the new header the new (see figure 2). The 
moved bits indicate which pages are part of the new version but not 
the old. 
The moved bits are also used when discarding new versions rather 
than instantiating them, and when digesting old versions. 	To 
discard a new uninstantiated version, the eleven disc addresses and 
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associated index pages are scanned, and pages corresponding to 
addresses with the moved bit set are returned for subsequent 
reallocation. Finally, the header is returned for reallocation. 
For a large file with only a small update, this scan does not 
require the entire tree of index pages to be scanned since only a 
moved index page can possibly lead on to further moved pages. 
Digesting an old version of a file requires both the old header 
and the new to be scanned. Whenever a new page was allocated to 
the new version then the corresponding page in the old version can 
be discarded. Note that this technique only works to discard the 
oldest existing version of the file. To discard an old version but 
leave older versions would require the moved bits from the 
discarded version to be propcgated through to the succeeding 
version, a rather complex operation. 
A file has a number of attributes. These are just pairs of 32 
bit integers and are mostly uninterpreted by the file servers. 
Certain low numbered attributes are those maintained by the file 
server, such as the timestamp of the version or the file size. 
These, of course, may not be altered by clients. 
The current version of a file is thus represented by a header. 
This header is located from the atlas, indexed by the 64 bit 
internal filename, although caching effects often out out the need 
for this lookup. Previous versions of a file are found from the 
current version by following the chain from one version to the 
immediately preceding version. This assumes that old versions will 
be rarely accessed. 
166 
Figure 2 	Simplified diagram of three versions of a file 
The number of disc addresses in each page has been reduced for clarity; 
most file header information is omitted. 
The file starts as ABC; then A is updated to A'BC; then B is updated 
to form the current version A'B'C. 
L,uI -1 VI I 
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Representation of active files 
Active files are files which are (or have recently been) taking 
part in a transaction. 	They need not have been updated to be 
active. Each active file is represented by an in-store structure 
called a lock record. 
A lock record contains the internal file name, the addresses of 
the current and the previous file headers and the eleven disc 
addresses together with their moved bits, the type of file, the 
file size and one of the file keys with its associated rights. 
This is merely a cache of part of the data held in the file header, 
with concessions to the creation of a new version, at which time a 
file has two relevant file headers. 
As their name implies, lock records are also used to lock the 
files that they describe. An attempt to use a lock record for a 
conflicting operation causes a process to wait. In the lock record 
are a reference count and a lock state. The reference count gives 
the number of readers for a shared lock. The lock state gives the 
state which the current version (the new if the file is being 
updated, the old otherwise) has reached. 	This can be one of 
unlocked, historic, archaic, reading, writing, deleting. 
Unlocked indicates that the file is not in use and that the lock 
record is merely an up-to-date cache of some of the file header 
data. This data is normally sufficient to activate the file 
without requiring to fetch the file header from the disc and is 
certainly sufficient to locate the correct header. The performance 
of the server is improved by having enough lock records to cache 
most of the files which are being worked with by users. Further, 
the atlas associating internal filenames and header addresses is 
only updated when an unlocked lock record is required for a file 
for which no lock record already exists. This is considerably more 
rare than the moving of the current header when each version is 
instantiated. A file just updated is a likely candidate to be 
updated again in the near future. Lock records are reused on a 
least recently used basis; when a lock record is needed the one 
which has been unlocked for the longest is taken. If necessary, 
the atlas is updated at this moment. 
A state of historic indicates that an old version of the file is 
being accessed but, incidentally, this happens to be the current 
version too. Archaic indicates that an old version of the file is 
being accessed, but that it is genuinely old. 	No locking is 
implied since an old version can never change (merely be superseded 
by new versions). 	Historic lock records can be cloned off lock 
records for reading and vice versa. If a lock record for writing 
is cloned off a historic lock then the historic lock is downgraded 
to archaic since it will probably (this uncertainty does not 
matter) become superseded. Historic, access to a redundant file is 
permitted, although archaic access is not. This is because there 
are no multiple versions of redundant files and so two different 
versions of a redundant file cannot be simultaneously accessible. 
Marking a file redundant is an efficiency consideration 
and so it should only be done if this will not be a restriction. 
Compiler object code files, for example, may not be edited in place 
if they are redundant, but this is unlikely to be a noticeable 
restriction. 
A state of reading indicates that the current version of the 
file is being read and is locked against competing updaters 
superseding it by creating a new version. 
A state of writing indicates that the current version of the 
file is a tentative one created but not yet instantiated. It is 
locked against any access by other than the creator. 
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A state of deleted indicates that the new tentative version is a 
tombstone for the file, but that it has not yet been instantiated. 
It is locked against all access by anyone. Only old versions of a 
deleted file can be accessed, and even they may well have been 
digested. If the file is redundant then instead of instantiating 
the tombstone the entire file is destroyed and its pages returned 
for subsequent reallocation. 
There are naturally quite a lot of commands associated with the 
management of files. These will be described briefly. There are 
additional commands for administrating the file server which are 
not described. 	These commands are privileged and relate to 
functions such as stopping the file server or initialising a virgin 
disc. Table 14 contains a summary of the commands available to 
clients. 
Firstly, there is a file create command. This includes the file 
type: one of normal, redundant or read-only. The command is not 
privileged, although the file will vanish, if it is not given a 
textname, when the transaction creating it commits. 	Creating a 
file returns the internal filename of the file. 	It is not an 
idempotent operation, although the restriction that a file must be 
textnaxued means that any accidentally created files will be short 
lived. A read-only file is actually a write-once file. 	The 
transaction which creates it can also write it. 	Once that 
transaction completes it can never alter again. 
A file can be opened for access in three ways. These are for 
reading, for writing and historically. 	Historic access requires 
the provision of a timestamp, although a timestamp of zero is 
conventionally taken to mean the latest version (but with no 
locking implied). Opening a file returns a channel number, a small 
integer associated with the transaction in which the file is 
opened. There is no close operation. Files are closed when the 
transaction which opened them completes. As well as the internal 
filename for the desired file, a key must be provided. This key 
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must grant appropriate access to the file. For genuine historic 
access, this means the appropriate key at the time in the past that 
the version existed. 
Having opened a file it can be accessed by a read page command 
and, for a file open for writing, by a write page command. 	The 
details of these commands interact quite closely with the 
implementation of the network. In the implemented system the read 
page command specifies a port number on the network to where the 
data should be delivered. The write page command replies with a 
port number at which the data will be accepted. The last page in a 
file may be short. For a write page command, the number of bytes 
is provided in the command; for a read page command, in the reply. 
Attributes are handled by two commands. Add attribute gives a 
new pair of 32 bit integers. The first is the number defining the 
attribute and the second is its value. By convention, a value of 
zero causes the attribute to be removed. Attributes with values 
less than ten are reserved and may not be altered in this way. Get 
attribute specifies an attribute and returns the associated value. 
A missing attribute returns zero so, to some extent, an attribute 
can be hidden by using an unlikely attribute number. Low numbered 
attributes return file server information such as the file size and 
t imestam p. 
The size of a file is the high water mark of the writes to the 
file, taking into account a possibly short last page. This can be 
altered by a set length command to either extend or truncate the 
file. 
There is no explicit delete command. 	Files are deleted by 
unbinding their textnames, which will either cause their reference 
count to fall to zero or may cause them to be garbage collected 
eventually. 
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A file may be moved from one server to another. This command, 
which is necessary for sensible archiving if for no other reason, 
is not currently implemented. No special care is taken at the file 
level to keep track of where a file has gone. 	Once moved, the 
current version becomes historic. Apart from only being accessible 
historically, it is a candidate for digestion, unless it is 
read-only, although even then it is not necessarily destroyed 
immediately. It may be sensible for this command to be privileged. 
Unfortunately, the problems which it may engender are difficult to 
deduce from an experimental implementation. 
There are also two commands to update reference counts (intended 
for use by the site implementing the textnaming). The two commands 
increment and decrement these counts. If they should fall to zero 
then the file is deleted. For a normal file this means creating a 
tombstone current version so that old versions remain accessible 
for a time. 
The garbage collector, which is not implemented, will need 
additional commands to obtain the internal filename of every 
existing file. By definition, it cannot find them all from the 
textname graph. 	Most of the garbage collector's operations, 
however, are interfaced to the textnaming scheme and not the 
underlying file scheme. 
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Table 	Summary of commands 
createFile trio key type => fno 
openRead tno fno key. => channel 
openWrite tno fno key => channel 
openliistoric tno fno key time => channel 
readPage tno channel pno port => bytes (-i-data at port) 
writePage tno channel pno bytes> port 	(-i-data to port) 
setLength tno channel bytes => ok 
addAttribute tno fno key att val => ok 
getAttribute tno fno key att => val 
incflefCount tno fno key => ok 
decRefCount trio fno key => ok 
start => tno 
commit tno => ok 
abort trio => ok 
unjam tno => ok 
addKey 	tno fno key key right> ok 
att is attribute number 
bytes is number of bytes in block 
channel is opened file number 
fno is internal file number 
key is key for file access 
pno is page number within file 
port is network address and subaddress 
right is granted rights 
tno is transaction number 
type is normal, redundant or read-only 
val is attribute value 
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Layout on the disc 
The disc is divided up by physical disc address into four areas. 
The bounds of these areas are recorded in a special page, the title 
page, which occurs as both the first and the last page of the disc. 
This page is only ever written when the disc is first handcrafted 
as an empty disc containing no files. The title page also contains 
the server number, which forms part of each internal filename. 
There is also a subtitle page which is occasionally written 
during normal running. This is held in the second and third pages 
on the disc. Normally, these pages are identical but the contents 
of either are always acceptable. If the first is unreadable then 
the second can be used. The subtitle page records a number of 
different pieces of information. Firstly, it records whether the 
holding server is running or not. When a server starts up, crash 
recovery is necessary if the subtitle page states that the server 
was running when it stopped. Otherwise, the disc is up to date and 
no crash recovery is needed. If the subtitle page states that the 
server is stopped then it also records one or two pieces of 
information necessary for a smooth restart. The main use of the 
subtitle page is to record a list of other servers which may need 
to be consulted during crash recovery. 
The first main area on the disc is an atlas of file headers. 
This is just a large hashtable associating internal filenames with 
header addresses. In normal running it is not kept up to date due 
to caching effects and so it needs to be reconstructed during crash 
recovery. 
The next area are the headers themeselves. 	Among the other 
information in a header is a bit which states whether or not it is 
free for allocation. Some of the free headers are used to hold a 
list of all the free headers so that header allocation can take 
place quickly. This free list is not maintained up to date on disc 
and needs to be reconstructed during crash recovery. 
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Next is a bitmap of the user area, indicating which pages are 
free and which are allocated to files. This is not kept up to date 
either and needs reconstruction after a crash. 
The last area is the user area itself, consisting of most of the 
disc. Data and index pages of files are all allocated from this 
area, using the information in the bitmap. 	There are no 
restrictions on what patterns of bits can occur in these pages. 
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Figure 3 	Layout of pages on the disc 
TITLE PAGE 	(copy 1) 
SUBTITLE PAGE (copy 1) 





(maps out files in user 
area) 
BITMAP (of user area) 
USER AREA 
(data pages from files) 
TITLE PAGE (copy 2) 
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Atomic transactions 
All file access is performed within the cocoon of an atomic 
transaction. Each atomic transaction is managed using data held in 
an in-store transaction record. This holds a list of pointers to 
lock records held by the transaction, the transaction number and 
some data concerned with transaction commitment. 
When a file is opened within a transaction then it is activated 
and the lock record is added to the list of those held by the 
transaction. Sometimes the lock will already be held and in this 
case it is merely upgraded if necessary. In both cases, this may 
involve waiting for competing transactions to complete and to 
release their locks on the file. 
A transaction number is a 32 bit integer and contains the 
identity of the server which started it and issued the number. 
This server is called the master server, and any other servers 
participating in the transaction are called slaves. When another 
server first receives a request from a transaction, it sends a 
message to the master server, extracted from the transaction 
number, adding itself as a slave and it receives a reply either 
that this has been done or that the transaction does not exist. 
Each server maintains an on-disc list of all the servers with which 
it has any dealings. 	This must guarantee to include all such 
servers although it is not a strict requirement that it includes no 
others. 
Finally, the transaction commits or aborts. This will normally 
be at the request of the client but servers may abort transactions 
to break deadlocks or due to crashes. The commit request is only 
accepted by the master server. 
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In the normal case, no other servers will be involved and so 
commitment is fairly simple. 	If no files were updated in the 
transaction then all the locks held are released. Otherwise, one 
of the updated files is selected as the master file for the 
transaction. The clock is read to give a timestamp for the 
transaction. Any other files updated in the transaction are 
flushed out onto the disc with their headers recording the internal 
filename of the master file and the timestamp. The data and index 
pages for the master file are flushed out onto the disc. Finally, 
the header for the master file is flushed to disc marked as its own 
master and with its stateword set to "committed" 	All locks are 
released. The transaction has now committed. 	Aborting a single 
server transaction merely consists of freeing any pages 
provisionally allocated to the nascent versions. In this case, the 
lock records for new versions are completely destroyed, so that 
they will be reconstructed from the file header if the file is 
accessed again. 
Note that the headers for new versions are normally only created 
at commitment, rather than, as described earlier, when the new 
version first starts to come into existence. Only if some item of 
data not cached in the lock records is updated will the new header 
need to be created earlier. This is done with its state set to 
"volatile". Thus, in the common single server case, no extra disc 
transfers are normally involved in atomic commitment. 
A transaction involving multiple servers proceeds as follows. 
First, the master server selects a file held there for which a new 
version will be instantiated. If it holds none then it creates a 
file specially for the purpose (this file will eventually vanish). 
This selected file is the global master file. The clock at the 
master server is read to get a timestamp for all the new versions 
being instantiated. First, the master server performs the single 
server commit already described, except that the file state is set 
to "ensured" rather than to "committed". Then a message is sent to 
every participating server informing them of the internal filename 
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of the global master and of the timestamp. 
Each slave server selects a file for which a new version will be 
instantiated as the local master. They then execute the single 
server commit scheme already described except that the header for 
the local master file is not flushed out as its own master, but 
with a state "ensured" and with the global master file as the 
master file; the identity of the master server is also recorded in 
the header. At the completion of this stage every server has all 
the new versions channelled through a single version, the local 
master, at that site; and all the local master files are channelled 
through a single version at the master server, the global master. 
If any server should fail to reach this stage, then the transaction 
is aborted, although if the master server should crash, it will not 
be aborted until crash recovery is completed. 
Now the transaction actually reaches the point of no return. 
The master server rewrites the header of the master file with the 
state set to "committing". 	From now on, the transaction is 
guaranteed to commit whatever happens. The preceding interaction 
exists to guarantee that all new versions of files held at slave 
servers are undamaged. 	The remaining part of the commitment 
procedure decouples the slaves so that they will later be able to 
autonomously decide which versions have been instantiated. 
The master server sends each slave server a message to commit 
their part of the transaction. Each slave server rewrites (to a 
new site) the header for the local master server with state set to 
"committed" and as its own master. It acknowledges the success (it 
cannot fail but merely take longer than expected) back to the 
master server. 
Finally, the master server rewrites the header for the global 
master file with state "committed". 	This logically unnecessary 
step means that crash recovery will not need to attempt to 
retransmit all the commit messages to the involved servers. 
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A multiple server abort is simple, provided that the transaction 
has not passed the "ensured" stage after the first round of 
messages. Up to this point, an abort consists of sending each 
server a message to abort the transaction. 	If the server has 
crashed, it will abort it in any case and so there is no problem. 
The difficult case arises if a slave ensures the transaction, the 
slave crashes and then the master needs to abort the transaction 
(perhaps because another slave had already crashed). Now, the file 
needs to go into suspended animation. The new version cannot be 
discarded since it is the only place that the transaction's 
aborting is recorded. The new version thus remains suspended and 
locked awaiting the return of the crashed slave. This might prove 
to be so inconvenient as to justify a special mechanism to deal 
with it. On the other hand, it is very unlikely. 
Crash recovery 
During crash recovery, two different sets of information are 
needed. Firstly, which servers are involved in transactions of 
indeterminate state and secondly, which file versions are involved. 
The servers attached to the recovering server at the time that 
it crashed are known from the on-disc list already mentioned. This 
is used as the list of all slave servers in any rediscovered 
transactions where the recovering server is the master. It would 
be more correct to record an individual list in each global master 
file, but crashes are hopefully rare and multiple crashes where 
some servers remain crashed for a long time, rarer. 	Thus, in 
practise, the optimisation would merely save some message traffic. 
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First, a message is sent to all connected servers announcing 
that crash recovery is taking place. These connected servers abort 
any transactions involving the crashed server which have not 
reached the point of no return, since they can now never commit. 
Transactions which are past this point will be rediscovered 
automatically. 
All the file headers are rediscovered from a complete scan of 
the area of the disc containing them. 	As file versions are 
discovered, the atlas associating internal filenames and header 
addresses is reconstructed. Apart from headers which are not in 
use, the headers are dealt with as follows. 
A header with state "volatile" is part of a transaction in 
progress at the time of the crash. It can safely be destroyed. It 
is possible that a message may arrive to commit the transaction 
containing these versions. 	The transaction number will be 
unrecognized and so the request will be rejected. 
A header with state "committed" is an instantiated version, as 
are any versions reached by following the chain of previous 
versions. 
A header with a master file held at the crashed server (but not 
its own master) is in the same state as its master. If a later 
version of the master file has already been instantiated, then the 
older version definitely committed even though it may now have been 
digested. It may require several passes over the remaining file 
headers to decide this since a header may be discovered before that 
of its master file. With enough memory, these multiple passes can 
be reduced in size and perhaps eliminated. The recovery time is, 
however, dominated by the time required to perform the pass over 
all the headers. 
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A header with state "ensured" is part of a transaction being 
committed or aborted around the time of the crash. Dealing with 
these headers is complicated by the fact that they may have already 
been superseded by another header with state "committing" or 
"committed". In either of these cases the ensured header is 
ignored. Consider the case of the slave server, first. The global 
master file, held at another server, will decide whether the 
transaction committed or aborted. An enquiry is sent to the master 
server to find out what to do. The global master file can be in 
one of two states. 
It can be "ensured" itself, indicating that the commitment in 
progress has still not completed. 	The transaction is aborted, 
taking care to avoid the race between a recovering slave causing 
the transaction to abort and the master server finally deciding to 
commit. it is possible, at a considerable increase in complexity, 
to keep open the option to commit at this point; this requires 
reconstructing at least part of the transaction record at the slave 
server. 
The global master can be "committing", indicating that the 
transaction is past the point of no return. 	The rediscovered 
version at the slave should be instantiated. 
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When a master server rediscovers an "ensured" header it has to 
handle things differently. The transaction will abort; indeed, it 
may already have done so at some slave servers. A message is sent 
to all slaves to abort the transaction. The transaction number is 
unknown and so this has to be done by specifying the global master 
file instead. Slave servers may already have aborted (perhaps they 
crashed too) and so a message that the global master file is 
unknown is acceptable. Until all these messages have got through 
successfully, the file cannot be unlocked and the version 
discarded. 
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A header with state "committing" can only be discovered at a 
master server. 	As with ensured headers, it may have been 
superseded by a "committed" header and in this case it is ignored. 
If not, then all the slaves must be informed or reinformed that the 
transaction must be committed. Again, the transaction number is 
unknown and so this has to be done by specifying the global master 
file instead. If the slave server denies knowledge of the global 
master file then it must already have committed it. The file could 
be unlocked if a slave server should prove inaccessible. This is 
not done due to the additional complexity it would introduce; the 
file remains locked until all slaves have been successfully told to 
commit. 
The details of the recovery algorithm are as follows. The goal 
of the algorithm is to either accept or reject each file header. 
Accepting a header will happen if and only if that header is a 
version to be instantiated. Rejecting a header will happen if and 
only if that header is a version contained in a transaction which 
has aborted (or will definitely abort). 	Firstly, the atlas is 
emptied since there are, as yet, no accepted files on the volume. 
An in-store bitmap is intitialised to record which file headers 
remain to be judged. Whenever a file is accepted, it is inserted 
into the atlas. All its old versions are also accepted, but these 
are not inserted into the atlas since the atlas only records the 
most recent version of a file. 
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Table 5: Summary of file header states 
State Own master Master file local Master file remote 
Volatile . 	. . Header is part of incomplete transaction 
Ensured Global master Non-master file of Local master file 
of completing transaction which for multiple 
transaction may have committed server transaction 
which will or may abort. which may have 
now abort. committed or may 
abort. 
Committing Global master 
file for 




Committed Local master 




The recovery algorithm is multiple pass. It could be reduced to 
a single incredibly complex pass with a sufficiently large main 
memory to hold a huge data structure. Some of the passes could be 
combined with only modest storage requirements. Recovery happens 
rarely so it seems judicious to place emphasis on getting it 
correct rather than fast. 	Only the first pass scans all the 
headers, and most of the other passes will normally be small. 
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Phase one consists of a scan to handle the simplest cases, which 
are the files which can be judged by their own headers alone. Each 
header which remains to be judged is examined. If it is unreadable 
then it is certainly not the header of a valid version and so it is 
rejected. If it is not in use then it is rejected (actually, in 
this case it can merely be ignored). If it is "volatile" then it 
is rejected. If it is "committed" then it is accepted, and so are 
any older versions of the file still in existence. Decisions about 
headers which are not in these classes are deferred to later 
passes. 
Phase two performs two tasks. It decides about each file which 
has its master file locally at the recovering server. 	And it 
removes all superseded file headers left as debris from 
transactions which successfully committed. 	Each header which 
remains to be •judged is rescanned. 	Firstly, if it is its own 
master, or the master is at a remote server, then the internal 
filename of the file itself is looked up in the atlas. 	If a 
version at least as recent as the header in question has already 
been accepted then the header has been superseded and so it is 
rejected. The second (and only other) case is where the header has 
a local master. 	The internal filename of the local master is 
looked up in the atlas. If a version at least as recent as the 
header in question exists then the file is accepted (together with 
its previous versions). This phase is repeated until a pass of it 
causes no new files to be accepted, since long chains of 
dependencies on old versions can occur. 
Phase three finds all local and global master files 
participating in transactions which were actually involved in 
committing at the time of the crash. There are three types of 
these files. Files with a remote master, files which are their own 
master and are "ensured" and files which are "committing". 	The 
headers remaining are scanned once again and for each header which 
falls into one of these three classes, in-store data structures are 
created. A lock record is created for the new version exclusively 
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locking the file, and a transaction record is created which 
possesses this exclusive look, with the file as the local master 
for the transaction. If a header for the same version is found in 
both the "committing" and "ensured" state, then the "ensured" 
header is rejected since it has been superseded by the "committing" 
one. 
Phase four finds all files dependent on those found in phase 
three. The headers remaining to be judged are scanned once again. 
The headers being looked for are those with a local master present 
in the in-store data structure constructed during phase three. A 
lock record is created for the new version exclusively locking the 
file, and this lock record is appended to those held by the 
transaction with the appropriate local master. 
Phase five reconstructs the header free list. All the headers 
still remaining to be judged are rejected. They can only be new 
versions of files involved in transactions being flushed to disc 
prior to commitment proper commencing. All the rejected headers 
are inserted into the list of file headers available for 
allocation. 
Phase six reconstructs the user area bitmap of pages available 
for allocation. 	Each accepted file header, and each header 
corresponding to in-store lock records, is scanned and all the 
pages comprising it are marked as not available. This pass makes 
use of the moved bits in the headers and indices to avoid scanning 
all the index pages of every version. 
At this point, the file server can open for service. The disc 
and the in-store data structures are pretty much as they were at 
the time of the crash. 	The fate of some files remains to be 
decided, but they are all locked. Phase seven decides about these 
remaining files. 	For each transaction for which the recovering 
server is the master, a message is sent to every server attached at 
the time of the crash. If the global master is "ensured" then this 
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message tells the slaves to abort, if it is "committing" it tells 
them to commit. The original transaction number has been lost and 
so this has to be done in terms of the internal filename of the 
global master file. 	When replies have been received from all 
slaves then the transaction is completed in the normal way, and all 
the locks are released. If the recovering server is a slave then 
it sends a message to the master to enquire whether to commit or 
abort the transaction. According to the reply, the new versions 
are accepted or rejected in the usual way, and all the locks are 
released. If any servers are inaccessible during phase seven then 
some files may remain locked for inconveniently long periods. 
Note that all the complexity of the consistency scheme occurs 
during crash recovery. In normal running, the situation is very 
much simpler and has almost no overhead for the single server 
commit, and little for the multiple server commit. 
There are four commands associated directly with transaction 
management, although all other commands also form part of a 
transaction and so include a transaction number. The four commands 
are start transaction, commit transaction, abort transaction and 
unblock transaction. There are also some server to server commands 
such as add server, commit slave portion or enquire state of global 
master. These are not described since they are not themselves 
complex and are fairly predetermined by the approach to committing 
transactions. 
Start transaction merely returns a transaction number. 	It 
allocates a transaction record and generates a unique transaction 
number. 
Commit and abort transaction do just that. Abort transaction is 
one of two commands which will be accepted immediately when the 
transaction is busy. All other commands will be rejected if there 
is an outstanding uncompleted command for the transaction at that 
server. After a commit or abort transaction command has been 
187 
received, the transaction number becomes invalid. 
Unblock transaction is the other command which is always 
acceptable. If there is no outstanding command being processed for 
the transaction at that server then it has no effect. Otherwise, 
if the uncompleted command is waiting for a locked file to become 
unlocked then it gives up waiting. The uncompleted command fails 
with no effect. 	If the uncompleted command is actually 
progressing, it is merely marked as unstoppable. It will fail if 
it ever needs to wait for a file lock. Unblock transaction thus 
guarantees to complete an outstanding command in a reasonably short 
time, perhaps because the user became bored and pressed an 
interrupt key. 
Security 
The security is managed by keys, uninterpreted 32 bit integers. 
In a more complete implementation there would need to be a 
recommended way of turning a text string into such a key, so that 
all client systems uniformly convert passwords to keys. 
As already mentioned, the file header contains a number of pairs 
of keys and their associated access rights. 	This restricted 
implementation only has three rights: to read the file, to write 
the file and to issue further keys for the file. 	Other rights 
which might be sensible are to append data to the file, to delete 
the file, to alter file attributes, and to move the file to another 
server. All operations like this are regarded as reading or 
writing in the current implementation, according to whether the 
operation implies any alteration to the file (and hence the 
allocation of a new header). 
188 
Each look record contains one key and its associated rights. 
This is the key last successfully used to access the file, on the 
reasonable assumption that this will be the most likely key to be 
used on the next access. 	This is all part of the desire that 
simple access to the file should entail neither looking in the 
atlas nor fetching the header from the disc. 
There is just one command for manipulating keys, which updates 
(or adds) the rights associated with a key. If the key does not 
exist then it is added, otherwise the rights associated with the 
key are updated. If the associated rights are none, then the key 
is removed. There is no command to discover the keys associated 
with a given file. 
T extnamin 
As already mentioned, the textnaming scheme is designed to be 
sufficiently independent of the underlying file implementation that 
it can be moved to a separate server, although there is no 
requirement that this be done. 
Textname directories are just files. Additionally, an attribute 
is set to discriminate between directories and other files. 
Naturally, directories are normal files rather than redundant 
files. This means that their implementation is considerably 
simplified. Complex structures can be used within directories 
without worry that a crash may corrupt the structures or cause the 
structures to get out of step with the files that they describe. 
That the textnaxning scheme is ixuplementable does not seem to be 
contentious. Almost every aspect of it has been used before, 
although not at the same time. Pathname naming schemes have been 
im 
used in many filing systems such as Unix [R1T72]. Both the CAP 
filing system [NEE77] and the Cambridge file server (D1080] allow 
these to become sufficiently complex to require occasional garbage 
collection EB1R78,GAR801. 	Binding of component names to other 
pathnames has been used in CAL [LAM76] and in Multics [BEN72]. 
Allowing objects other than files to be preserved in the textname 
scheme has been used in Unix [R1T72] (for devices and mounted 
volumes) and in an extension to Unix [RAS80] where non-leaf objects 
can be named which are capable of handling resolution of the 
remaining part of the pathname. Naming across volumes has usually 
been barred due to the problems of consistency. With an underlying 
consistency scheme this is no longer a problem. 
The textnaming scheme has not been implemented. 	It is 
implementable, but to investigate how convenient it is in practice 
would require a genuine multiple server implementation with real 
users, rather than an experimental prototype. A simple textnaming 
scheme has been implemented merely to keep track of files when 
testing other parts of the file server implementation since 614 bit 
numbers .are inconvenient to remember. 
If the textnaming is implemented in a client system, then the 
commands which it makes available to application programs are not 
in the province of the network filing system. The commands which 
are described are those which could be implemented by a separate 
textnaine server. 
There are four main commands available to manipulate the 
textnaming scheme. Additionally there will need to be a number of 
commands to handle volumes which influence each other, add new 
server names and interface to the garbage collector. These latter 
commands are not considered in detail and, to some extent, will 
depend on factors outside of the network filing system (such as 
whether there are name servers on the network). 	In all these 
commands, when an internal filename is a parameter then a key must 
also be provided which grants suitable access. 
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The first command is that to create a directory. This takes a 
key and returns the internal file number of a new empty directory. 
This should be preserved in the textname graph before the creating 
transaction commits or it will be rather short lived. A directory 
is just a normal file with a special attribute, but it makes for a 
more convenient interface to the textname scheme to distinguish 
directories immediately they are created. 
Next there is an add binding command. This could be split up 
into a number of different commands since the varying format could 
prove embarassing in a strongly typed language. This takes three 
basic parameters, although the third is subdivided. 	The three 
basic parameters are the internal filename of the directory in 
which the binding will be preserved, the component name to be bound 
and the object to be bound. The object to be bound consists of a 
type code and the defining data, either a string or 64 bit integer. 
If this object is a file (or a directory) then this data consists 
of a 64 bit integer, the internal filename. 	If this object is 
pathnaine then it consists of a string. The only complex case is 
that of adding a binding to a file. In this case, the reference 
count for the file may need to be incremented, and this requires 
finding the file. 	Normally it will be at the creating server, 
which can be extracted from the internal filename, but otherwise 
all the servers under the Influence of the server holding the 
directory may need to be searched. If it is not found here but all 
the influenced servers were available, then the binding can simply 
be added for it does not affect preservation of the file. If the 
file could be on an offline influenced volume then the binding must 
be rejected, since it does have implications for the preservation 
of the file. These two cases should really be distinguished more 
explicitly, perhaps by separating the two cases where the binding 
should and should not have implications for preservation of the 
file. It is assumed that directories do not drift away from their 
creating server. 
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The next command is the remove binding command. It takes the 
internal filename of a directory, and a component name. 	The 
binding is removed from the directory. For a file, an attempt is 
made to decrement the reference count but it is not an error if 
this should fail (perhaps because the relevant volume is a normally 
offline archive). 
Finally, there is the resolve command. This takes as parameters 
a pathnaine and the internal filename of a directory in which to 
commence resolution; zero conventionally means starting from the 
global context. 	The name is resolved to produce the object it 
names. The result is thus the 64 bit internal filename and also 
the remaining unresolved part of the pathname, if any. 
Assessment 
The prototype implementation handles almost all of the data 
transfer primitives, all of the consistency and all of the 
security. The textnaming scheme has not been implemented. 
Apart from textnaming, the few unimplemented areas are as 
follows. Files may not be moved between servers automatically 
(keeping the same internal filename). 	There is no automatic 
detection of deadlocked transactions, since there are no timeouts 
associated with waiting for locked files. 	It is possible to 
abandon waiting by command, however. 	There is no automatic 
digestion of old versions of files. Only single page transfers are 
implemented; this is partly due to the inter-process communication 




The consistency scheme seems to have as low an overhead as 
predicted. This depends crucially, though, on the mix of single 
and multiple server transactions, which is not something which can 
be predicted accurately from a prototype file system. 
We began by refining the notion of a network filing system and 
deriving some criteria with which to assess such a system. It is 
appropriate to return to these criteria and reassess the proposed 
solutions. 
e 
The first criterion stated that the existence of the network 
filing system should have no implications for application programs. 
It should continue to be possible to write portable programs which 
are independent of whether they are run using a network filing 
system or a coresident filing system. 
This criterion is not difficult to satisfy. 	Run-time systems 
for high-level languages have rather stereotyped notions of files. 
This is because great care has already been taken to avoid 
operating system and filing system dependencies. 	If they are 
assumed to be textnamed, then the textname is just a character 
string of system dependent form. Files may be read and written 
sequentially, perhaps also randomly and perhaps by being mapped 
into the virtual memory space of the program. 
None of these requirements is hard to satisfy and the network 
filing system proposed certainly does this. The only dubious area 
is that of data representation within files if different client 
systems are all to be able to access the same file (at a level 
higher than raw bytes). 	This requires agreement amongst the 
designers of client operating systems about how such files are 
represented. 
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The efficiency criterion 
The next criterion was that access to the network filing system. 
should be about as fast as access to a coresiderit filing system 
implemented on a local disc. This criterion is difficult to assess 
without a genuine implementation to actually measure performance. 
However, we can examine the solutions proposed for excessive disc 
traffic or excessive computation requirement. 	Either of these 
would indicate probable performance problems. 
The data transfer primitives access individual pages from files. 
In itself this is an efficient operation. The consistency scheme, 
however, requires a file to be indirected through indices rather 
than be constructed from a small number of contiguous extents of 
disc. Large files further require multiple levels of index. This 
means that a disc page cache in each server is essential if 
accessing a page is not always to involve several disc transfers. 
The implementation has such a cache. 
Each page written to a file goes to a new place on disc. This 
means that locating and allocating unused pages must be very fast. 
Because of disc head latency, these pages should not be too widely 
scattered or otherwise the common operation of reading a file 
sequentially will be unnecessarily slow. The implementation uses a 
bitmap with a pointer to the last bit allocated. Since only single 
pages are allocated, the bitmaps never need extensive searching and 
so pages can be allocated quickly. 
The textnaxning scheme clearly requires a number of disc 
transfers to resolve a long pathname. However, most file textnames 
are single components resolved in a known directory such as the 
user's working directory or a directory of executable programs. 
The ability to concisely name such a directory with its internal 
filename means that the resolution of the directory textname need 
not be repeated. 
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The consistency scheme is efficient for the single server case. 
Hopefully, this will be the rule rather than the exception. The 
multiple server case requires two rounds of messages and some extra 
disc transfers. It does, however, seem to be faster than any other 
scheme proposed for commitment of multiple server transactions. 
This is partly because the time taken to perform digestion of old 
files is not counted as an overhead since it is not synchronised 
with client activity at all. 
Local discs are not used efficiently. 	Much of the traffic 
between a client and the filing system will be creating versions of 
files which will subsequently be updated further before they are 
ever accessed from another client. 	However, the existence of 
read-only files simplifies the caching of many frequently used 
files. 
Overall, the system proposed seems to be fairly efficient. 
There is little overhead on a single server transaction, and access 
to pages in files should be no less efficient than it is on Unix, 
where it is only seen as a problem by the largest database 
programs. 
The coherence criterion 
The next criterion was that the file servers should conspire to 
present the illusion of a single filing system and that the 
facilities available should not vary with file location. 
The data transfer primitives are weak in this area. Each client 
will get the same data upon accessing a file. Whether this is seen 
at the client as a representation of the same information depends 
on agreement amonst the designers of client operating systems about 
how data, especially text files, should be represented as bytes. 
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The scheme for naming files is coherent at both the textriaming 
level and the internal naming level, apart from the minor 
restriction connected with influenced volumes which is necessary to 
make the rediscovery of lost files tractable. 	Whether the full 
generality of the naming scheme is delivered to users by client 
systems may vary. For example, a client system may have no command 
to create multiple textnames for a file. However, it will still be 
able to access existing files through multiple textnames created in 
some other way. 
The security scheme is uniform across the network at the level 
of keys. 	Users should have (or not have) access to files 
independently of which client system they are using. At the very 
least, this requires agreement amonst client systems about how a 
character string password is transformed into a key. Changing of 
passwords is very poorly handled. 	To improve this requires 
authority servers of some sort. 
Making the consistency guarantees uniform across the network 
considerably complicates the implementation, especially in the area 
of crash recovery. 	In compensation, other areas of the 
implementation, such as the textnaxning, are much easier to 
implement because of the strong consistency guarantees. 
The uniformity of the network filing system proposed is good, 
but relies on a certain amount of cooperation from client operating 
systems. There is, unfortunately, no certainty that pre-existing 
client systems will be able to live with the standards which are 
needed. Further, there is no certainty that the primitives which 
the network filing system provides to clients will be sufficient 
for sophisticated client operating systems in the future. 
196 
The autonomy criterion. 
The autonomy criterion insists that the file servers comprising 
the network filing system are largely independent of each other. 
In particular, there should be no assumption about all the servers 
simultaneously being in any state. 
Only the textnaming and the consistency schemes are not 
completely autonomous. 	The textnaming scheme only requires 
coordination when creating and removing textnames; at these points, 
reference counts to files need to be udpated. Even this could be 
avoided by only destroying files when they are detected as lost 
after a garbage collection of the textnaming graph. 
The consistency scheme requires close cooperation only when 
committing (or aborting) a multiple server atomic transaction. It 
is in the nature of such a transaction that the file servers cannot 
operate independently at such a point. 
The autonomy of the file servers is thus good. 	They only 
cooperate when explicitly requested to by clients, and even then 
the cooperation is as minimal as possible. 
The ignorance criterion 
The design of the network filing system should not be predicated 
on clients' possessing extensive resources. 	However, the design 
should not hinder the use of such resources should the client, in 
fact, possess them. 	The network filing system has to remain 
ignorant of the facilities at clients. 
The data transfer primitives assume that clients can buffer a 
few pages from files since files can only be accessed starting on a 
page boundary. With a very large page size this could prove an 
embarassment. The implementation uses a page size of 512 bytes, so 
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buffering the current page of eight files requires only 4 kilobytes 
of store. 
There is an underlying assumption that client operating systems 
will be designed to exploit, rather than obstruct, the uniformity 
that the network filing system seeks to provide. 	If a client 
operating system does not cooperate in this way, it does not 
compromise the filing system but rather seriously reduces the 
ability to share files amongst different client systems. 	This 
assumption seems reasonable. A client system that stores files or 
uses security keys in an idiosyncratic way will not only hinder 
their export to other systems, but also hinder files being 
imported. To an extent, client systems have to compete for users 
in a network environment. If they are seen to be unreliable, or to 
make poor use of the facilities available over the network, then 
users may choose to run other systems. This fact should militate 
against client systems being too uncooperative. 
The distribution criterion 
There are many clients and few servers. This leads to the last 
criterion, that tasks should be implemented in clients if doing so 
would not compromise the guarantees of the network filing system. 
The data transfer primitives are in terms of raw data; any 
transformation of this data is done in client machines. The file 
servers have no concept of records, character codes and so on. 
The only other area where this criterion has much impact is in 
the implementation of the file textnaming scheme. Curiously, being 
able to implement the textnaming scheme in the clients depends on 
having a good security scheme and on having resistance against a 
crashing client system. Such a scheme means that textnaming can be 
implemented in client systems, in separate servers specially for 
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the purpose or in the file server machines themselves. Further, a 
mixture of all these approaches could be used since any 
synchronisation required in the textnaming scheme is provided by 
the locking of the transaction mechanism. 
It is unfortunate that there does not seem to be any simple 
scheme whereby the current copy of a file can be held on a local 
disc at a client system without the need to write it through. 
Simple solutions seem to have one of two faults. 	If the file 
server acknowledges the copy at the client as being the current 
version, then the strong consistency guarantees are violated if the 
client system should misbehave and lose the copy. Alternatively, 
if the file server does not acknowledge the copy at the client as 
current but rather as a tentative new version, then there is a need 
for long term locks. These are difficult to handle over crashes 
since it may be necessary to break them without enumerating them 
(for example, if a client system has a hardware failure which takes 
days to fix). 
There was no guarantee when the original criteria were outlined 
in chapter 2 that they would be simultaneously satisfiable. The 
prototype implementation has shown that, in the main, they are. 
Further assessment of the network filing system proposed 
requires a real implementation to be done. There are two areas 
where a prototype forms an inadequate basis for assessment. The 
first is performance. It is not possible to do more than estimate 
the deliverable bandwidth between a client system and a file. The 
other area which is hard to assess is the ease of use. Only by 
constructing real client systems with real users will the powers 
and weaknesses of the network filing system be laid bare. 
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Much of this thesis has been concerned with the compromises 
necessary to keep the servers of the network filing system as 
autonomous as possible, without breaking down the user's view of 
the filing system as a coherent whole. In particular, we started 
from a belief that it is undesirable, and probably also 
intractable, to perform any operation on the entire filing system. 
This has lead to an emphasis on preservation of consistency. 
Coresident and single server filing systems traditionally avoid 
the problems of consistency by two approaches. 	Firstly, they 
artificially restrict any consistency guarantees to the filing 
system structures themselves (level one consistency); they then 
further restrict even this consistency by strictly partitioning the 
filing systems into areas (usually disc volumes, but sometimes 
smaller partitions) which only need to be self-consistent rather 
than mutually consistent. The second avoidance tactic is to have a 
program which can regenerate consistency from a damaged filing 
system. Since each partition only needs to be self-consistent, 
this regeneration is tractable. 
Our original criteria that the facilities and guarantees should 
not vary with file location mean that the network filing system 
cannot be statically partitioned into independent areas. 	This 
means that regeneration of global consistency is not tractable. In 
any case, it is a design criterion that all servers need never be 
running siniultanously, so no consistency regeneration program could 
guarantee to scan the entire filing system anyway. Thus the only 
way to ensure consistency is never to lose it in the first place. 
This is, of course, not directly attainable and much of chapter 7 
was concerned with precisely what consistency means and how it can 
be preserved. 
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Once global consistency is guaranteed, it is much easier to 
implement other facets of the network filing system, and to 
implement client systems. Choosing among different file structures 
in an environment without consistency guarantees is often 
influenced more by what is not dangerous than by what would really 
be most appropriate. 
Most other schemes for the preservation of consistency have too 
large an overhead to be considered for a filing system. They do 
not trade cheapness in normal running for an expensive crash 
recovery. The new scheme proposed in chapters 7 and 9 has a much 
lower overhead. To some extent, this is because it trades time for 
space. Although fast, it uses up disc space. This disc space can 
be recovered quickly, if necessary, but the recovery time has not 
been included as an overhead of the scheme. It is assumed that 
file digestion will take place at off-peak times such as the middle 
of the night. In a very active filing system, this might require 
large amounts of disc space to act as a buffer during the day. 
Summarising, consistency in a network filing system is so 
important that a proper scheme for controlling it is a prerequisite 
for implementation of the other parts of the filing system (unless 
each part implements its own consistency scheme independently). 
The security schemes of other network filing systems have been 
shown to be lacking. Capability based schemes tie together naming 
and security at the lowest level, and it seems to be impossible to 
divorce them in the view of the filing system seen by client 
systems. Given a capability based scheme it is impossible to 
implement a textnaming scheme in which some files can be textnamed 
but not accessed, unless client systems are assumed to be secure 
and well-behaved. 
Access list security schemes seem unsuited to a highly 
distributed environment since they have the inherently global 
concept of a username and a way of validating identity. 	There 
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seems to be no easy way to implement these global concepts on a 
local basis. To some extent, the keys of the system proposed are 
just validated usernames with different powers; the fact that a 
user can have several means that it is not necessary to reveal a 
powerful one in order to be permitted access to a file. 
The textnaming scheme is more general than in other filing 
systems. To some extent this is because the proposed scheme would 
be too vulnerable to crashes without the strong consistency 
guarantees which are lacking in most filing systems. 
Unfortunately, the desire to reuse file pages impacts on the naming 
scheme, and special rules are required to handle lost files. In 
turn, this leads to further restrictions to make the garbage 
collection tractable and increase its locality. The textnaming can 
be implemented in client machines, but their freedom to implement 
other than the standard scheme is restricted by the insistence that 
every file have a standard textname. This is an improvement over 
other network filing systems, where the textnaming is either 
implemented in the file servers or else must be implemented in the 
client systems by a trusted program. In both cases, it is the lack 
of a proper security scheme which makes the textnaming problematic. 
The consistency, security and textnaming schemes are not 
independent. As we have seen, implementation of a textnaming 
scheme of any complexity requires consistency guarantees if 
directories are not going to be corrupted and files lost. To be 
able to devolve the textnaming to client systems requires a good 
security scheme since security must not be devolved at the same 
time. The existence of the networkmeans that consistency has to 
be properly controlled since a restart of the whole network is not 
an acceptable way to cope with the crash of a single site. This 
makes it possible to construct a filing system superior to existing 
ones (including coresident filing systems). 
202 
Further research 
The main failure of the design proposed, where further research 
is needed, is in the use of local discs for holding current 
versions of files, without compromising the strong guarantees of 
the filing system. The overhead of not being able to do this can 
be large, especially for the vast majority of files for which 
attempted concurrent access is unlikely. 	In any sort of design 
cycle, whether designing integrated circuits, newspaper pages or 
programs, files are accessed only by their creator before they are 
superseded by a new version. It is unnecessary to despatch this 
version to a file server if it is not going to be accessed. 
Atomic transactions, as described in chapter 7, are completely 
independent. However, there is nothing to prevent a client program 
from starting more than one transaction. 	These cannot share 
exclusive locks since the filing system assumes that they are 
competing against each other, rather than working towards a common 
goal. If the client system lets the transactions share such locks, 
so that one transaction is allowed to see the data of the other, 
then all the consistency guarantees are void. 	If a transaction 
commits after accessing data by routes unknown to the filing 
system, then the strong guarantees about being able to see a 
consistent view of a set of files can be invalid. 	Clearly, the 
seriaJ.isability of transactions is too strong a condition under 
these circumstances, but suitable weaker conditions are elusive. 
The design of a network filing system is one example of a 
general problem. How can a global abstraction be constructed from, 
local implementations? 	As well as provision of services on 
networks, there is some commonality with parallelism in 
computation, where a large program is executed by a number of small 
processors [A3E78], and with large designs (such as space-craft or 
integrated circuits) where a number of largely independent 
designers work together to achieve a goal. There is possibly some 
general theory about how to partition such a task among the maximum 
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number. of largely autonomous agents. If there are too few, then 
the task is excessively centralised at some of them; too many, and 
the autonomy is lost by the excessive communication required to 
synchronise them. Many of the criteria derived in chapter 2 are 
concerned with attempting to increase both the functional 
distribution and the autonomy. 	It is an open question whether 
there are any universal results about how to assess this balance. 
It is possible to implement a network filing system on a large 
inhomogeneous open network in such a way that the facilities are 
globally available independent of location, but without sacrificing 
the efficiency which comes from largely independent local 
implementations. This can be done without the requirement to trust 
client systems, and without assuming that file servers will never 
crash, and without requiring unacceptably complex client systems. 
The basis for such an implementation has to be the effective 
control of the consistency of files. 
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